All eyes are on forthcoming Syria-Israel peace negotiations, expected to resume soon after they were suspended in 2008. Those talks had been indirect, mediated by Türkiye and former US president Jimmy Carter. They failed, however, because then-president Bashar al-Assad wasn't prepared to sever his ties with Hezbollah.
Of course, there were ten years of negotiations preceding that, from 1990 to 2000, which have been written about by historians and by those who lived through them, such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, and US Secretaries of State James Baker, Warren Christopher, and Madeleine Albright. Earlier talks, however, from the first half of the 20th century have not received their share of attention. Here, Al Majalla sheds light on them following the historic meeting between presidents Donald Trump and Ahmed al-Shara on 14 May 2025.
Earliest encounters
Influential Zionist figures had long sought to engage Arab leaders on Palestine, enticing them with financial promises and political support, whether to rid themselves of the Ottomans or their subsequent French and British occupiers. Zionist leaders visited Damascus in 1913, again in 1918–1919, and in 1932, when Dr. Chaim Weizmann personally negotiated the purchase of fertile agricultural lands in Palestine from their Syrian owners. The first official negotiations, however, took place in the summer of 1936, though accounts of these talks vary.
Canadian historian Neil Caplan was the first to publish these minutes in his seminal book, Futile Diplomacy. Meanwhile, former Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli had mentioned them in his exchange with French historian Jacques Benois-Mechin during the latter's visit to Damascus in August 1958.
They were also mentioned in the memoirs of Syrian presidential secretary Abdullah al-Khani, published in Beirut in 2003, and in the private papers of Syrian nationalist Fakhri al-Barudi, preserved at the Damascus Historical Documents Centre. However, it is unclear whether they survived the massive Souq Sarouja market fire on 16 July 2023.
First negotiation round: 16 July 1936
In March 1936, a delegation from the National Bloc travelled to Paris to discuss Syria's political future and demand an end to the French Mandate that had been in place since 1920. The prime minister of France was prominent Jewish socialist Leon Blum, who had strong links with the Jewish Agency in Palestine. David Ben-Gurion reached out to a member of the Syrian delegation in Paris, future premier Jamil Mardam Bey, offering to assist the negotiations through his influence on Prime Minister Blum.
Simultaneously, on 17 July 1936, Eliyahu Epstein (later Israel’s first ambassador to Washington) and Eliyahu Sasson (a Damascene Jew who had left Syria five years earlier to work with the Zionist Agency) arrived in Damascus. They met with Damascus MP Fakhri al-Barudi at his home in Douma, near the capital, proposing to limit Jewish immigration from Europe to match Palestine’s absorptive capacity. They also promised to support the National Bloc’s negotiations in France in return for backing the Zionists against Jerusalem’s Grand Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, who was leading a revolt against the British and the Jews in Palestine since April 1936.
Barudi said: “I did all I could to calm things down (in Palestine). Thousands of people wanted to go from Syria to help their brethren, but we prevented them. We also sabotaged many attempts to smuggle arms. As for the clashes themselves, no power in the world can put an end to them without certain preconditions—not even the Prophet Mohammad can do that. People are furious with what you are doing in Palestine."
Barudi called for confidence-building measures, urging the Zionists to utilise their influence in France to ensure the success of the Paris talks. "You’ve got the talent and the money", he said to Epstein, "and we’ve got the land and the manpower. Let's work for a better future once we are rid of European colonisers." The first round of talks concluded without a deal on the table.
Second round: 1 August 1936
Two weeks later, another delegation from the Jewish Agency met with Barudi, this time at the Bloudan Hotel near Damascus. This group included Epstein, Dov Hoz (leader of the Zionist labour movement), and Moshe Sharett (later Israel’s first foreign minister and second prime minister). Barudi, Shukri al-Quwatli, and Lutfi al-Haffar, all prominent leaders in the National Bloc, represented the Syrian side.
Al-Quwatli began the talks by questioning Jewish historical claims to Palestine: "If we go by history, can we then demand Andalusia?" They replied: "Let’s talk economics first—it’s far more useful than history or politics."
