Politics

After el-Fasher: the trajectory of war in Sudan

Washington seems to have changed its tone after the RSF committed atrocities in October, putting increasing pressure on the foreign backers of a paramilitary that now controls Darfur. What next?

REUTERS/Mohamed Zakaria

Women and children at the Zamzam displacement camp, close to el-Fasher in North Darfur, Sudan, in January 2024.

After el-Fasher: the trajectory of war in Sudan

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb

last update on 16 Nov 2025

In el-Fasher, the sky seemed to collapse upon the weary shoulders of a city long strangled by siege, as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) flung open the gates of hell on 26 October, unleashing terror on those clinging to life like. The level of violence has reshaped the civil war in Sudan. Many now wonder whether the state itself will survive.

El-Fasher is the capital of North Darfur and the last holdout of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in western Darfur, a landlocked, mineral-rich area the size of Spain. It fell to the RSF after more than 500 days under siege. By the end of October, the city’s population of 1.5 million (as recorded in May 2024) had shrunk to around 250,000. Many of these were internally displaced and close to starvation, surviving on livestock fodder. As satellite images showed, the RSF built a 57km earthen barrier encircling the city, sealing it off entirely.

A coalition of army units, joint forces from Darfuri armed movements, and local popular resistance fighters had mounted the 500-day defence of el-Fasher. In their minds was the RSF’s genocidal rampage through El Geneina, capital of West Darfur, at the war’s outset. In April, the RSF stormed the Kalma camp for displaced persons. Drone struck hospitals, mosques, and homes. More than 260 ground assaults were launched in attempts to breach el-Fasher.

In the end, starvation was used as a weapon, until 26 October, when the RSF launched a massive offensive against the Sixth Infantry Division, the army’s last remaining base in Darfur. After fierce combat, the RSF seized the base, deploying advanced Chinese-made drones, hundreds of foreign mercenaries, and a sophisticated Chinese jamming system capable of disabling Starlink communications. The use of such technology by a non-state actor alarmed regional observers.

AFP — Aerial shot of el-Fasher during the RSF offensive.

A tale of horror

Having breached the city’s gates, the RSF began massacring civilians. According to the World Health Organisation, more than 460 patients and staff were killed inside the Saudi Maternity Hospital alone. RSF fighters posted videos on social media showing them stepping over piles of corpses and shooting survivors at point-blank range. No-one was spared—not the sick, nor their caretakers. Up to 2,000 people are thought to have been killed in the hours after the city’s collapse.

The International Organisation for Migration estimated that around 62,000 people fled el-Fasher from 26-29 October, most of them on foot, heading towards the town of Tawila, 70 km away. Along the way, they faced extortion, sexual violence, and brutal assaults. A much smaller number are thought to have made it to the town, but reliable statistics are hard to come by.

Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab observed body-disposal activities between 25 October and 13 November 2025 at four locations within el-Fasher. Two sites—el-Fasher University and Saudi Hospital—are reported by Sudan Tribune to serve as two of five RSF detention centres identified, according to those arriving in Tawilah. More than 50,000 people are believed to be detained by the RSF.

Among the atrocities and perpetrators, one name recurs: that or Fath al-Rahman Abdullah Idris, known as Abu Lulu. The most notorious of RSF's field commanders, he is unwaveringly loyal to the RSF's military leader, Abdelrahim Dagalo. Abu Lulu is known for his extreme brutality against civilians, orchestrating massacres and looting. He regularly flaunts his atrocities on social media. This is not just sadism; it is psychological warfare, designed to instil terror, crush resistance, and reinforce the idea of racial supremacy that is at the root of this conflict.

The RSF took el-Fasher using Chinese drones, foreign mercenaries, and a Chinese jamming system that disabled Starlink communications

Diplomats meet

Two days before the fall of el-Fasher, on 24 October, Washington hosted a meeting of the so-called Quad (the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates), attended by a delegation from the Sudanese government. The aim was to revive the political track towards ending the war and to address the role of foreign interference that continues to fuel the conflict. The UAE has been accused of supporting the RSF with funding and weapons, but denies doing so. This meeting, therefore, brought Sudanese and Emirati officials face-to-face.

The Quad roadmap was issued on 12 September 2025. It called for a three-month humanitarian truce to facilitate the delivery of aid, followed by a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month transitional process to establish a civilian government. Yet divergences within the Quad quickly surfaced. The Americans, Egyptians, and Saudis favoured a phased approach, beginning with confidence-building measures and a ceasefire before moving towards political negotiations, but the UAE pushed for a compressed timeline.

Talks collapsed just as the RSF stormed el-Fasher. The fall of el-Fasher dealt a severe blow to the Quad's efforts to broker a humanitarian truce. On-the-ground events indicated that the RSF had no interest in a ceasefire. Instead, it sought to ensure its military dominance over Darfur before any political settlement could be imposed.

