Barbara Leaf on being the first US official to meet Ahmed Sharaa

There was a great deal of anxiety and concern about what this event meant. Nobody was sorry to see Bashar al-Assad go, but everybody, except for the Turks, was concerned about this jihadist and this group of jihadists coming to power.

Then, Secretary Blinken returned to Washington to consult with President Joe Biden. He and I agreed that I would stay back in Jordan, awaiting Washington's green light for me to go to Damascus. And so I spent that week preparing for that and working with Washington on a list of issues.

I got the green light and flew to Damascus on 20 December, accompanied by Roger Carstens, the President's Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs, who had been working on a set of missing Americans, including one who was very prominent, Austin Tice. I was also accompanied by one of my staff members, Jomana Kador, as well as my colleague, Ambassador Daniel Rubenstein, who had previously served as our Syria envoy.

So we met al-Sharaa for about an hour and a half. It's important to note that he was not president at that point; he was just 'the guy' who had liberated Syria. I had a full list of issues to raise with him, and also had a full list of issues to raise with me. We also discussed the $10mn bounty the US had on him.

By the end of the talks, it was just him, me, and Asaad Shaibani (Syria's now-foreign minister), and we had a very wide-ranging discussion. I raised the issue of terrorism, the fight against the Islamic State (IS). I asked how Damascus would posture towards the Syrian Kurds, the Syrian Democratic Forces, neighbouring states, Russia, etc.

Chemical weapons as well? Foreign fighters?

Yes, all of that. It was a very long list. He was clearly well-prepared for this discussion. Regarding the missing Americans, he said he would gladly assist in the search and asked us to assist him in the search for the thousands upon thousands of missing Syrians.

When he raised the issue of sanctions and requested that we lift everything immediately, I was very candid with him that it was a serious matter that we had to mull over.

At that point, there were six weeks left for the outgoing Biden administration to transition to the incoming Trump administration. I made no promises, but we had a very detailed discussion about the history of sanctions and the fact that there were different sanctions regimes with varying requirements. For example, some were executive branch decisions, while others, such as the Caesar Act, were matters of US law passed by Congress.

It was clear that his priority was the economy, but he was ready and willing to discuss all the other issues.

Then, a few weeks later, Natasha Franceschi, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, met Asaad Shaibani in Brussels and presented him with a list of American demands. Right?

Yes.

After that, the US approach appeared to be "here is a to-do list that you need to make progress on before we can seriously engage with your new government," but then Trump came to power and changed the whole equation. Right?

Yes, he did.

Why do you think he changed it?

You tell me. Well, the transition from January to May was very limited, so for four months, there was very limited engagement with the new Syrian government. And when there was, it was to hand over a list of requirements. And there was a second meeting later in March or April, I think, in New York, where there was further discussion of these conditions, etc.

I think a couple of things happened. First, one of the first topics the Saudi Crown Prince, His Highness Mohammed bin Salman, discussed with President Trump when they met at the airport in Riyadh was Syria. It was sort of a two-tiered message: we need you to lift US sanctions so that this new government can have a chance to work on the economy, and that will help stabilise Syria.

Then, they talked about al-Sharaa. As I understand it from several senior sources, the president immediately said, 'Bring him here, let me meet him.' It was a very bold move, one that, frankly, most US administrations would not have made. They would move very slowly, very gradually and make it a condition that if you do this, we'll do that and so forth.

I will tell you one thing that struck me when I returned from Damascus and spoke to senior congressional staff. There was already broad support for repealing the Caesar Act and lifting sanctions on Syria, to allow the new government space and time to regenerate the economy. Trump listened to the Saudi Crown Prince and the Turks.

Do you think that the Turks were involved in the operation to topple al-Assad?

To be sure, the Turks had enormous influence with HTS and maintained personal relations with Ahmed al-Sharaa and his senior lieutenants. They had a very large presence in the north. However, after speaking with many people and reviewing the incoming information, it seemed that, as fighters themselves publicly stated, they didn't expect to fully topple the regime. Their plan was to take Aleppo and govern it. But when they saw the Syrian army disintegrate, the road opened up to them. Regimes can look very solid and strong, but they turn out they be very brittle.