Epstein told his Syrian hosts: "At first glance, our interests seem conflicting, with no room for understanding. However, a more realistic, unemotional view reveals that they are actually aligned—if we want them to be. Rest assured, we seek no agreement at the Palestinians’ expense. On the contrary, our presence will greatly benefit them economically."
Barudi asked: "What exactly do you want from us?"
Epstein responded: "The National Bloc must publicly acknowledge our historical right to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine."
The Bloc leaders refused to make any such commitment, and the Zionist delegation left Bloudan empty-handed.
Third round: 25 August 1936
The final pre-1948 meeting with the Zionists was again held at the Bloudan Hotel, this time with Abba Eban (later Israel’s UN envoy). On the Syrian side were al-Quwatli again, and Fayez al-Khoury, the former dean of the Syrian University’s law school and brother of the future Syrian premier, Fares al-Khoury.
Eban asked al-Quwatli to write to the Mufti of Jerusalem urging a ceasefire in Palestine, but the future Syrian president refused. Eban then bluntly offered: "How much do you need? One million pounds? We’re ready. Five million? Ten? Even 100 million—we’re ready."
Al-Quwatli: "Let me ask: How many Jews are there in Britain and France?"
Eban: "About half a million in each."
Al-Quwatli: "Half a million in Britain, and you control the greatest empire on which the sun never sets, and another half a million in France, the second-largest empire ... and you want to bring four, five, or ten million Jews to Palestine and ‘help’ us unite 80 million poor and ignorant Arabs under one state so you can dominate them? I assure you, we are in total disagreement—this matter is settled for us."
Eban then made another offer: "We heard your delegation recently went to Paris to negotiate with the French government. We’re prepared to assist—since Léon Blum, as you know, is Jewish—and we can get him to sign a treaty that guarantees Syria full independence and complete sovereignty."
The meeting ended without any agreement, and although the National Bloc signed a treaty with the Blum government in September 1936, the French National Assembly rejected it and never ratified it. Syrian politicians were convinced that this was due to their refusal to cooperate with the Zionist delegations that came to Damascus.
In 1999 Munir al-Ajlani, who had been a member of the Bloc back in 1936, shared with me what he heard from the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem: "Hitler said to me that when German troops entered the French Foreign Ministry after occupying Paris, they found documents from the Zionist Agency urging France not to ratify the Syrian treaty unless an agreement was first reached with the Syrians."
Negotiations of 1952
Shortly after Syria’s first military coup on 29 March 1949, Husni al-Za’im engaged in secret talks with Israel while simultaneously holding official, public negotiations for an armistice. Occasionally, the lines blurred, and al-Za’im tasked Lieutenant Colonel Ghassan Jadid, a member of the armistice committee, to relay messages to Israeli representative Shabtai Rosenne, legal advisor to Israel’s foreign ministry. The first session was on 20 July 1949; the second on 1 August, two weeks before al-Za’im’s overthrow and execution.
After al-Za’im’s death, Israel maintained backchannel talks with Jadid, framing them as "technical." Their objective was to foster cooperation with the new authorities in Damascus and to keep the discussions flexible, both sides decided to exclude the United Nations. Records of those talks are now kept at the Israeli National Archives and the Armistice Supervision Office in Damascus.
The first meeting between Jadid and Colonel Aryeh Friedlander took place on 9 January 1952. In total, the two sides met 18 times in 1952, three times in 1953, and twice in 1954. Syria insisted on total secrecy. The first session addressed Syrian fishermen in Lake Tiberias. Later talks covered prisoner exchanges (22 January 1952), Israeli military barriers near Lake Hula (10 April), and displaced Syrian farmers allowed to work—but not live—within one kilometre of the border.
Jadid raised the plight of villagers in Kurad al-Baqqara and Kurad al-Ghanama, stranded on the Israeli side of the border. Israel permitted family visits if the household head was in Syria and guaranteed their return. When Israel requested similar visits for Syrian Jews to see relatives in Israel, Jadid refused.
On 24 April, they discussed locust control in border fields and the installation of a military emergency phone line. Friedlander asked about emergency landings for Israeli planes in Damascus or Syrian planes in Tel Aviv. Jadid said it could be studied—but only for boats, not aircraft. They also reached a verbal agreement on livestock stranded since 1948: either peaceful exchange or compensation, particularly for Dutch cows seized by Syrian forces from Kibbutz Ayelet HaShahar during the war.
