The implications of expanded Syria-Türkiye military ties

Israel has made clear its objection to Turkish military bases in Syria. Could a recently signed MOU between Ankara and Damascus to boost security cooperation threaten Türkiye's good ties with the US?

Syrian Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra and Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler hold up an MOU on security cooperation in Ankara on August 13, 2025.
Syrian Foreign Ministry
Syrian Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra and Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler hold up an MOU on security cooperation in Ankara on August 13, 2025.

The implications of expanded Syria-Türkiye military ties

Diplomatic activity within and about Syria is currently running at a frenzied pace, as parties both internal and external jostle for position, ahead of what some suspect may be pending clashes between the Syrian government and Syria’s Kurds, well-armed and trained mostly by the US throughout the years.

There had been hopes of calm after the violence on the coast in March and the south, around Sweida, in July, but a recent conference held by the Kurdish-led SDF, which senior Druze and Alawite leaders also attended virtually, has rattled Ankara.

Druze leader Hikmet al-Hijri and Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, a spiritual leader of the Alawite minority, both agreed at the ‘Joint Position Conference’ held in al-Hasaka on 8 August that Syria should now be governed through a decentralised system, with autonomous areas allowing their armed groups to remain armed.

Recent developments suggest that Syria’s new government may not in fact be able to convince its disparate factions to unite, as many had hoped. For Türkiye, Syria’s neighbour to the north, armed autonomous Kurdish groups on its border are a red line and cannot be allowed. Meanwhile, Israel, Syria’s neighbour to the south, opposes a strong centralised government in Damascus that could supplant the autonomy of the Druze and other minorities.

Cue the diplomacy

There is intense traffic both in the military sphere and in the diplomatic arena. In reaction to the outcome of the meeting in al-Hasaka, the Syrian government said it would not participate in any meeting with the Kurds anywhere other than Damascus (Paris had been suggested by the SDF).

In parallel, the Syrian army has been deployed to some areas in the oil-rich north-east of the country that the SDF controls. The SDF’s armed wing is the YPG, which Türkiye considers to be linked to the terrorist group, the PKK. Clashes have already been reported along the Euphrates and in Deir el-Zor.

AFP
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani, accompanied by General Intelligence Service Director Hussein al-Salama and Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, meet with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara, on August 13, 2025.

On 7 August, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Damascus to meet Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and President Ahmed al-Sharaa. A week later, there was a return visit comprising al-Shaibani, Syria’s Defence Minister Maj. Gen. Murhaf Abu Qasra, and Syria’s Director of the General Intelligence Service, Hussein al-Salama

In Ankara, the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on “joint training and consulting” of their armed forces. Türkiye is offering to develop and modernise the Syrian army’s capabilities. This includes exchanges of military personnel and specialised training in counter-terrorism, mine clearance, logistics, and peacekeeping. At the press conference, Fidan did not pull his punches.

He stated that the SDF had not fulfilled the commitments it undertook when signing an agreement with al-Sharaa and the Syrian government on 10 March 2025. He accused the Kurdish-led group of stalling and Israel of stirring up trouble in Syria. He said Türkiye would not be deceived, hinting at armed options if the situation did not change. Likewise, al-Shaibani said Israeli attacks on Syria were directed at Syrian sovereignty, adding that Tel Aviv sought to provoke sectarian conflict within Syria.

Key to unlocking these tensions may be the United States. President Donald Trump enjoys good relations with both Erdoğan and Netanyahu.

Trust deficiencies

Al-Sharaa's administration has promised legal and administrative protection for Syrian minorities, but nearly nine months after ousting Bashar al-Assad, no concrete steps have been taken in this regard. This fuels minorities' distrust of al-Sharaa's Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which has a Salafist past, and whose fighters have been filmed on occasion summarily executing unarmed civilians of Syrian minorities since taking power.

