Some predict partition, others federalism or fragmentation. Amidst the competing interests of Arab states, Russia, the US, Israel, Iran, Türkiye, and Europe, Syria treads its own path
The toppling of Bashar al-Assad from Syria has left the country in the hands of those who forced it, but the state is broken, and millions who left are still to return. As the interim rulers seek to rebuild the political and economic apparatus, ministers in Damascus are having to manage several powerful and competing interests.
Foreign states with an interest in Syria’s development include the United States, Russia, Iran, Israel, Türkiye, and a raft of Arab and Gulf states. Many of them want and envisage different things. Some align with Syria’s best interests, others do not.
For his part, US President Donald Trump reportedly predicts partition. Meanwhile, Israel pushes for federalism; Iran eyes fragmentation; Arab states seek regional stability; Russia wants to retain and secure its naval and military bases, and Türkiye wants the armed Kurdish groups on its southern border gone.
How Damascus navigates these competing visions will be key to its future. This is an in-depth look at the various parties’ interests after Al Majalla spoke in confidence to several well-placed diplomats from countries with a seat at the table.
United States
In December and January, in the final days of Joe Biden’s presidency, Washington initiated dialogue with Syria’s new leadership. Senior State Department official Barbara Leaf met Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, while other US diplomats spoke to Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani.
There were some early decisions, such as the temporary six-month sanctions relief on select Syrian sectors, but with Donald Trump’s return to office, two different sets of thinking emerged about US-Syrian relations.
One camp in Trump's administration is of the mind that the US should not engage with Syria's new rulers; the other supports "conditional engagement"
One camp in the Trump administration is of the mind that the US should not be engaging with al-Sharaa, al-Shaibani et al. They point to the men's past links to Al-Qaeda, cite the legacy of the Iraq War and the 9/11 attacks, and/or have personal associations with the Assad regime, such as with National Intelligence Director Tulsi Gabbard. This group also opposes cooperation with Syria's reconstituted army in the fight against Islamic State (IS).
The other camp supports "conditional engagement" with Damascus on a step-for-step approach that builds confidence by meeting defined commitments. Those commitments might include the formation of an inclusive government, establishing a professional national army, expelling all foreign fighters, dismantling Assad's chemical weapons programme, combating IS, expelling Iranian 'advisors,' severing Hezbollah's supply routes, and serving Russia's bases an eviction notice.
Washington has indicated its willingness to gradually ease sanctions on specific sectors, potentially leading to full removal—including the Caesar Act, the Syria Accountability Act, and terrorism-related sanctions—by the end of Trump's term. Some date back to 1979. Yet, Syria remains a relatively low priority on Trump's foreign policy agenda.
A comprehensive policy review is underway across US institutions to formulate a cohesive strategy. In a private meeting, Trump reportedly said Syria would ultimately be divided into three zones, each controlled by foreign powers such as Israel and Türkiye, while underscoring the need to maintain counter-terrorism efforts.
He alluded to a potential US withdrawal from north-east Syria, prompting the Pentagon to begin drafting a six-month exit plan, yet at the same time, Washington has intensified its support for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi, encouraging him to pursue a negotiated settlement with President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi during the signing of the agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, Damascus, March 10, 2025.
To be sure, Israel is actively working to shape Trump's policies to ensure its strategic interests are prioritised. There are indications that Washington largely supports Israel's position on post-Assad Syria, which is through a prism of national security imperatives. Its chief goal is ridding Syria of Iranian influence and destroying its military capabilities to ensure it does not turn around and use them against Israel. It has already done the latter in the immediate aftermath of Assad's fall.
On 7 December, as al-Sharaa's troops prepared to take Damascus, around 350 Israeli aircraft flew into Syria, hitting 320 targets in 48 hours. They destroyed around 80% of the Syrian army's capabilities. Airfields and weapons production sites in Damascus, Homs, Tartus, Latakia and Palmyra were hit, and 90% of Syria's identified surface-to-air missile batteries were destroyed.
Israel also took over the buffer zone in the occupied Golan Heights and seized the summit of Mount Hermon along with vital water resources. It would like to see a federalist—or highly decentralised—political system emerge in Syria, with a southern zone that encompasses Sweida and Daraa, an eastern region administered by the SDF, and a western Alawite enclave.
This would isolate the central Sunni-Arab heartland from neighbouring states (such as Israel) and deny it vital access to the Mediterranean Sea. Needless to say, Syria's current Sunni-Arab rulers reject it outright.
Regardless, Netanyahu is said to be pushing the federalism plan in Washington and elsewhere, which has raised alarms among Arab and Turkish leaders, triggered indirect monitoring from Tehran, and attracted close scrutiny from Moscow. Meanwhile, European governments are keeping a close watch.
