Politics

As Sharaa steps into the White House, Syria steps into the US orbit

In what could be a historic turning point in US-Syria relations, the new government in Damascus will likely join the international coalition against the Islamic State (IS)

Axel Rangel Garcia

As Sharaa steps into the White House, Syria steps into the US orbit

Subhi Franjieh

last update on 09 Nov 2025

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa is set to arrive in the United States for the second time in less than two months —this time in Washington, DC—marking the first-ever visit by a Syrian head of state to the White House since the country gained independence.

US envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, outlined the visit's agenda, noting that a primary objective is Syria's accession to the international coalition against the Islamic State (IS), describing the move as "a historic turning point and a landmark in relations with Washington."

Washington has several objectives in bringing Syria into the coalition, objectives that are matched by potential gains for the Syrian government, making this a mutually beneficial step on both the political and military fronts. It presents an opportunity to ease regional tensions, close the IS chapter once and for all, deter Syria from falling back on its historic alliance with Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), and counter any Iranian attempt to regain its foothold in Syria.

To facilitate this development, the US scrambled to overcome both legal and political hurdles. These included easing tensions between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), reassessing the geographical and logistical aspects of its military presence in Syria and removing al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Khattab from the terrorism watchlist. On Thursday, 6 November, the US secured their removal after pushing for a Security Council vote on the matter. Of note, China abstained after requesting amendments, which ultimately led to its decision not to oppose the motion.

A second goal involved conducting field assessments of specific military sites within areas under the control of the Syrian government. Washington and the coalition plan to use these locations as operational bases for missions targeting IS within Syria. They are also expected to serve as logistical hubs supporting both Syrian forces and international troops stationed across the Middle East.

Washington considers this military presence crucial in addressing Israeli security concerns, which remain a major obstacle in its dialogue with Damascus. It is also seen as a way to counterbalance any foreign military deployments in the region that might threaten Western interests, particularly those linked to Russia.

In addition, Washington's move to establish a military base is also aimed at narrowing internal divisions within the US administration. For its part, the Department of Defence has voiced concerns over what it sees as the State Department's increasingly favourable position towards the new Syrian government.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa during his meeting with US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Brad Cooper in Damascus on 12 September 2025.

Site scouting

In an effort to alleviate the Pentagon's concerns, as well as those of certain coalition partners, a coalition base within Syrian government-held territory, designated for operational coordination, will likely be established.

According to Al Majalla sources, a coalition delegation recently visited several military sites, including al-Dumayr Military Airport, al-Sin Military Airport, and other bases close to al-Sin Airport. The strategic positioning of these locations is considered significant for several reasons. They are situated in the Syrian desert—an area where IS remains active—positioned along the international highway that links to the al-Tanf base, and lie near both southern Syria and the Lebanese border.

Sources familiar with the matter expect al-Sin Airport to be prioritised over al-Dumayr, particularly after the coalition delegation conducted a second visit to the site earlier this month, carrying out detailed inspections of the area and its surrounding geography. This indicates that the coalition may be planning to establish key observation outposts near the airport, which is likely to become its main base of operations.

Although the final decision to establish a coalition base remains under discussion, several Western sources told Al Majalla that they expect swift progress on the matter. However, the operational phase depends on Syria officially joining the international coalition against IS.

Washington's laundry list

From the outset, Washington set several preconditions for its support of Syria. Foremost among them is Syria's formal accession to the international coalition. Other demands include addressing the issue of foreign fighters embedded within the Syrian army, curbing Iranian and Russian influence in Syria, tackling the captagon drug trade, and entering into negotiations with Israel.

Syria's inclusion in the coalition would provide significant political and military gains for Washington and its Western partners. Officially, the Syrian government would become a recognised partner in the fight against terrorism and would be required to implement several internal measures, including the removal of radical foreign fighters, restructuring its military and counter-terrorism units, sharing intelligence with the coalition, and allowing coordinated operations by coalition forces on Syrian soil.

