On 20 June 2020, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi drew a red line around the Libyan cities of Sirte and al-Jufra, threatening to intervene militarily if Türkiye-backed forces crossed it. In so doing, he set Cairo on a collision course with Ankara. A year earlier, after the former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi died from a heart attack while in court, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly mourned his former ally’s death, blaming Egypt’s “tyrants” for his death, which he said stemmed from a lack of medical care in prison.
Today, that all seems like a distant memory, as Egyptian and Turkish fighter aircraft flew over the Egyptian capital last week at the end of a joint military exercise, their first in nearly two decades. It speaks volumes about the change in bilateral relations and their perceptions of one another in just a few years. After a period of tension, Egypt and Türkiye are charting a new course, one that has built momentum since February 2024, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Cairo for the first time in 12 years.
Back in 2013, Erdoğan criticised the Sisi-led coup that ousted Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood from power just a year after the party won a general election following the removal of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. The two countries still hold divergent regional views and ideological affiliations and have differing economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
However, Sisi reciprocated Erdoğan’s overture a few months later by visiting Ankara and confirming his administration’s desire for a new beginning. When the Turkish president returned to Cairo in February 2026, it heralded a realignment that could prove significant at a time when regional alliances are shifting.
From friction to friends
Over recent years, Türkiye has courted Islamist movements across the Arab world, seeking to empower political Islam after the fall of several autocratic regimes in Arab states, including Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Ankara may have felt that Islamist regimes taking over in Arab states would reposition Türkiye at the top of the regional order and help its claim to contested Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon resources.
At one point, friction between Egypt and Türkiye was so intense that it threatened to morph into an actual confrontation in Libya, where Cairo and Ankara backed two opposing sides, hence Sisi’s red line around Sirte and al-Jufra to protect the eastern Libyan government. Although Libya was not the only contentious point between Türkiye and Egypt, it was emblematic of the broader tensions.
Today, Libya is a symbol of the positive change in relations. In April this year, special combat troops from Egypt and Türkiye participated in joint drills in none other than Sirte. Part of the Flintlock 2026 exercises, the drills were the latest involving Egypt, Türkiye, and other states, but the recalibration also has an economic angle. The two countries want to raise bilateral trade from $9bn to $15bn by 2028, enhance their investment cooperation, and work together in the defence sector. Egypt would also like Türkiye to invest in its economy and craves Turkish technology, especially its military know-how.
