The fight for resources could determine who 'wins' the war in Sudan

The army and the RSF rely on the assets at their disposal to sustain governance and fund their war efforts, while trying to win over the international community by seizing larger swathes of Sudan

Peter Reynolds

The fight for resources could determine who 'wins' the war in Sudan

With no end in sight to Sudan’s civil war between its army and a breakaway paramilitary group, and efforts to facilitate peace talks frustrated, analysts now suggest that the fight will come down to each side’s control of resources, suggesting that the winner will be the one able to command the necessities for an economy.

Now in its third year, the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), based in Port Sudan in the east, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), based in Darfur in the west, is now in its third year, with no prospect for a peaceful solution, after efforts by states including the US, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt drew a blank.

The two foes now seek international recognition and have both sought to establish a ‘government’ in recent weeks, to confer a sense of legitimacy, despite the fighting having precipitated perhaps the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with widespread reports of war crimes on all sides. “In Sudan’s war, legitimacy and resources are two sides of the same coin,” said Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King's College London, speaking to Al Majalla.

“Neither the SAF nor the RSF can credibly sustain a government without controlling the resources that fund the war effort, feed populations, and underpin patronage networks. In practical terms, whoever can point to a functioning economy—whether through oil exports, gold sales, agricultural surpluses or customs revenues—will have a stronger case for governance.”

 Peter Reynolds

Controlling resources

The SAF controls the vital Red Sea coast, huge tracts of agricultural land, oil transport infrastructure, hydropower dams (which generate most of Sudan’s power), and has the capital Khartoum. In Darfur and Kordofan, the RSF controls most of Sudan’s gold, its livestock grazing lands, and Gum Arabic—a substance harvested from acacia trees that is used to make beverages (Sudan supplies nearly 80% of the world’s Gum Arabic).

“From a purely economic standpoint, the RSF sits atop the country’s most valuable raw assets, while the SAF holds the ports, institutions, and infrastructure that would let those assets reach international markets,” said Krieg. Both army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti) are fighting over Sudan’s oil supplies. A victory for either side over this crucial resource could prove decisive in the confrontation.

However, Krieg cautioned that although “recognition depends as much on legitimacy, conduct, and international law as it does on resource control, in the event of a long stalemate, oil would be a powerful tool for the faction that holds it to present itself as the functional government of Sudan,” adding: “At present, international legitimacy still rests with the SAF, which holds Sudan’s formal seat at the UN and retains the appearance of a state apparatus.”

Arguably, the SAF has received more support than the RSF. Iran gave arms and drones at a time when the RSF was winning territory in Africa’s third-largest country. China and Russia have also built relations with the SAF. Moscow, which wants a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, has given the SAF fuel, weapons, and equipment. Regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Türkiye, and Egypt, have also stood behind Burhan. A Saudi delegation visited Port Sudan in March, vowing to help in the reconstruction effort. That month, the SAF wrested back Khartoum and Gezira, the latter being the country’s central farming hub.

In the event of a long stalemate, oil would be a powerful tool for the faction that holds it

Andreas Krieg of King's College London

Generating revenue

Hellen Abatoni Muzungu, a security analyst at business risk consultant RANE, told Al Majalla that "although the RSF's assets generate considerable revenue, the SAF's dominance over ports, financial institutions, farmland, and state infrastructure provides it with a stronger strategic foundation". Port Sudan, a key trading hub, has been the SAF's temporary capital since 2023, but the army plans to relocate back to Khartoum later this year in what would be a symbolic move. The RSF's looting of Khartoum was comprehensive, however. Even the city's cabling has been completely stripped.

For the time being, the most important territory the RSF holds is western Darfur, known for its vast mineral wealth, including its gold mines. The group controls the entire region of Darfur except for El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which the RSF has surrounded, trapping the SAF's troops and 900,000 civilians. Having cut all supply lines, there are fears of mass starvation in the city.

The RSF has been fighting to control the gold trade in North Darfur since 2017. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese are believed to have been killed, and millions displaced in what has essentially been a sectarian scorched-earth campaign. The RSF, having begun life as the Janjaweed militia. Comprised mainly of Arab nomadic tribes from the Sahel, who were first recruited as mercenaries by Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, the Janjaweed targeted communities based solely on their ethnicities.

In April 2019, Burhan and Hemedti's RSF (which grew out of the Janjaweed in 2013) teamed up to topple Sudan's longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, ending his 30-year reign. However, they turned on each other just three years later. Hemedti's gold smuggling via neighbouring countries to the United Arab Emirates is widely believed to have financed the RSF's war effort since then (the UAE denies helping the RSF).

Sudan is Africa's third-largest producer of gold, which crosses Darfur's borders into Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic before reaching the UAE's international markets. Despite the UAE's claims to the contrary, both the UN and the SAF accuse it of giving the RSF arms and drones, either directly or via its regional allies such as Khalifa Haftar, a warlord who controls eastern Libya. Haftar's men have fought alongside the RSF, according to the Sudanese army in June.

Getty
Pure Sudanese gold nuggets, one of the best in the world.

Battle for Kordofan

Between the SAF-controlled Khartoum and the RSF's Darfur lies the oil-rich region of Kordofan, which is now a key battlefield. The RSF currently controls areas in north, west, and south Kordofan, and the SAF knows that victory in Kordofan would put it in pole position to threaten the RSF's core base in Darfur. Conversely, if the RSF wins all of Kordofan, it could once again threaten Khartoum.

Muzungu said: "Should the RSF consolidate control over Kordofan—most of which it already holds—it would expand its financial base and political leverage, likely reinforcing its parallel governing structures, deepening the stalemate, and further eroding the SAF's claim to national authority." Krieg agreed. "Control of Kordofan's oilfields would certainly shift the balance of power in practical terms. Oil remains Sudan's most strategic resource. It provides fuel for domestic consumption and generates transit fees from South Sudan."

The latter's economy is "almost entirely dependent" on pumping crude northwards through Sudan's pipelines, said Krieg. A pipeline across Sudan transports around 150,000 barrels of oil per day to the Red Sea coastline. "Whichever side can guarantee uninterrupted oil flows to Port Sudan could find itself in a stronger bargaining position, both domestically and regionally," he added. 

"In the medium- to long-term, this control might translate into greater diplomatic leverage. Neighbours such as South Sudan and international investors like China would be compelled to deal with whoever keeps oil production running. This echoes Libya's experience, where control of oil terminals in the east eventually forced international traders to engage with the separatist administration in Benghazi." 

AFP
The Brega oil port in Marsa al-Brega, about 270 kilometres west of the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, on September 24, 2020.

Split predicament

Since the killing of Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has been ruled by two administrations—the UN-accredited one in Tripoli, and Haftar's in Benghazi. Each controls different assets. Some now think the same split could happen in Sudan. This would make a political transition and economic recovery virtually impossible. "If neither side achieves a decisive victory, this division of resources and territory could solidify into two rival governments coexisting for years," Muzungu said.

"The resemblance (to Libya) is sharpened by the role of the UAE," which backs Haftar in Benghazi, said Krieg. "By strengthening a parallel power structure in Darfur, Abu Dhabi has amplified separatist dynamics in Sudan much as it did in Libya, making reunification less likely.

"Yet Sudan's social fabric is more complex than Libya's, with tribal networks, ethnic militias and shifting alliances that make a clean east—west split improbable. Instead of two coherent states, Sudan risks fragmenting into multiple fiefdoms, each sustained by different resources and foreign backers. In that sense, the Libyan parallel may even understate the danger: what Sudan faces is not just dual governments but the potential for prolonged chaos as resources are siphoned off by competing warlords."

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