AFP — US soldiers on patrol near oil fields in the Hasakah Governorate, northeastern Syria, on 13 February 2021.

Read more: What Trump wants from Sharaa

Furthermore, Syria's participation would involve expanded training and coordination efforts, eventually including the Syrian army. For now, coordination remains limited to the Ministry of the Interior. It would also open the way for joint operations between the Syrian and Iraqi governments on related fronts, potentially leading to combined efforts against Iranian-backed militias operating along the Syrian-Iraqi border.

Additionally, Syria's membership would lend legal and political legitimacy to the presence of coalition forces in the country. This, in turn, would provide Washington and its allies with a recognised political and military influence in the region. Over time, such a development could help prevent the resurgence of extremist movements and steer Syria away from its traditional alignment with the Eastern bloc.

Weighing the pros and cons

Over the past two months, the Syrian government, particularly the Ministries of Defence and Interior, has held a series of meetings to assess the implications of joining the international coalition. These discussions have centred on the potential benefits and foreseeable challenges to manage the transition as effectively as possible.

The anticipated benefits are considerable. Foremost among them is enhanced legitimacy for the Syrian government and its formal partnership with the coalition, a development expected to have a direct impact on negotiations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose influence has stemmed mainly from being the coalition's sole partner in Syria.

For the Ministry of Defence, a key advantage lies in gaining access to coalition intelligence on individuals who are currently or have been previously affiliated with IS. Such intelligence would significantly strengthen internal vetting procedures for recruits and existing personnel, with similar benefits extending to the Ministry of Interior.

By including it in the anti-IS coalition, the US hopes to deter Syria from falling back on its historic alliance with Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), and counter any Iranian attempt to regain its foothold in Syria

On the military level, Syrian forces are set to benefit from coalition-led training programmes and the provision of arms, recognising Syria as a full partner in the fight against terrorism.

However, challenges remain. While senior figures within both ministries support Syria's official entry into the coalition, there are less influential factions that oppose the move, particularly among foreign fighters who see the decision as the first step to their elimination.

Recent unrest at the French nationals' camp is viewed as evidence of this internal resistance. As a result, the Syrian government is factoring these groups into its calculations. Although they are not considered a threat to state stability, authorities believe it is essential to devise a containment strategy, especially given concerns that IS may exploit these individuals for recruitment.

The SDF file also poses a significant challenge. As US-trained forces tasked with combating terrorism, the SDF cannot simply be marginalised. Washington is unlikely to accept any arrangement that reduces the SDF's role in favour of exclusive coordination with Damascus. It is therefore necessary to establish a framework that allows for the integration of SDF fighters into the Syrian army or the Ministry of Interior's counter-terrorism units.

Al Majalla has learned that the upcoming phase may see a thaw in tensions between Damascus and the SDF, as well as joint military operations with the coalition. These efforts are expected to coincide with negotiations to incorporate key SDF leaders involved in anti-IS operations into the Ministries of Interior and Defence. They are also likely to continue until negotiations between the two sides, the SDF and the Syrian government, are finalised regarding the implementation of the 10 March agreement between President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi.

AFP — Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi during the signing of the agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions on March 10, 2025.

Alongside joint meetings between the two ministries, each has also conducted internal sessions with senior personnel to review the preparatory measures required ahead of al-Sharaa's visit to Washington and Syria's formal ascension into the coalition.

As part of these preparations, the Ministry of Defence has recently launched orientation lectures that emphasise the importance of counter-terrorism and cooperation with the international coalition. The messaging aims to emphasise that cooperation does not constitute foreign interference in Syria's internal affairs but reflects its emergence, under its new government, as a key partner in the global fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Interior has stepped up training for its counter-terrorism units and recently tested their readiness through joint operations.

The Syrian government's decision to join the international coalition has cast a long shadow over internal deliberations within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The group that has long enjoyed the status as the coalition's chief partner in the fight against IS now fears it will play second fiddle to the Syrian army.

