Since the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of the HTS-led transitional authority in Syria on 8 December 2024, Israel has carried out an estimated 700 air strikes on Syrian territory. This, despite the fact that not a single bullet has been fired across the border from Syria.
On the surface, Israel appears to be the aggressor—particularly as several Israeli ministers have openly called for Syria’s partition. The scale and persistence of Israeli military actions seem, at best, excessive, and at worst, part of a broader campaign to keep Syria weak and fragmented.
Yet simply denouncing Israel’s conduct misses the strategic logic that underpins it. Understanding that logic does not mean endorsing it. But without understanding, we cannot effectively engage—nor can we hope to safeguard Syria’s interests on the regional and global stage.
From Israel’s perspective, its most dangerous and intractable enemies are Islamist movements—whether Iran and its network of proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis) or transnational terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda, and their offshoots. And while Syria’s new leaders now present themselves as pragmatic and non-threatening, many have past associations with jihadist groups and espouse ideological tenets that continue to fuel instability.
Israel’s current security doctrine is shaped by painful lessons—chief among them its experience with Hamas in Gaza. That experience has hardened a belief that Islamist-led governments cannot be trusted to remain pragmatic for long.
Sanctions relief is not a blank cheque. It comes with clear expectations, which include constructive relations with Israel.
Israeli hesitations
For Israelis, it is not enough for a government to refrain from violence today—they fear what may come tomorrow, when ideology once again overrides rational statecraft. Thus, the Syrian leadership's recent declarations of moderation and its hints at future participation in the Abraham Accords are viewed in Tel Aviv not as breakthroughs but as question marks—unbankable promises born of transitional necessity.
Still, Israel's concerns cannot be allowed to indefinitely justify violations of Syrian sovereignty. Nor should Syria's troubled past prevent it from pursuing a different, more constructive future. What is urgently needed now is not more air strikes or rhetoric—but direct dialogue: open, transparent, and grounded in realism.
This dialogue should begin with limited but tangible goals. Not normalisation. Not entry into the Abraham Accords. These steps will require difficult concessions—particularly on the Golan Heights—that only a future, democratically-elected government can legitimately make. Instead, the immediate objective should be an interim agreement that addresses Israeli security concerns about Syria's trajectory while affirming that Syria cannot be treated as a permanent buffer zone or proxy battlefield.
Confidence-building measures might include coordination on border security, joint monitoring arrangements, or limited cooperation on reconstruction and energy projects in Syria's south—mirroring the pragmatic engagement seen in parts of northern Syria under Turkish influence. The aim is to build trust and predictability, paving the way for more meaningful negotiations in the future.
Some may argue that such an initiative is futile—that Israel's global alliances, particularly with the United States, give it little reason to compromise. But this assumption may no longer hold. In fact, President Donald Trump's recent decision to lift sanctions on Syria—reportedly over the objections of current Israeli leaders—signals a shift. Whether strategic or transactional, the move suggests that Washington is open to giving Syria's transitional government space to prove itself.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (R) watching as US President Donald Trump (C) shakes hands with Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Riyadh on May 14, 2025.
No blank cheque
This sanctions relief is not a blank cheque. It represents a trial period with clear expectations: progress in addressing the presence of foreign fighters, responsible engagement in the ongoing fight against IS, respect for pluralism and minority rights, and yes, constructive relations with neighbours, including Israel. How Syria's leadership handles these issues will determine whether the relief continues or is reversed.
This moment presents a rare opportunity. For all its ideological baggage, the HTS-led transitional authority has a chance to demonstrate that it can govern differently, that it can learn from the past and lead Syria down a new path. Engaging Israel in a serious, open-ended dialogue—one that acknowledges hard truths while aspiring toward real compromise—would be a powerful sign of that evolution.
We do not need to approve of, or legitimise, Israel's actions in Gaza or elsewhere to recognise that Israel is a geopolitical reality. It is militarily and economically dominant, diplomatically entrenched, and supported—at various times—by all major powers, including Russia and China. Ignoring this reality is not a strategy. Confronting it wisely and soberly is.
Syria's future will not be secured through slogans, silence, or wishful thinking. It will be forged through difficult decisions, made with eyes wide open and the interests of our people at heart. And right now, what's best for Syria is to talk with Israel.
