The fall of the Assad regime and the subsequent takeover of al-Sharaa, the leader of the Islamist Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham movement, was a groundbreaking development in Middle East politics, to say the least.
It also marked a critical turning point in Israel’s relationship with Syria. Between 1991 and 2011, the dire conflict between the two countries was replaced by an intermittent peace process that failed to produce a peace settlement and was interrupted by occasional outbursts of lingering hostility.
This ended with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, which saw Iranian influence surge to unprecedented levels, effectively turning the country into an Iranian proxy. But the toppling of the Assad regime in December 2024 was an unintended consequence of the Gaza war. The blows inflicted by Israel on Iran and Hezbollah weakened the two regional actors and undermined their support for the Assad regime. As a result, al-Sharaa and his HTS movement took advantage of the opportunity to break out of their stronghold in Idlib and, to their surprise, encountered little resistance in capturing Aleppo and then Hama, Homs, and Damascus.
Mixed feelings
For its part, Israel had mixed feelings about the radical change. It realised the benefits of eliminating Iran’s iron grip on Syria and Syria’s removal from the Iranian orbit, but remained untrusting of the country's new leaders.
To begin with, Israel, like many others in the region and internationally, had yet to decide whether the former jihadist of the new regime had indeed relinquished his extremist outlook and become a pragmatic leader determined to reunify and rebuild his country.
They were also unsure of his ability to overcome centrifugal forces in Syria to actually rebuild a coherent Syrian state and his ability to deal with external forces meddling in Syria, be it Türkiye which clearly seeks a hegemonic position south of its border, or Iran and Russia seeking to reassert or salvage at least some of their former influence in Syria.
Al-Sharaa himself stated on a number of occasions that he was not interested in confronting Israel or dealing with it at this time, that he was bent on rebuilding the country, and that the Israeli issue would have to wait.
But for its part, Israel decided not to wait. Traumatised by the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, it began by preempting the prospect of any attack by jihadist elements from the Syrian Golan. It captured the Upper Hermon and the demilitarised zone separating the two countries since the Disengagement Agreement of 1974, and also destroyed much of the military equipment left by the Assad army in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of jihadist elements. It also intervened ostensibly on behalf of parts of the Druze community attacked by jihadist components of the regime.
This was not an auspicious beginning, but this pattern need not continue. Both countries have an interest in consolidating their relationships, short of an effort to reach a peace agreement or a resolution of the underlying Syrian-Israeli conflict. Such a resolution is not feasible at this time, given the need of the regime to consolidate itself and the importance of nationalistic elements in the Israeli governing coalition.
Immediate issues
But Israel and Syria can come to an agreement on several immediate issues that would help them establish fruitful cooperation on a number of immediate and practical issues.
First and foremost, they need to establish a hotline that would enable the two governments to communicate, settle points of tension, and avoid unnecessary conflicts. This line should be discrete. It can function as the mechanism of coordination between Israel and Russia in Syria, which has prevented clashes between the two air forces flying in Syria’s airspace since 2015.
A second important issue concerns Türkiye's ambitions in Syria. Israel is concerned that Türkiye will establish a military presence deep in Syria’s territory and close to the borders with Israel. And while Israel doesn't consider Türkiye an outright enemy, its government has been critical of Israel.
This is also not in the interest of the al-Sharaa regime if it wants to establish the essence and image of a sovereign state. In order to achieve that, negotiations have to be carried out with Türkiye by both Syria and Israel, and possibly also by the Trump administration.
On the issues of the regime's relationship with minority communities, Israel has no relationship or interest in the Alawite community that was the mainstay of the Assad regime. It does have a historic relationship with the Kurds, but not a particularly close relationship with the Syrian Kurds, and in any event, it seems that the relationship between the regime and the Kurds has been calmed.
