Syria lacks a coherent policy on foreign fighters

Tactical fix

To prevent further escalation, several senior foreign militant figures, primarily from Uygur and Uzbek factions, intervened as mediators. Their involvement led to a temporary ceasefire that halted hostilities, reduced incitement, and referred Omsen's case to a Sharia court.

Yet the truce is inherently fragile. It emerged not from institutional or judicial structures, but from informal negotiation among armed actors within the militant ecosystem. It contains no peaceful enforcement mechanism and is effectively hostage to the same faction it seeks to restrain.

Precedent offers little reassurance. Similar ceasefires in Idlib, including those between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and rival groups, have repeatedly collapsed due to mutual distrust, limited oversight, and the parties' refusal to accept the verdicts of joint adjudication.

The Harem standoff has exposed what many in Damascus already know: Syria lacks a coherent policy on foreign fighters. Internal debates continue, particularly regarding militants unwilling to disarm or integrate, but no unified strategy has been adopted.

According to Ministry of Defence sources, the government is now pursuing a dual-track approach. Fighters who have integrated—such as Uygur and Uzbek units operating within the 82nd and 84th divisions—are treated as regular soldiers. They receive state salaries, follow command directives, and are subject to military discipline.

Groups like Firqatul Ghuraba sit outside this framework. They reject state authority, refuse demobilisation, and adhere to transnational ideological agendas. Officials increasingly view such factions as security threats. While some policymakers advocate gradual reintegration and negotiated disarmament, patience is limited. In this context, the kidnapping allegation may have served both as a legitimate concern and as a politically useful justification to reassert control over an autonomous camp.

Delicate balance

Militarily, Damascus retains the advantage. It controls the airspace, commands superior firepower, and possesses an extensive intelligence network. Politically, though, its position is far less secure.

A heavy-handed crackdown risks fracturing fragile alliances and driving militants towards Islamic State remnants or other spoilers. A timid or inconsistent response invites criticism from Western governments and deepens public doubts regarding the state's capacity to govern and impose order.

Syria cannot afford to lurch from one confrontation to the next. Temporary truces and ad hoc arrangements may buy time, but they do not build peace. Without a coherent and long-term policy—one that combines credible security enforcement with structured pathways for demobilisation, integration, or repatriation—the government will remain trapped in an exhausting cycle of confrontation.

The real test of Syria's transitional leadership is not whether it can prevail in the next flare-up, but whether it can prevent it altogether.