For Syria's Kurds, who have had a decade of support from the Pentagon, it seems that their autonomy will not be given up lightly, and they have stated from the outset that a return to life as it was before Syria's civil war in 2011 is not an option. They demand self-government, the preservation of their armed structures, a share of the natural resources, and recognition of Kurdish as an official language. Druze and Alawite leaders have made similar demands.

For Damascus and Ankara, this is a red line. The state must have one unified army, so both governments think Syria's armed groups must disarm and disband voluntarily (integrating into the national army) or be disarmed by force if no agreement can be reached. This equation introduces external actors, with Israel, Türkiye, the US, and some Arab states keen to shape developments in line with their own interests.

Israel does not trust al-Sharaa and HTS, which grew out of Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra and was, until recently, considered a terrorist outfit in the US and Europe. Israel thinks HTS is implementing 'Hudna,' a temporary ceasefire to allow for preparations ahead of the main battle, and that they will train their guns on Israel when they feel strong enough. As such, Israel wants a weak and fragmented Syria, so it is supporting minority groups to distance themselves from the central government.

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The "Unity of Position" conference, held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Hasakah on August 8, 2025.

No good options

For Türkiye, a decentralised system of governance would give Kurds a privileged status. This would have consequences for the Turkish political landscape. With the PKK announcing that it is ready to disarm, and with the possibility of an amended constitution in the pipeline, this is a delicate time for Türkiye, for whom a renewed civil war in Syria, and the country's possible division, would be bad news. Even worse would be the direct involvement of regional powers in such a war, including Türkiye and Israel.

Suspicions abound. Tel Aviv thinks Ankara actively supported Hamas and wants to use Syria to threaten it. Türkiye, on the other hand, believes that Israel is using the Kurds against it and is forming alliances with Greece and the Greek Cypriots in the eastern Mediterranean to stir trouble.

This mutual lack of trust has been 15 years in the making. Today, relations are at their worst, not least over Gaza. It is well known that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu despise each other both personally and ideologically, and Netanyahu's statements outlining expansionist aims are being taken as a direct threat also in Türkiye. For Israel, Türkiye's influence in Syria has simply replaced Iran's influence during Bashar al-Assad's presidency. Tel Aviv worries that Ankara may be an even bigger threat than Tehran.

Key to unlocking these tensions and guiding developments may be the United States. President Donald Trump enjoys good relations with both Erdoğan and Netanyahu, and Trump's decision to support the Syrian government of al-Sharaa has, for now at least, drawn a line in the sand, signalling to both Tel Aviv and Ankara that the new regime in Damascus is to be given a chance to set Syria on a new path.

AFP
Türkiye's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) and US President Donald Trump (L) meeting on the NATO Heads of State and Government summit in The Hague on June 24, 2025.

Risk of war

Trump's envoy Tom Barrack is working intensively to find solutions to the disputes in Syria, while Washington seeks to keep Türkiye and Israel from coming to blows, with fevered behind-the-scenes diplomacy said to be taking place, but Israel is clearly opposed to the establishment of Turkish military bases in Syria and bombed a few airbases earlier this year to make the point.

Whether Ankara and Damascus push this into fruition within the framework of their military cooperation—and how Israel reacts—will be a serious test. Türkiye-US relations have improved since Trump's second term, with Erdoğan and Trump known to get on well, but the US president is also known for his changing sentiments. Ankara will know that things can change at any moment.

Top-level Turkish officials have publicly declared several times that Türkiye will not ignore requests from Damascus for support in the event of internal or external interventions. Any military intervention by Türkiye in Syria risks putting it at odds with Washington and having a negative impact on the ailing Turkish economy. But Israel, whose allies are beginning to withdraw their support over Gaza, is also stretched on several fronts, and would face serious risks in case of a direct confrontation.

Despite their shared antipathy, Israel and Türkiye still have more reasons not to fight. Yet with so many actors with conflicting interests in such a tight area, there is always a risk that events spiral out of control. Barrack et al have their work cut out.

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