Sudan's war is hard to end because it is so misunderstood

On 11 April, RSF fighters stormed the Zamzam camp, committing atrocities of an ethnic nature and carrying out summary executions of humanitarian workers, according to eyewitness accounts. Among the victims were nine healthcare workers at a clinic operated by Relief International, the last functioning medical facility in the camp.

Zamzam was already a place in dire need of help. In August 2024, catastrophic famine (Phase 5 of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) was declared there. Respected healthcare charity Médecins Sans Frontières reported that one child was dying every two hours due to hunger or disease.

Analysts and activists have long accused the United Arab Emirates of supporting the RSF in return for some of Darfur's mineral wealth, including diamonds. Last month, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) began hearing a case brought by Sudan accusing the UAE of being "complicit in genocide"—a charge Abu Dhabi denies.

In London, UAE representatives opposed language suggested by Egypt and Saudi Arabia that called for respecting Sudan's state institutions, an implicit reference to the Sudanese army.

Calling out the RSF

Continued military and logistical support for the RSF, including drones used to attack infrastructure, is increasingly causing tensions diplomatically and politically. US Representative Sara Jacobs and Senator Chris Van Hollen are among those calling this the main reason for the perpetuation of war in Sudan.

In February 2025, the RSF and other forces formed the 'Tassis' alliance in Nairobi, after the 'Tagadum' alliance led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok splintered. Their aim is to announce a parallel government based in Darfur, and explain the militia's intensified efforts to seize El-Fasher. This would heighten the risk of Sudan's fragmentation, which would impact its immediate neighbours most of all.

Outside the London conference, Sudanese protesters voiced their opposition to the invitation of those they accuse of fuelling the conflict. Some Western diplomats felt that these protests were contrived extensions of official Sudanese government positions—aligned with the political aspirations of Sudan's elite—rather than genuine expressions of public anger.

To some Sudanese, however, this simply exemplified the West's misjudgment of Sudan and its inability to adapt to unfolding realities, with international actors clinging dogmatically to their initial assessments, regardless of unfolding evidence. This has led to Sudanese scepticism about foreign intentions and weakened the perceived ability of external actors to come up with solutions.

False equivalence

Some have likened the international community's handling of Sudan to the early stages of the Bosnian War, where Western powers adopted a false equivalence between the Bosnian government and Serbian militias, despite clear evidence of ethnic cleansing and genocide by the latter.

While SAF soldiers are not without fault or blame, there is a stark difference between their conduct and the conduct of the RSF militia. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the SAF was responsible for nearly 200 incidents involving civilian casualties last year, compared to around 1,300 incidents attributed to the RSF.

Diplomatic neutrality in the face of clear aggression can enable the very crimes the world vowed never to tolerate again, yet from the RSF's massacre of the Masalit people in 2023 to the recent storming of Zamzam camp, many remain indifferent amidst the weaponisation of information and use of alternative narratives.

For instance, the spectre of Islamic extremism is invoked, possibly to divert international attention from the atrocities being committed by the RSF. This narrative seeks to frighten the West with the prospect of a resurgence of political Islam and terrorism, effectively enabling genocide under the guise of 'counterterrorism'.

In such an environment of misinformation, external actors have been urged to redouble their efforts to verify facts, as the world faces a moment of truth over Sudan: whether to continue with its policy of equivalence with the SAF and RSF, or whether to align with the aspirations of ordinary Sudanese, who seek neither foreign patrons nor proxy negotiations, but rather sovereign, sustainable peace.

Currently, the RSF and their external sponsors are largely free to act without accountability, which means that reports of massacres will continue to come in. London shows that peace in Sudan is unlikely to come from power-brokered mediations behind closed doors in Western capitals, no matter how well-intentioned.