Politics

5 unanswered questions about Trump’s Venezuela plan

Maduro’s exit doesn’t mean the end of his government

Al Majalla

5 unanswered questions about Trump’s Venezuela plan

Ravi Agrawal

last update on 06 Jan 2026

After the White House’s audacious mission to snatch Nicolás Maduro and his wife from Caracas, there are more questions than answers about Venezuela’s future. It is also unclear what lessons US President Donald Trump will draw from successfully toppling a brutal dictator, and how that might impact his foreign policy more broadly.

Here are five major questions policymakers and journalists will puzzle over in the coming days—with some context for how to think about them.

1. Who is actually in charge?

Trump surprised the world when he announced on Saturday that the United States would “run” Venezuela until he was satisfied with a transition to a new leader. In reality, Maduro’s departure left Vice President Delcy Rodríguez in pole position. What this means is that the operation to nab Maduro was not quite a regime-change mission; it just removed the figurehead. Notably, Rodríguez was no puppet deputy. In Venezuela, the vice president plays a major role. Rodríguez runs the petroleum ministry in addition to a major intelligence agency. Her brother heads the National Assembly.

Federico PARRA / AFP — Venezuela's Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez (L) speaks next to National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, on 11 December 2023.

There are rumours that Rodríguez may have struck a deal to enable Maduro’s capture. The interim leader may be playing a double game, telling the cameras that she wants Maduro back while privately liaising with American diplomats about Venezuela’s future. For now, we just don’t know the truth. Rodríguez may be powerful, but she has every reason to fear the United States.

One thing seems less ambiguous: The situation doesn’t look promising for María Corina Machado. The 2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner has publicly praised Trump and sought his good graces in the hope of one day taking over from Maduro. But at his public remarks on Saturday, Trump dismissed Machado, saying, “She doesn’t have the support within—or the respect within—the country.”

2. Why topple Maduro?

Trump made clear on Saturday that Operation Absolute Resolve was not about democracy. If it were, he would have talked about a road map to elections instead of seemingly endorsing Maduro’s deputy and snubbing Machado. (Trump didn’t even name-check Edmundo González, the winner of the 2024 presidential election.) The operation also wasn’t about fentanyl, which did not merit a mention in the Department of Justice’s indictment against Maduro. The document mentions cocaine, but Venezuela is hardly the greatest source of that particular drug.

Other potential factors, such as the migration crisis caused by Maduro’s misrule or the kleptocratic, criminal, and illegitimate nature of his government, are significant but hardly unique or enough cause for a US military intervention. If they were, Washington would be embroiled in regime change operations on several continents.

Trump has mentioned oil multiple times since announcing Maduro’s capture, but even that seems like a far-fetched rationale for ousting Maduro. Caracas has ruined its oil infrastructure and chased away a generation of capable personnel. Turning things around would take years and cost more than an estimated $100bn, a price that feels even more daunting given the current low price of crude—a market signal that suggests slowing demand.

Reuters — A Venezuelan oil tanker in the middle of the sea near Singapore, after being pursued by US authorities, on 18 March 2025.

One mustn’t discount the possibility that Trump doesn’t personally care about Venezuela, and that he may have delegated policy to two key lieutenants: Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has long been a hawk on Venezuela and neighbouring Cuba, and Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, whose pet issue is immigration. To a degree, that may explain Trump’s televised remarks about oil—a topic he does care about—and his vague assertion that he would soon decide which of his cabinet officials would “run” Venezuela.

The Trump administration’s repeated invocation of the Monroe Doctrine suggests an attempt to intellectualise US actions in Latin America, which include not only the operation in Venezuela but also the co-opting of El Salvador’s prisons and a $20bn bailout of the Argentinian economy led by the pro-Trump leader Javier Milei. Under this theory, the White House sees the Western Hemisphere as its playground.

Two unintended consequences may immediately arise. Major regional economies such as Brazil, Canada, and Colombia may either find ways to punch back at the United States or strike alliances that increase their collective power. And then there’s the question of the other hemisphere. Seen from the corridors of power in Beijing, New Delhi, or Moscow, the White House’s actions in Caracas suggest that big powers can do as they please in their backyards. Policymakers in those capitals may one day want to test the boundaries of this new world disorder.

To punch back at Trump, major economies such as Brazil, Canada, and Colombia may look to strike alliances that increase their collective power

3. What does this mean for international law?

As my colleague Michael Hirsh wrote in Foreign Policy, the Caracas mission "could be seen as a Trumpian hammer blow to the frail husk of international law that remains." It's difficult to disagree. International rules and norms were already severely challenged globally. Washington's misadventure in Iraq—in which the White House at least attempted to seek UN authorisation and form a coalition of partners—built a sentiment among the current crop of dictators that there were few consequences for breaking international law. Russian President Vladimir Putin thoroughly tested that thesis by invading Ukraine and then, in 2025, gleefully visiting the United States, China, and India—three countries that have each refused to sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

But will Trump's actions really end international law as we know it? I'm not so sure. There is a long and sordid history of US interventions in Latin America. And as the American University scholar Amitav Acharya writes in FP this week, we shouldn't think international law begins and ends with the United States. Concepts such as territorial integrity and freedom of navigation date back millennia. Countries are highly incentivised to find ways to return to the same norms and rules when given the chance to do so.

4. Will Trump continue his military adventurism?

This was the most ominous part of Trump's public utterances since the completion of the US mission in Caracas. Colombia's president, Gustavo Petro, should "watch his a*s" and "something is going to have to be done with Mexico," Trump said. Colombia is the world's biggest producer of cocaine, and Mexico is the primary source of fentanyl in the United States, giving Trump a reason to build on the precedent he has just set in Venezuela.

Trump has also made clear his designs on Canada and Greenland, although those would admittedly be far more difficult to pull off.

A worrying aspect of Trump's second term is his growing air of infallibility: a sense that nothing, not even an assassin's bullet, can stop him. That alone should be cause for concern for military planners and policymakers worldwide. Yet the more risks Trump takes, the more likely it is that he will one day confront an adverse military outcome.

5. What is the Trump Doctrine after Venezuela?

Well, was there ever a clear doctrine?

It was striking to see Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth crow to the cameras on Saturday: Maduro "effed around and he found out," he said, referring to the internet slang FAFO. "This is America First. This is peace through strength," he added.

One gets the sense that a year into his second term, unfettered by officials warning him against his instincts, Trump is increasingly comfortable ordering the world's largest military to do his bidding. This may not necessarily contradict his desire to be a peacemaker or his instinct to avoid lengthy conflicts abroad, but it does mean Trump won't hesitate to use lethal force and then turn it into an international TV moment. Trump clearly relishes the projection of power and the drama of describing military action to the world's cameras.

One factor that might determine Trump's future actions is whether he views Operation Absolute Resolve as a success. In the short term, the military operation itself was clearly impressive in what it pulled off, especially without the loss of any US soldiers. Caracas was on a ruinous path and Maduro has no credible defenders. In the longer term, however, if Venezuela continues along a path of kleptocratic rule and the United States gains little from "running" Caracas, then Trump may come to see the mission as more trouble than it was worth. The latter scenario could make Trump reluctant to try similar operations elsewhere.

But regardless of how Trump sees it, it has already become harder for the United States to criticise other countries for using military might when they deem necessary. It will now be interesting to see how foreign leaders and adversaries shift their own actions in response to Trump's disposition.

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