Mazloum Abdi agrees to merge the SDF into Syria's state army

There was a round of negotiations on 29 December. You travelled to Damascus and met with al-Sharaa. Could you provide more details about those discussions?

This was my first visit and my first meeting with al-Sharaa. The situation was still evolving, and our goal was to understand the new administration's perspective while also presenting and briefing them on our position.

Given that this was an initial meeting, we regarded it as a positive step. At the very least, both parties gained insight into each other's viewpoints and concerns. Fundamentally, we agreed during the meeting to continue negotiations. There are no disputes over the core principles—we are aligned on the broader framework.

And these principles are?

Syria's territorial integrity, the formation of a unified army, a single institutional framework, one capital, and one flag – these are fundamental and sovereign matters.

However, many details remain unresolved, particularly concerning implementation mechanisms, timelines, and logistical considerations. Differences persist in the specifics and our respective perspectives.

We agreed to continue negotiations and dialogue until these issues are settled. From this standpoint, we considered the meeting constructive.

During our discussions, we also addressed Afrin and the return of displaced residents. We received assurances and commitments regarding their return and have observed these promises being fulfilled—something we welcome.

Was the promise to return displaced people fulfilled?

At the very least, this marks a significant development for the Kurdish people, with no fewer than 200,000 displaced individuals returning to their areas. The issue was raised, and the same commitments were reaffirmed to the people of Afrin during al-Sharaa's visit to the city—a step we consider positive.

You said you agree on the fundamental principles. Can you elaborate?

I will be frank. The key military-related points include the establishment of a unified national army, integrating institutions, and returning state institutions—or the state as a whole—to our regions. We have been disconnected from the Syrian interior for 12 years, and reintegrating is important to us.

Regarding administrative, military, and security issues, we are aligned within the framework of a unified Syria while preserving its existing borders. There are areas of agreement, but the mechanisms for implementation and timing still require discussion and evaluation.

My sources tell me the SDF must integrate as individuals rather than as a collective entity, the AANES must be dissolved, strategic natural resources must be placed under state control, and all foreign fighters within the SDF must leave Syria. Is this true?

Our primary focus is on achieving results and ensuring that the ongoing dialogue and negotiations succeed. The details of these matters remain open for discussion.

As for the army, I believe there is currently a structured approach being followed for its reorganisation, and as the SDF, we are fully committed to adhering to the fundamental principles guiding this process. This region has distinct circumstances, which we will address during discussions on integrating military institutions. The military aspect requires careful deliberation, particularly regarding implementation mechanisms and timelines. 

When I interviewed the minister of defence, Major General Murhaf Abu Qasra, he said he had a plan to restructure the national army. Is the SDF ready to integrate its forces into said army?

We believe that we should be part of the Ministry of Defence, but it's important we have a say in the methods employed and how they are implemented. We will remain committed as long as we are included in this process and consulted on key issues. Our commitment is tied to our participation.

Have you begun military-level negotiations to discuss this?

No, but we have requested negotiations.

What about foreign fighters?

I wouldn't consider them foreign fighters. They are our Kurdish brothers who came to defend this region and our people during the war. These fighters are ready to return to their places of origin and will do so once a formal ceasefire is reached.

How many Kurdish 'outsiders' are there in your areas now?

I won't get into specific figures, but you can say they number in the hundreds, not thousands. It's important I point out this issue of foreign fighters betrays a clear double standard, with foreign fighters belonging to other groups being granted citizenship, whereas our Kurdish brothers came to our areas solely to protect their own relatives.

What about strategic resources? Damascus is demanding full control over them, with only a portion of the revenues allocated to northeastern Syria.

We have no objection to this in principle but our key demand is that this region—previously neglected by the former regime, does not remain marginalised. The distribution of resources should be fair and ensure all regions in Syria receive their rightful share.

Read more: Resource-rich yet underdeveloped, Syria's northeast could pay dividends

Damascus also wants the Autonomous Administration dissolved. Are you willing to do so?

We do not insist on keeping the current system as it is, but these issues should be addressed during constitutional discussions in the transitional phase.

The political and administrative structures we set up over the past ten to 12 years were established out of necessity, primarily to provide essential services and safeguard the region from the military and administrative institutions that existed at the time.

Now that the situation in Syria has evolved, we are fully prepared to adapt to the new reality. More precisely, we do not want to suffer the experience of the Ba'ath Party again, where all powers were centralised in the capital. Some of these powers should be distributed to the regions, not just ours. These matters must be discussed during the drafting of the constitution or within the framework of the National Dialogue Conference.

We are in favour of some form of local administration across the regions. However, we are open to discussing the administrative framework of our region in a way that aligns with the changes Syria has undergone following the fall of the Assad regime.

Read more: Why did Assad fall so easily?

Did you expect the Assad regime to collapse so quickly?

The fall of the Assad regime was always possible, but I don't think anyone expected it to happen so swiftly—not even those who orchestrated it. Everyone was taken aback.

The new government recently held the first round of National Dialogue talks and set up a preparatory committee. What are your thoughts on this?

We certainly have reservations about the way the committee was formed. We believe it's representation should reflect the region's diverse communities as a whole, not just the Kurdish community. Other communities must also be included in the dialogue process.

If negotiations between us and the administration are successful, we will insist on proper representation, but in its current form, the committee does not represent all Syrians and falls short of what is required.

Read more: Without inclusive governance, Syria could fall back into chaos

There is also talk of establishing a legislative body and a transitional government. Have you been briefed and consulted on this?

No. One fundamental issue that hasn't been adequately addressed is the notion that only those who reach an agreement are allowed to participate, while others will be excluded. This defeats the purpose of the National Dialogue Conference in the first place. Participation should not be contingent on prior agreement. Rather, even those with differing views should take part to work towards consensus.