These technical talks, however, unravelled amid tension over Israel’s project to drain the Hula Valley swamps in northern Palestine. Hula Lake, surrounded by marshes, was shallow (6m deep), 26 km long, and up to 8 km wide. Israel aimed to divert its waters to the Negev Desert. Legally, this was based on a 1914 Ottoman concession (later inherited by France) sold to a Zionist land-purchasing agency in 1934 for £192,000.
On 12 February 1951, Israeli bulldozers began work 4 km from the lake without consulting either the UN or Syria. Damascus protested to the UN, arguing: "Your government claims it inherited this project from the French Mandate, which expired five years ago. We are now a sovereign state and do not recognise this 40-year-old concession, which, even if valid, doesn’t permit work in the demilitarised zone."
Israel countered that the 1934 concession predated the armistice by 15 years. After a month’s pause, Israeli work resumed in Hula on 13 March 1951. Jadid warned: "If the bulldozers don’t stop immediately, Syria will respond as it sees fit." The UN intervened, halting work for a week from 14 March. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett agreed to compensate affected landowners, but Prime Minister Ben-Gurion ignored his suggestion and ordered the resumption of drainage works.
On 14 March, Israeli equipment came under light arms fire from civilians near the lake. The Israelis accused Syrian soldiers in disguise, blaming Ghassan Jadid for the incident since he had been the commander of the 8th Infantry Battalion stationed in the area. Jadid retorted: "Syria is not responsible for individual acts by Arab landowners provoked by Israel’s encroachment."
Amid an 18-day Syrian cabinet crisis, Israel restarted its work in Hula. The UN proposed military talks, to which Syria sent Colonel Adib al-Shishakli (de facto ruler since 1949), while Tel Aviv commissioned his Israeli counterpart, Colonel Mordechai Makleff.
Shishakli-Makleff Negotiations (1951)
The sharp-witted al-Shishakli told Makleff, "For me, peace doesn’t mean normalisation, trade, or even flying an Israeli flag in Damascus. I want to end this conflict because if prolonged, it will be used and exploited by future governments." He added that instead of digging trenches and buying military equipment, he wanted to spend Syrian money on the building of schools and universities. The Israelis knew that he stood behind the most recent attack on their equipment, and Makleff said to him, "Draining Hula is non-negotiable."
To this, al-Shishakli asked: "How old are you, Colonel?"
Makleff: 31
Al-Shishakli: "Did you come from Europe?"
Makleff: "No, I was born near Jerusalem in 1920."
Al-Shishakli: "And your parents?"
Makleff: "They came from Europe."
Al-Shishakli: "But the peasants shooting ... their fathers were born here, and so were their grandfathers."
Makleff, recalled their past clashes, when al-Shishakli was fighting in Palestine alongside Fawzi al-Qawuqji, whom he described as a "Nazi collaborator." He then said, "We know each other well. Just tell me: Who fired on our equipment today?"
Al-Shishakli: "Civilian locals from the demilitarised zone."
Makleff: "Our intelligence shows that they were either Syrian troops or their proxies. No one enters that zone without approval from the Army Command in Damascus, which you control."
Al-Shishakli: "If true, then those soldiers will be punished. But we can’t control public anger. If Hula’s residents consent, you may work—but only on the lake’s western shore."
After five hours, no agreement was reached. Israel expanded its operations, declaring the demilitarised zone entirely under its authority, and then razed two Arab villages. Enraged, al-Shishakli and then-Prime Minister Khaled al-Azm retaliated with an ambush attack on an Israeli police patrol near Al-Hamma on 4 April 1951.
Israel then bombed a Syrian police station the next day, killing two women and wounding six men. On 2 May, Syrian troops fired on Israeli soldiers, ending the escalation. Al-Shishakli’s press secretary, Qadri al-Qal’aji, published a small booklet entitled Israel’s Enemy No. 1, and Syrian newspapers began using the title to refer to al-Shishakli on their front pages.
