Down but not out: Russia adapts to new regional landscape
Despite the fall of its long-time ally in Syria, Russia isn't retreating; it is adjusting—leveraging military assets and transactional diplomacy to pursue its strategic interests across the region
Reuters
Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa (R), and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, posing for a picture during their meeting in Damascus on January 29, 2025.
Down but not out: Russia adapts to new regional landscape
Russia is working to secure its strategic foothold in Syria despite the overthrow of long-time ally Bashar al-Assad – a moment that at first appeared to be a strategic setback for the country.
Last week, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Special Envoy to the Middle East and Africa, led the first official Russian delegation to Damascus since al-Assad was toppled. The visit, which included talks with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani about the future of Russian military assets in Syria, underscores Moscow’s determination to maintain its strategic presence in the country.
Moscow remains an influential player – not only in Syria but also in the Middle East. The region continues to provide Russia with plenty of opportunities to progress its strategic interests: projecting power, checking the US and EU, and championing the Global South.
The nature of its engagement in the region has shifted since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It sees the Middle East as a source of funding, fighters, and weaponry, and its pragmatic and transactional approach resonates soundly with state and non-state actors it engages with. It has established a strategic partnership with Iran, is striving to retain a foothold in Syria, has cultivated valuable transactional ties in Libya, and has deepened its engagement in Yemen with the Houthis.
Pundits predicted Russia's influence in the Middle East would wane after al-Assad's fall, but its diplomatic, political and financial investments are long-standing and deep
Lost posture?
In the immediate aftermath of al-Assad's ouster, many commentators questioned whether Russia's strategic posture in Syria was lost forever. After all, Moscow stepped in, saved the regime in September 2015, and gave it full backing. Russian aircraft not only targeted opposition groups, including HTS and its forerunners but deliberately bombed civilian infrastructure.
Moscow also provided al-Assad with a diplomatic pass after he was blamed for using chemical weapons against his own population. As such, Russia, along with the regime and Iran, became the number one enemy among Syrians opposed to the regime.
Nevertheless, the focusing of energies on Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)'s taking of Damascus, establishing governance, and consolidating power, gave Russia a reprieve. It instructed its forces to return to base and hunkered down.
Russia has invested heavily in its Syrian relationship and will not walk away. At present, it operates an air base at Khmeimim, as well as a naval facility at Tartus – which serves as a key hub for Moscow's operations in Libya and the Red Sea and for its Africa Corps operations in Sudan and West Africa.
Russian soldiers stand aboard a ship at the Russian naval base in the Syrian Mediterranean port of Tartus on September 26, 2019.
Moscow moved quickly to open dialogue with Syria's new leadership, deploying a high-level delegation to seek assurances that its strategic assets will remain under Russian control. No agreement between the two sides was reached, but Syrian officials set out the conditions for a reset in relations, which included compensation, reconstruction aid, and financial relief.
Russia's engagement with Syria's new leadership is fraught with complications; however, it has found in President Ahmed al-Sharaa a pragmatist who is willing – for the time being – for Russia to keep its presence in the country.
However, this will be on al-Sharaa's terms and might entail Moscow accepting a Syria-Turkish defence pact, which establishes Turkish airbases and sees Ankara training Syria's new army. Such a move would be an unpalatable compromise for Russia, but it has managed to retain its position by hunkering down, weathering the storm, and waiting for time to pass.
Libya: A strategic opportunity
Al-Assad's departure from Damascus has also renewed attention on Russian activity in Libya. A key node in Moscow's Mediterranean ambitions, Libya is yet another theatre in which Moscow is capitalising on fractured domestic politics to secure its strategic interests and project power. The North African country is an entry point into the broader continent – where Russia is pursuing increased influence via the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) – and offers both military and economic opportunities.
Moscow has most notably provided financial, tactical and military support to the East's General Khalifa Haftar – but has thus far been unable to translate this into anything beyond a transactional relationship.
Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov (2-R) received Khalifa Haftar (C) at a Moscow military airfield on September 26, 2023.
It is true that Haftar has relied on Moscow for goods and services – such as counterfeit dinar printed in Russia – but his refusal to become beholden to the Kremlin and his choice to engage with multiple actors, from Turkey to China to the US, shows that he is pragmatic and unwilling to be tied to one major power.
However, Russia will be well positioned to take advantage should a leadership battle ensue in the event of Haftar's death by offering to support his successor (one of Haftar's sons). Moscow can offer formal ties and recognition in exchange for establishing Russian military bases and winning valuable oil concessions.
In the immediate term, though, Russia will continue its quest to establish military bases in eastern and potentially southern Libya, and if Haftar manages to secure tangible gains from Moscow, such as sustained financial and military support, then it may just succeed.
Yemen: A tactical shift
Moscow has shifted its approach to Yemen in the wake of the Israel-Gaza conflict. While it previously pursued a "non-aligned" approach, engaging with all actors across the political scene, since 2023, it has stepped up its interactions with the Iran-backed Houthi movement.
The timing coincides with Putin's push to undermine US influence, drain it in other theatres, and distract it from the war in Ukraine. Houthi activities in the Red Sea offer Moscow an opportunity to leverage its ties with Iran in pursuit of these aims.
A Houthi helicopter flies over the cargo ship Galaxy Leader as Houthi fighters walk on the deck of the ship in the Red Sea, on 20 November 2023.
Although Russia is planning to reopen its embassy in Aden early this year and is pledging support for the internationally recognised Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), it has been accused of simultaneously aiding the Houthis, both diplomatically and tactically. US officials claim Moscow, via Iran, provided the Houthi movement with tracking data to better enable its Red Sea operations while ensuring Russian vessels can pass through the waterway uninhibited.
It is also accused of entering discussions on providing weaponry to the Houthis, sending military intelligence (GRU) advisors to assist them and using the group to recruit Yemeni mercenaries to fight on its behalf in Ukraine. Politically, Moscow abstained from a January 2024 UN resolution condemning Houthi attacks on commercial vessels and later questioned the legality of US and UK strikes against Houthi infrastructure.
Adapting to new realities
Pundits predicted Russia's influence in the Middle East would wane after al-Assad's fall. However, Moscow's diplomatic, political and financial investments are long-standing and deep, allowing President Putin to change tactics and ensure that Russia remains an important external power. To a certain extent, its approach echoes Iranian policy, as it is comfortable working with both state and non-state actors to pursue its interests.
