Striving for calm as Israel and Türkiye find more reasons to fight

Ankara and Tel Aviv have been at each other’s throats for years, not least over Gaza, while a change in leadership in Syria has thrown fuel on the fire. Thankfully, there are deconfliction mechanisms.

Eduardo Ramon

Striving for calm as Israel and Türkiye find more reasons to fight

Relations between Türkiye and Israel have deteriorated further ever since opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) toppled the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December 2024. Türkiye supported HTS and maintains good relations with the current HTS-led interim government in Damascus, whereas Israel is wary of the newcomers.

Türkiye-Israel relations have been poor since October 2023, and for the two preceding decades, they had their ups and downs, albeit with much more frequent downs, not least because Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) can be generally described as ideologically anti-Israel and pro-Palestine.

It is far more subtle than that, however. Erdoğan can point to some of the big moments in world history to showcase support. In 1492, the Ottoman Empire embraced Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain when few others did. Likewise, shortly after the independent State of Israel was declared, Türkiye was the first Muslim country to recognise it diplomatically. Jews have been living in Türkiye for a long time, and there are still around 14,500 Jews living there.

Today, Türkiye’s longstanding Middle East policy is a thorn in Israel’s side. Ankara sees the Palestinian issue as a core problem compromising peace and stability in the region. It therefore perpetually calls for a Palestinian state, alongside the State of Israel. Yet that has not always been an impediment.

Promising beginnings

Most analysts believe relations with Israel peaked in the 1990s, with Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's visit in November 1994. In February and August 1996, the countries signed defence agreements that raised eyebrows in the Arab world. Turkish diplomats told their Arab counterparts that these agreements with Israel did not target Arab countries, and that good bilateral relations would be to the benefit of the Palestinian cause.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Türkiye became the top tourist destination for Israelis. More than 310,000 holidayed there in 2001, and by 2008 this number had climbed to 580,000. On 10 June 2005, Erdoğan was presented with the Courage to Care Award in New York by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a Jewish organisation. In his speech, Erdoğan referred to antisemitism as a shameful disease of the mind and called the Holocaust the worst crime against humanity throughout history.

Eitan ABRAMOVICH / AFP
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shakes hands with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon during a joint press conference in Occupied Jerusalem on May 1, 2005.

Yet it was around this time that the first problems began to arise, beginning with Erdogan's memorable reaction in March 2004 to Israel’s assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas. Erdogan accused Israel of state terrorism.

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül visited Israel in January 2005, and Erdoğan visited in May, so relations seemed to be back on track. Three years later, in 2008, Türkiye initiated and mediated indirect talks between Syria and Israel on the occupied Golan.

Consecutive blows

Significant problems were caused by Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, launched against Gaza in December 2008, which killed up to 1,400 Palestinians. Erdoğan believed that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert—who visited Ankara just a few days before the operation—knowingly deceived him.

Relations took a further hit later that year when, during a panel discussion at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Erdoğan yelled at Israeli President Shimon Perez, saying: “When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill.” He then left the stage.

In 2010, Israeli commandos attacked the Mavi Marmara, a ship carrying humanitarian aid supplies to blockaded Gaza. Ten Turkish citizens onboard were killed, causing relations to nose-dive. In 2013, Israel apologised to Türkiye for the commandos’ actions and paid compensation to the families of those killed in 2016. This paved the way for the two countries to reinstate their ambassadors after a six-year diplomatic hiatus.

In the years that followed, relations were still bumpy, but Israelis still holidayed in Türkiye, with more than 20 flights daily between Istanbul and Tel Aviv, plus charter flights, while bilateral trade reached $4.9bn in 2017 (Türkiye’s exports to Israel were $3.4bn and imports from Israel were $1.5bn).

In 2018, President Donald Trump recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, despite the city also being claimed as the capital of Palestine. Trump’s recognition, which included moving the US Embassy, led to a war of words between Türkiye and Israel. Ambassadors were again withdrawn—and remained so for four years.

Adem Altan/AFP
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas (L) with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara on March 5, 2024.

As the two countries grew further apart, Israel established close relations with Greece, Türkiye’s traditional adversary, and with the Greek Cypriots. Together with Egypt (whose relations with Türkiye were also strained), they established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum to challenge Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

In 2022, Turkish and Israeli ambassadors returned to resume their duties, and Erdoğan met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in September 2023 in New York, where they were attending the United Nations General Assembly. Analysts saw this first-ever bilateral meeting as a sign of improving relations.

Yet just days later, on 7 October 2023, Hamas attacked southern Israel, prompting a retaliation that remains ongoing. With tens of thousands of Palestinians having been killed, relations between Israel and Türkiye have reached a nadir. Türkiye ended all trade relations and supported a legal case against Israel in the international courts.