Events have exposed internal RSF fractures. The political wing, led by Hemedti's younger brother Al-Qouni Hamdan Dagalo, appeared to have little control over the militia's battlefield operations, which the elder brother, Abdelrahim Dagalo, directed. Meanwhile, the militia's founder and nominal leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—known as Hemedti—remained conspicuously absent, offering only pre-recorded video messages that seemed increasingly detached from reality.

This disconnect was already evident in September, when Hemedti spoke by phone to Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump's advisor on African affairs and Washington's envoy to the Quad. Hemedti pledged to allow humanitarian aid into el- Fasher. Boulos, relying on this assurance, announced on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly that aid delivery to the city was imminent. What followed was the opposite. The siege tightened, and military operations escalated. Hemedti's promise evaporated, revealing his lack of effective command. He is now seen only as a symbolic figurehead—an absent imam, rather than an active RSF commander.

Getting tough

After the massacres in el-Fasher, the US stance towards the RSF hardened. On 12 November, at the conclusion of the G7 summit in Canada, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered a pointed statement, emphasising the urgent need to halt the arming of the RSF, saying that the sources of RSF support were "well known and would be addressed at the highest levels of the US government." For Rubio, culpability extends not only to those who supply weapons but also to those who transfer them.

Rubio noted that while the RSF had nominally agreed to a proposed ceasefire, it had consistently failed to honour its commitments. Its violations, he stressed, were not the result of rogue elements but part of a systematic pattern. His remarks marked a departure from the previous US policy of balanced neutrality, placing clear responsibility on the RSF's foreign backers for the war's continuation and its atrocities. With advanced Chinese weaponry now seemingly in RSF hands, the US is concerned.

Trust between the SAF and RSF was already non-existent, but events in el-Fasher have extinguished any hope of rebuilding it. Strategically, the RSF has now strengthened its position with the full takeover of Darfur. This may mean it is less inclined to negotiate. Darfur has several productive gold mines, expansive agricultural lands, and strategic border crossings with Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. This facilitates the movement of weapons and fighters between Libya, Sudan, and the Sahel.

By taking el-Fasher, the RSF now controls an uninterrupted land corridor stretching from Benghazi in northern Libya to Nyala in southern Darfur. This strategic artery serves the interests of the RSF's foreign backers. It links eastern Libya, where Khalifa Haftar's forces hold sway, to western Sudan and deep into the African interior, spanning thousands of kilometres across resource-rich terrain. Analysts think this may redraw the map of regional influence and sovereignty.

Rubio noted that while the RSF had nominally agreed to a proposed ceasefire, it had consistently failed to honour its commitments

A new reality

The opening of this corridor carries profound implications for regional security. From Benghazi to Nyala is a vast stretch, all of which now lies beyond the reach of national governments. Instead, it is run by militias and armed groups affiliated with sprawling regional networks backed by foreign states. Drones, advanced munitions, logistical networks all come from external sponsors.

After the fall of el-Fasher, many ask: what now for Sudan? One possibility is for a prolonged war, driven by outside support for the RSF. This would mean more deaths, more displacement, and the total collapse of what remains of Sudan's infrastructure. It would also risk regional spillover. Another option is a de facto partition, with the RSF consolidating control over the west and south. This would mirror the fractured realities of Libya and Yemen, a scenario some external actors may favour.

To resolve the civil war militarily would require one side's clear superiority and the severing of all external supply lines. Yet even if the SAF could achieve this level of superiority and even if the RSF funding and weapons were to dry up, the militia would likely resort to prolonged guerrilla warfare and a drawn-out war of attrition. Equally undesirable is an imposed settlement, brokered through international pressure. As long as the RSF continued to operate, the situation would remain fragile. Moreover, the region's history shows that imposed resolutions seldom endure.

AFP — Members of the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) celebrate in a desert area called Gouz Abudloaa in 2019.

There is a growing international consensus that any sustainable peace in Sudan must begin with the dismantling of the RSF, as it is not a conventional military force that can be integrated into the national army. Rather, it is a militia built on tribal loyalty and sustained by systematic brutality. El-Fasher was entirely consistent with a recurring pattern of RSF crimes.

The international community faces a moral test. There is a difference between political neutrality and ethical indifference. Killing patients in hospitals is not a military act. Genuine pressure on the RSF's external sponsors could help end the war and the RSF's project of fragmentation rooted in narrow loyalties and foreign interests. El-Fasher's collapse and the massacres that followed show that the road ahead is long and arduous. The Sudanese people deserve a peace grounded in justice and accountability, and a state that protects them, not militias that plunder their resources.

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