Last week’s rocket fire from southern Syria into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights was the first such incident since the ousting of the Assad regime, yet it triggered a familiar cycle: cross-border retaliation and political finger-pointing. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz swiftly blamed Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, promising a "full response" and holding him personally responsible for every projectile fired.
But Israel’s position reveals a glaring contradiction. It is both incoherent and self-defeating to hold al-Sharaa’s government accountable for attacks while simultaneously obstructing its ability to govern and restore order in southern Syria. If Israel continues to weaken the very state it expects to secure its frontier, the result will likely be increased, not reduced, security threats. Such policy incoherence is a risk the fragile region cannot afford.
According to Israel, the rockets were launched from the southern town of Tasil. No casualties were reported. The Israeli military responded with immediate force, targeting what it claimed were weapons sites and issuing a blanket warning that the Syrian government would “continue to bear the consequences” of any future attacks.
There was no confirmation of who launched the projectiles. A little-known group calling itself the Muhammad Deif Brigades—named after the late Hamas commander—claimed responsibility, though the statement remains unverified. Damascus denied involvement, reaffirmed its non-aggression policy, and condemned the Israeli strikes as a violation of its sovereignty that caused significant civilian and material losses.
Here lies the contradiction: Since al-Assad's fall in late 2024, Israel has ramped up air strikes across Syria, blocked Syrian military redeployment to the south, and occupied large swaths of Syrian territory. Yet it continues to insist Syria is solely responsible for security lapses. Ironically, the very power vacuum Israel decries is one it has helped to create.
Missed opportunity
There was a brief window after al-Assad's ouster when things could have taken a different course. Al-Sharaa’s transitional government publicly declared its intention to avoid confrontation with Israel. Instead of supporting de-escalation, Israel launched over 600 air strikes in just ten days, advanced deeper into Syrian territory, and began constructing infrastructure indicative of long-term occupation.
If Israel maintains this course—isolating and attacking Syria while demanding that it enforce stability—it will only escalate the very instability it claims to oppose. Already, tensions in Daraa and its surrounding regions are escalating. Israeli military incursions, restrictions on civilian movement, and repeated airstrikes are inflaming an already fragile environment. Power vacuums don't remain empty for long; they are filled not by allies, but by groups and cells intent on confrontation.
Southern Syria risks becoming another southern Lebanon—a haven for militias, foreign influence, and protracted conflict. By degrading Syria’s transitional authority, Israel is opening space for Iran, Hezbollah, and other destabilising forces to entrench themselves.
Washington seems to recognise the danger. The US has shifted its Syria policy, lifting key sanctions and initiating direct engagement with Damascus. This is not out of goodwill, but out of strategic necessity: only a functioning Syrian state can reassert control and limit foreign exploitation. If Israel wants to avoid becoming surrounded by failed states and foreign proxies, it must rethink its approach.
Israel’s doctrine of strategic depth—the rationale behind buffer zones and territorial control—has been stretched to absurdity. Tel Aviv now demands a demilitarised zone (buffer one) to protect its newly occupied territory (buffer two) to defend the Golan Heights (buffer three). This recursive logic is no longer a strategy—it is a cycle of fear posing as policy.