Vocal in his criticism of Israel, Erdoğan called on Islamic countries to form an alliance against “the growing threat of expansionism” from Israel. One of Erdoğan’s fiery statements was even interpreted as a threat to send military forces to stop Israel.

Fight over Syria

Israeli leaders now see Türkiye as an ideological opponent, and the overthrow of al-Assad in Syria has set up an arena in which the two countries’ militaries are both active, raising the prospects that their already-strained relations may come to a head.

Israel knows that interim-President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Islamist HTS have a jihadist-Salafist background and fears they could target Israel at some point, so the Israeli air force systematically destroyed all Syrian state military infrastructure—including warships, fighter jets, and radar—in the hours after al-Assad fell.

Ultimately, Israel wants Syria to remain weak and divided. It does not want a strong, assertive, pro-Palestinian state to its immediate north. Israel aims to create a security belt around its borders, so its forces now occupy all of the Golan Heights.

Despite Israel’s aggression, President al-Sharaa continues to act pragmatically and with a cool head. His priority is to keep his country united and to get it back on its feet economically. To this end, he has stated several times that Syria does not pose a threat to Israel and does not seek conflict. Yet Israel is concerned that Türkiye plans to train the Syrian army and establish military bases in Syrian territory.

 Ozan Kose/AFP

These concerns were publicly voiced by the Nagel Committee, an advisory board tasked by the Israeli government with identifying national security threats. In a report it released in January, the committee pointed to “Türkiye’s policy to rebuild regional influence” and referred to “a Turkish threat worse than Iran”. The committee concluded by recommending that Israel prepare for potential conflict with Türkiye.

On 11 November 2024 (before the fall of al-Assad), Israel’s foreign minister, Gideon Sa’ar, recommended reaching out to minorities such as the Kurds, whom he called “victims of oppression and aggression” by Iran and Türkiye, describing the Kurds as “one of the great nations without political independence”.

Israel has continued its outreach work ever since, with an emphasis on Kurds, Druze and Alawites. Speaking at an Independence Day reception in Jerusalem in May, Sa'ar said the international community must "fulfil its duty to protect minorities in Syria, and specifically the Druze, from the regime and its terrorist gangs". This was interpreted as a threat against both al-Sharaa and Türkiye.

Period of posturing

Israel is closely monitoring Syrian-Turkish links, with al-Sharaa said to have reached informal agreements on defence cooperation during his visit to Türkiye in February.

Türkiye was reportedly set to provide training to the Syrian army, while using two military bases in Syria where aircraft and air defence systems would also be deployed. Shortly after, the Israeli air force bombed military bases in Homs and Hama that were said to have been allocated for this purpose, destroying runways, hangars, and other facilities. Israel also dropped bombs near the presidential palace in Damascus, in a move designed to intimidate al-Sharaa.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during his visit to Hungary that they do not want Türkiye establishing itself on Israel's borders. And a senior Israeli official said that establishing military bases in Syria under Turkish protection is a red line, but that Tel Aviv is not looking for conflict with Ankara and hopes that the reverse is true. 

With fears of a direct confrontation between Türkiye and Israel growing, representatives of both countries met secretly in Baku in March and held talks aimed at deconfliction. These appear to have brought about an air of calm. While no official statement was forthcoming, the two countries are understood to have agreed to establish contact points and a 'hotline' of sorts.

Many analysts see Netanyahu as an increasingly unpopular politician at home, who casts around the region seeking wars to wage, but this approach is leading to criticism from allies such as the UK, France, and Canada, while even President Trump is reportedly unhappy at Israel's continued bombardment of Gaza.

Bandar AL-JALOUD / Saudi Royal Palace
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (R) watching as US President Donald Trump (C) shakes hands with Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Riyadh on May 14, 2025.

Not all Israel's way

While Trump has not publicly rebuked his Israeli counterpart, his actions are read as messages, with observers noting that Israel was not included in Trump's Middle East tour in May. Trump has also met al-Sharaa and lifted sanctions on Syria, a decision he took after speaking to Erdoğan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Tellingly, he added that he did not ask Israel. Such steps and statements have irked Netanyahu, but Israel's extreme right-wing government only has itself to blame.

Azerbaijan hosted a second set of meetings, in May, this time with representatives of Israel, Syria, and Türkiye convening in Baku for talks. Again, there was no official statement, the meetings having been at a technical level and aimed at deconfliction. Yet it would only have taken place with the blessing of the relevant political authorities.

Calm prevails between Türkiye and Israel for now. Israeli and Syrian officials are also said to have met face to face at their border. This kind of engagement will help pave the way for new relations among the major regional actors, encouraging economic cooperation and development. Although Netanyahu and Erdoğan are unlikely to become best friends, if the two countries can refrain from fighting each other in Syria, that will be seen as a success.

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