Israel's federalist plan for Syria would isolate the central Sunni-Arab heartland from neighbouring states and deny it vital access to the Mediterranean Sea
Russia
When Russian President Vladimir Putin recognised that the Syrian regime was nearing its end—particularly after President Bashar al-Assad spurned the Kremlin's insistence to meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—Moscow began coordinating with Ankara to manage the regime's final days.
The objective was to minimise Russia's strategic losses while shielding Damascus and loyalist elements from destruction or retribution. In the end, the transition was executed with minimal disruption to cities, civilians, and regime supporters.
Russia's military installations at Hmeimim and Tartus were left intact by Syria's new rulers, who issued public statements reaffirming Syria's historical ties with Moscow. Russian presidential envoy Mikhail Bogdanov soon visited Damascus to meet al-Sharaa, who had spoken to Putin by phone.
They had much to discuss, not least the supply of Russian arms, the extradition of al-Assad and other officials accused of war crimes, the future status of its military bases, its role in Syria's reconstruction, financial compensation through aid and Russian-printed currency for Moscow's involvement in suppressing the Syrian uprising, and the resolution of Russia's longstanding debts to Syria.
Putin said Russia would not extradite Assad, who has been granted political asylum and who many feel should "meet a Russian-style end," but he did signal a readiness to provide Syria with military support, contribute to its reconstruction, and withdraw its forces "immediately, should Damascus request it".
Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa (R), and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, posing for a picture during their meeting in Damascus on January 29, 2025.
For its part, Damascus expressed openness to re-evaluating the terms of Russia's military presence, and negotiations are ongoing, even as Moscow explores alternative strategic footholds in the region, including plans to establish military bases in Port Sudan and Libya, part of a broader effort to bolster Russian influence in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and Africa.
Interestingly, it has emerged that Israel is in favour of Russia's continued military presence in Syria as a counterbalance to Turkish influence and has been lobbying Washington to this end. Both Russia and Israel have reason to want an autonomous Alawite region to be formally established, comprising Latakia and Tartus, where Russia has its bases.
This would have something of a historical precedent. In September 1920, shortly after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the French divided Syria and Lebanon into territories, granting local autonomy to these demographic regions. One was 'the Territory of the Alawis'. Noting that the Alawites were religiously distinct, it was intended to protect them from Syria's more powerful majorities.
When remnants of the former Assad regime launched an ambush on government forces in Syria's coastal areas earlier this month, the result was bloodshed. Within three days, more than 1,000 people had been killed as the forces that defeated Assad's army descended on the coast in response. Moscow may have leveraged the uprising to press the new Damascus leadership while simultaneously keeping its options open.
Israel is in favour of Russia's continued military presence in Syria as a counterbalance to Turkish influence
Iran and Iraq
For years, Iran had an ally in Bashar al-Assad, whose regime it supported in 2011 when it sent its Lebonon-based proxy Hezbollah to fight alongside Assad's forces. Syria was Iran's supply route for Hezbollah, whose arsenal of weapons it slowly built. A generational project that began decades ago, this was Iran's first line of defence.
Tehran has not accepted the new reality of 'losing' Syria, yet it has also lost influence in Lebanon and Iraq, meaning that its leverage against Israel through the Lebanese and Syrian fronts is now greatly reduced. All indications suggest that Iran's latest strategy is to pursue Syrian fragmentation, hoping that—in time—this will let it regain a foothold.
As part of these efforts, Iran is trying to rebuild connections with figures from the former Syrian regime, including Brig. Gen. Ghiyath Dalla, who commanded the Al-Ghaith Forces within the Fourth Division under Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad's brother. Dalla previously served as a liaison officer between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah.
Maher al-Assad, who was known to prefer Iran as Syria's principal ally (over Russia), fled to Iraq on 8 December 2024, along with leaders of Iranian-backed militias, with reports indicating that he later moved to Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan. His current whereabouts are unknown.
Iran is suspected of involvement in the recent coastal rebellion and has pressed the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) to move toward the Syrian border, eager to utilise these forces in Syria. Iran has also been working to exert pressure on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to stir up Arab tribes east of the Euphrates, encouraging them to attack the new Syrian administration.
In an interview with Al Majalla, however, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi denied these allegations, saying: "There will be no future ties with Iran. We are currently focused on integrating into the new administration and engaging in political talks rather than acting as an opposition force, as some have accused us" (SDF leaders signed an agreement in principle with al-Sharaa in Damascus on 10 March).
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) and Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa shake hands during a joint press conference following their meeting at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, on February 4, 2025.
Türkiye
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was cautious about the Sharaa-Abdi agreement, with concerns in Ankara about the coastal rebellion and the accompanying violations, as well as reports of confidential US discussions about a possible withdrawal from north-eastern Syria within six months.