We want to reach common ground on key principles and are committed to participating in this conference. If we do not take part, we do not want to be pegged as the detractive and uncooperative party.

Read more: Missteps in the making – Syria's National Dialogue risks failure

I believe you sought to enshrine Kurdish rights in the constitution during negotiations. What constitutional provisions are you demanding?

In northeastern Syria, various communities and regions coexist under an established administration that has been in place for the past decade. The Kurdish people, however, have a unique situation, having faced systemic oppression throughout Syria's modern history—from independence to the present. They have been deprived of their most fundamental rights, including the use of their mother tongue, access to education in their own language, and even citizenship. Naturally, Kurdish political and cultural rights must be addressed during the drafting of the constitution, including the issues of language and regional governance.

What was the reaction in Damascus?

In principle, they did not object. I believe they are generally supportive of including Kurdish rights in the constitution, but we have yet to discuss the specifics.

On the issue of foreign stakeholders in Syria, do you think Türkiye supports the dialogue between the new government and the SDF?

We think Türkiye is against dialogue, although we don't see any reason for their opposition. We encourage Türkiye to refrain from obstructing this process.

What about the United States? Has it backed SDF dialogue with Damascus?

Not only does the US encourage us to engage in dialogue with the Sharaa government but it is also actively mediating and pushing both sides to sit down and negotiate.

What advice have they offered thus far?

They advise us to maintain communication to prevent talks from derailing. They want us to focus on areas where we can reach agreement. Overall, their involvement has been helpful and positive. They also advised us not to get tripped up over details too early. The focus is to establish a dialogue first, then address the specifics.

In his first term as president, Donald Trump pulled US troops out of some parts of Syria in October 2019 which allowed Türkiye to establish a zone between Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad. Are you worried he may do this again?

Well, Trump ended up backtracking on some of his earlier decisions regarding Syria, particularly pulling out US troops and the US ended up pressuring Türkiye to uphold the ceasefire.

Congress also threatened sanctions to ensure Turkish compliance with the ceasefire process. Positive steps were taken at that time, and now we expect President Trump to honour the commitments he made to us at the end of his first term.

Agreements were brokered by then-vice president, Mike Pence, and the Turkish government, in what we referred to as the October Agreements. We expect Türkiye to uphold these agreements.

Throughout history, the Kurds have repeatedly felt betrayed by the US. Does this fear loom over you?

I remain optimistic and sincerely hope that does not happen.

Do you believe the US military presence in the region will continue indefinitely, or is there a set timeline?

I do not see an indefinite US presence. And American officials have consistently stated that they will not remain in the region permanently. However, the conditions that led to their initial involvement, primarily the fight against terrorism and the Islamic State (IS), still persist.

The threat of terrorism continues to endanger the entire region as well as American interests. As long as these threats exist, so will the rationale for the US military presence. Once these threats are eliminated, they will withdraw.

Syria's new government has stated that it could take over the fight against IS from the SDF, which has worked closely with the International Coalition to counter the terrorist group. Is this true?

I believe there has been a request in this regard, and I think they are prepared for it. We have no issues with them wanting to be part of this coalition.

Is it possible for the SDF and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to collaborate in fighting IS?

Absolutely.

Have any concrete steps been taken in this direction?

So far, no operational steps have been initiated, but in principle, we are open to cooperating in this regard.

What about Iran's role? Some claim that it is opening channels to support and cooperate with the SDF against the new government. What is your response?

I am glad you asked this question. These claims work against us, and we are well aware of their source. We have never had, nor will we ever have, any relations with Iran in this regard—past, present, or future. All reports suggesting Iranian support for our forces, or even attempts at cooperation, are entirely false and deliberately misleading. We will never cooperate with Iran in this regard. This is our clear and unequivocal position.

How do you view the evolving regional order—14 years after the war in Syria, more than 20 years since the fall of Saddam's regime, the recent Israeli wars on Gaza and Lebanon, and the broader changes in Syria?

I am not sure if a new regional order has fully taken shape yet, but I believe significant changes have occurred. The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has shifted considerably, and alliances have evolved. We are likely heading toward a new regional order, and overall, I think its heading in a positive direction.

A few days ago marked the anniversary of the arrest of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan of the PKK. There is talk of a new initiative towards peace between his movement and Türkiye. Do you have anything to say about this?

According to our information, 26 years after his arrest, there has been some form of reassessment. We are now on the verge of a breakthrough in Kurdish-Turkish relations, with the possibility of a ceasefire that will usher in a new phase. I expect this phase to unfold in Türkiye between the Kurdish national movement, led by Öcalan, and the Turkish state.

This development will undoubtedly impact the Kurdish issue across all four parts of Kurdistan and, by extension, influence the broader Middle East.

Kurdish leaders in Iraqi Kurdistan have stated that they advised you to negotiate with Damascus and act as a Syrian force. Is this true?

I consider this advice to be valuable and constructive, coming from brothers whose perspective I take seriously and with due consideration.

Are you optimistic? How do you see Syria's future in a year? And in four years? Al-Sharaa has suggested that elections could be held in four years. What is your outlook on this timeline?

I believe four years is a long period; ideally, the transition should take less than that. We still have concerns because in politics, nothing is strictly black or white. But we remain optimistic.

How do you see your role in rebuilding Syria?

We have affirmed our willingness to play an active role in shaping the new Syria. This region possesses immense potential, and over the past 12 years, we have amassed extensive expertise across various sectors.

We stand prepared to contribute through our administrative and military cadres and the wealth of experience cultivated within our region to support Syria's reconstruction. But this is not a unilateral endeavour—it necessitates cooperation and commitment from all parties involved.