According to available information, the SDF has held a series of meetings to assess the implications of this shift—particularly the potential loss of political backing, logistical support, military protection, and control over detention facilities, all of which could be redirected towards the Damascus government.

The SDF has opted to engage with Damascus and try to secure key posts for its commanders in the Syrian army and counter-terrorism forces, alongside a phased plan to integrate SDF units into the Ministry of Defence, despite their initial opposition.

But the Syrian government appears lukewarm to the proposals, viewing them as a departure from the core principles it has set for the negotiation process. The SDF is seeking a degree of autonomy for its forces and wants Washington's help, but it could be a tough sell given Damascus's commitment to a centralised state and a unified military structure.

AFP — Members of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attend the funeral of an Arab fighter in SDF who was killed the previous week in the eastern Deir Ezzor province, in thenortheastern Syrian Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli.

American pressure

The US seems to be pressuring the SDF to reach a settlement with Damascus. In recent weeks, American officials have repeatedly conveyed to the group that Washington's strategic objective is to ensure maximum stability in Syria, which it views as a necessary foundation for any prospective US–Israeli action aimed at curbing Iranian influence across Syria, Lebanon, and the Iraqi border.

Persistent instability and political tension in Syria remain a growing concern for Washington, which fears that further deterioration could open the door for renewed Iranian influence in the region. As a result, the US administration is keen to finalise Syria's accession to the coalition, expedite negotiations between the SDF and Damascus, and provide the Syrian government with both political and economic support.

Al Majalla has learned that the upcoming phase may see a thaw in tensions between Damascus and the SDF, as well as joint military operations with the coalition

About the anti-IS coalition

On 10 September 2014, the US unveiled the international coalition against IS. At that time, the training programme in Syria was still in its infancy as Washington was still engaged in negotiations with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), then the principal opposition force. However, the FSA rejected the idea of limiting its operations solely to fighting IS, insisting that any effort must also target the Assad regime.

Ultimately, Washington decided to support a newly formed group, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose leadership structure was dominated by Kurdish factions, including the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the People's Defence Units (YPG). Meanwhile, the FSA continued to wage its campaign against both IS and the Assad regime, maintaining limited coordination with the United States, which provided selective support to some of its factions.

Today, the international coalition comprises 89 partners, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, Türkiye, Italy, Poland, and Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Jordan. It also includes Iraq, the Arab League, Interpol, NATO, and various other entities.

In 2017, the coalition announced the liberation of Raqqa, IS's former stronghold in Syria, marking a turning point in the group's territorial decline. This was followed by a series of major defeats, delivered both by coalition operations and Turkish-led military campaigns in northern Syria, including Operation Euphrates Shield.

AFP — Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed leader of the Islamic State (IS).

In October 2019, during his first term as president, Donald Trump announced the death of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a US operation carried out in northwestern Syria, in territory controlled by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, who was known at the time as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.

Since then, coalition operations have focused on eliminating remaining IS elements in Syria and preventing the group from regrouping. The SDF and the anti-IS coalition hold IS leaders and operatives—both foreign and local—in different detention centres in northern and eastern parts of Syria. Chief among these are the al-Sina'a Prison in Hasakah and the Central Prison in Raqqa.

In addition, IS family members were placed in camps such as al-Hol and, later, Roj in northeastern Syria. The issue of detention remains both legally and politically sensitive, with thousands of former IS fighters, captured during combat or subsequent security operations, still in custody. Washington continues to urge countries to repatriate their nationals. However, some governments are now considering an alternative: if Syria joins the international coalition, detainees of various nationalities could be tried under Syrian law, as their crimes were committed on Syrian territory.

The Syrian government has already floated the possibility of establishing a dedicated prison for IS combatants, to be operated by Syrian authorities in coordination with the international coalition. This would shift the responsibility of respective states dealing with IS-affiliated citizens to the Syrian state, lifting a heavy burden off their shoulders.

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