Erdoğan's top priority is to disband the armed Kurdish groups in Syria, which authorities in Türkiye claim to have links to the Kurdish terrorist group, the PKK. Yet in recent weeks, Ankara appears to have reached a new understanding with the PKK, after its jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan called for the group to lay down its arms.
These dynamics prompted al-Sharaa and Abdi to embrace US-French mediation and sign the integration agreement—though its full implementation will require protracted negotiations and a detailed roadmap. Abdi can claim to have achieved a historic breakthrough by "opening a presidential channel for discussing Kurdish rights for the first time in Syria's history".
Likewise, al-Sharaa has laid the groundwork for reuniting and rebuilding the nation after more than a decade of fragmentation, with Türkiye now working to implement the Sharaa-Abdi agreement, which seeks to dismantle the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration and prevent the establishment of any Kurdish political entity.
The plan includes integrating north-eastern Syria into a unified Syrian state, disbanding the People's Defence Units (YPG)'s heavy military infrastructure, and expelling PKK-affiliated leaders from positions of authority within the YPG.
Beyond the Kurdish question, Ankara is leveraging its ties with al-Sharaa and his Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group to expand its influence within Syria and across the wider region both economically, militarily, and politically. Historically, Syria has been Türkiye's bridge to the Arab world, but Ankara's growing involvement has left some Arab powers wary of its expanding regional footprint.
Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara poses for a group photo at the Arab Summit in Cairo on March 4, 2025.
EU and Arab states
Since the collapse of al-Assad's regime, leading Arab states have engaged with the new Syrian administration, aiming to forge a renewed relationship. A key objective is to capitalise on Iran's loss of an ally. Other aims include curbing Syria's dependence on Türkiye. A common theme among Arab states is a need to ensure stability.
However, Arab engagement is not straightforward, given that international sanctions remain in place. While the US has authorised limited relief—such as facilitating gas supplies to ease Syria's electricity crisis and granting exemptions in exchange for access to chemical weapons stockpiles—it hesitates to allow big financial transfers or to reintegrate Syria into the global banking system.
In response, Arab states have adopted a cautious approach, granting Damascus time, offering guidance, and coordinating diplomatically with Western capitals to identify realistic ways for Syria to rebuild and reintegrate. There is an urgency for stability, given the events in Syria's coastal region from 6-10 March, which served as a stark warning.
Given that the Assad regime had been in power for 54 years, and given the brutality of its suppression of opposition, it was remarkable that the transition occurred with minimal bloodshed, due in large part to the discipline of fighters with HTS and other factions. But after al-Assad fell, there were always questions as to whether that discipline would continue, given changes in the chain of command as the country transitioned.
The violence and bloodshed between pro-regime remnants and fighters who ousted Assad have led to concern in European capitals over minority protection, given that hundreds of Alawites (including non-combatants) were killed. Paris postponed high-level talks with Syrian officials while other capitals delayed the reopening of embassies.
Beyond the immediate instability, however, the situation highlighted the broader risk of Syria's fragmentation, with uncontrollable spillover effects, including the spread of jihadist elements throughout the region and beyond.
Iran's latest strategy is to pursue Syrian fragmentation, hoping that—in time—this will let it regain a foothold
Looking ahead
Syria's new leaders face several formidable and urgent challenges not only related to security but to infrastructure, as they seek to restore essential services like electricity. Sanctions and dwindling foreign aid run counter to steadily rising public expectations. Aid is largely in-kind and subject to the constraints of Western banking systems.
Some suggest printing money, potentially with support from Moscow, as the Syrian diaspora and regional allies continue to lobby Washington for sanctions relief. In Brussels on 17 March, states pledged $6bn (since 2011, the European Union and its member states have mobilised almost $40bn in aid for Syria and neighbouring states).
At the Brussels conference, there was a growing consensus that supporting Syria's new administration is far less costly than isolating it. France has become a leading voice of support. The focus is on long-term solutions, the provision of humanitarian aid, and the prosecution and punishment of those responsible for killing civilians.
It aligns with the focus in Damascus, where Syria's leadership is consulting foreign powers but ultimately working to advance its own national vision. In response to the killings near the coast, al-Sharaa established an investigative committee, a national reconciliation council, and issued a constitutional declaration.
There were mixed reactions. Some were positive, others questioned their inclusivity and called for more transparent engagement with the country's regions. Yet at the heart of the Damascus strategy is a firm rejection of partition and federalism. Al-Sharaa's government prioritises the formation of a unified national army, a cohesive government, and stable state institutions, all underpinned by a commitment to national reconciliation.
The Sharaa-Abdi agreement reflected this approach, symbolising a shift toward a cohesive national framework. Further reciprocal measures are expected between Damascus and forces in Syria's south, north, and west, aimed at countering the influence of foreign agendas.
Ultimately, Syria's future remains contested ground, shaped by the clash between internal and external forces, each wielding its own tools, alliances, and strategies to determine the country's trajectory.
