Will Öcalan’s call for the PKK to disband be heeded?

Cautious welcome

For its part, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling AK Party welcomed it cautiously, saying the proof would be its actions to follow.

Kurdish armed groups are based in north-eastern Syria and northern Iraq. The rest of the PKK leadership, which is based in the Qandil Mountains near the Iran-Iraq border, has yet to comment, but has previously noted that Öcalan's life sentence and decades-long confinement mean that he cannot exercise his free will.

Öcalan called on the PKK to convene its congress and formally take the decisions along his directives, but some in Türkiye are wary. The nationalist IYI Party and the Victory Party, for instance, said nothing good could come out of Öcalan and the PKK. For its part, the CHP, the main opposition party, is not negative but cautiously distant.

There has been no comment yet from Bahçeli or his MHP. He underwent surgery three weeks ago and no one has heard from him since. Although the MHP has said he is well and resting, there are rumours that he remains in intensive care. 

Lack of transparency

The general lack of transparency over this process has frustrated some Turks, who are eager to learn of progress. Yet there is no doubting the size of the opportunity to end PKK terrorism, which has been Türkiye's biggest problem for decades.

Despite Öcalan's call to disarm, there are many unanswered questions, such as: what is the Kurdish leader hoping to get in return? Will PKK militants who lay down their arms be granted an amnesty and allowed to return home, or will they be arrested and tried for past offences?

More broadly, what of the Kurdish fight for recognition? Will the new constitution currently being drafted by the AK Party give Türkiye's Kurds special rights? Will Kurdish be recognised as an official language? Will Kurdish children get the right to an education in their mother tongue? Will there be some form of local governance? 

Although the PKK originally sought an independent Kurdish state, in 2005 Öcalan reformulated the objectives of the Kurdish movement to establish an autonomous, democratic, and decentralised entity within the Turkish state, something that has been called 'confederalism'.

Öcalan loyalists say he still speaks for the entire organisation, that no one can overrule him, and that the PKK will follow his instructions. But although many in Qandil still see Öcalan as their leader, they say he is far from the realities of the field and is thus unable to express a sound opinion, because of his imprisonment. This makes it possible that his call will go unanswered, or that it will be answered by some but not others, facilitating a split in the PKK ranks.

Wider impact

The outcome will impact armed Kurds in Syria, known as the YPG. Türkiye believes the YPG is an extension of the PKK and has fought against it for years. Some think that if the PKK disarms, the YPG may do the same. Others think that the YPG will continue to exist, within the dynamics of Syria.  For now, the latter appears more likely:

YPG commander Mazlum Abdi reportedly said Öcalan's statement does not include the YPG. Abdi is currently in negotiations with the interim government in Damascus, led by Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. He wants to bring all of Syria under the control of a national Syrian government and a national Syrian army, which he wants the Kurds to be part of, but Abdi wants a continuation of autonomous Kurdish rule. 

There are also other dimensions to the continuation of armed Kurdish conflict, given that Israel is strongly suspected of using the YPG/PKK as leverage against Türkiye, given Erdogan's condemnation of Israeli actions. 

All eyes on PKK response

All eyes are now on the PKK response. Bahçeli's olive branch last year was the first big step in the process of solving the Kurdish issue. Öcalan's call is now the second. Many suspect that the PKK  will convene to decide whether to dissolve itself, in line with Öcalan's call. If it does, that will be the third.

Then, it will be time to talk about all the details, which are expected to be difficult. Erdoğan, whose biggest problems are currently economic, knows that the prize of Kurdish terrorists laying down their arms is huge. 

Presidential and parliamentary elections are three years away and according to the constitution, Erdoğan cannot run again, unless the constitution is changed. To do so, he needs the support of the DEM.  Many, including Kurds, think that is a major motivator for him.

There were similar peace initiatives before. In September 1999, the PKK declared a ceasefire, but this ended in 2004 and clashes resumed. In March 2013, Öcalan announced the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkish territory and an end to the armed struggle, but in October 2014, Islamic State (IS) forces attacked Kobani in Syria and the Kurds reacted, prompting renewed fighting between Turkish security forces and the PKK.

Experienced Turkish politicians, who—like Erdogan—would welcome a lasting peace, likewise know there have been several false dawns in the past. This explains why, although they remain hopeful, they are not (yet) holding their breath.