And after nearly three years of war in Ukraine, Russia simply didn't have the means or the political will to assist Assad. The same thing on the Iranian side. Also, Hezbollah was broken into pieces. So Assad had no support.

Israel intervened as well to prevent Iran from helping Assad.

No, I really don't think that's the case. The fact is, the Israelis had been striking the Iranians in Syria for some time. They had smashed up Hezbollah; they had two big military face-offs with Iran in April and October. The cumulative effect of all of that was that Assad, in the end, had only his own army, which was a mess, to depend on. And when he saw them disintegrating, he did what all such dictators do: he thought of himself, he got his bags, and he fled in the night.

Back to the meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Trump and al-Sharaa in Riyadh, on 14 May. Would you say that was a turning point in terms of engagement with Damascus?

Yes, the Saudis were conveying messages throughout the spring, but that was a hard ask. But because Trump likes big moves, and I think he bought the argument that stabilising Syria was an imperative, and it was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. But also what won him was the argument that 'we're not asking the American people to pay for this; we're just asking that America step out of the way with the sanctions, and we, regional actors, will do the work. I think that was a very persuasive argument.

Do you think that the idea of stabilising Syria in order to ensure Iran cannot get its foothold back into the country was part of the calculation as well?

Definitely. If you had gone back a year earlier in 2023, nobody would have been able to see such an eventuality. Assad flees, and overnight, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), all of the Iranian presence is gone, vanished. It was an extraordinary opportunity.

Even now, several regional actors and states have concerns and are closely monitoring al-Sharaa's actions, but even if their concerns about him, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and the foreign fighters persist, they mostly agree on the importance of stabilising Syria and keeping Iran and Hezbollah out because that has a wider security impact on events in Lebanon, Jordan, Türkiye and Israel.

When you met al-Sharaa in December 2024, could you ever have imagined that he would be in the White House less than a year later?

No. It's extraordinary.

When Trump met with al-Sharaa in Riyadh, the White House put forth a list of demands: IS, Abraham Accords, foreign fighters, and chemical weapons, among others. Do you think he has made some progress on those demands?

He was already moving on the chemical weapons issue. He had already welcomed the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) and said he's happy to cooperate with international experts coming in to secure and take those chemicals left over from the Assad regime.

Regarding the foreign fighters, yes. This is closely connected to the arrangements in northeast Syria and the relations with the SDF, which are also a work in progress. There is pressure from several sides to continue moving forward. Al-Sharaa agreed to meet with General Mazloum (Abdi).

I know that there were other governments pushing, but I can say that we, in the Biden administration, and then the Trump administration, both through military channels and diplomatic channels, pushed both sides to meet and agree on arrangements that would protect Kurdish rights, but also allow Syria to begin the long process and the complex process to integrating the forces into a national army. This issue is still in its infancy.

Do you think they will make genuine progress, or is one or both sides just buying time?

There's huge mistrust. This mistrust also exists between the Druze community and Damascus, as well as between the Alawite community and Damascus. Trust doesn't develop overnight; it is a work in progress.

Are you optimistic that they will reach a deal?

They have to, and it's in the interest of both. However, it will be a long and arduous process to reach the detailed arrangements necessary to effectively combat terrorism, drawing on the experience and capabilities of the Kurdish forces, but as part of a national force.

I think this administration will remain very engaged on this because any friction or collapse in the relationship between Damascus and the Kurds opens up opportunities for IS. That hurts Syria, the US and other countries. So everybody is motivated. But it's going to be a long and hard process.

What do you think about al-Sharaa signing Syria up to join the international coalition to fight IS?

It's a huge step forward. For more than 20 years, the Assad regime made Syria a conveyor belt for all of these fighters and then eventually for IS. So for Syria to go from that to being a member of the coalition is huge.

In terms of SDF, does that mean that coalition headquarters will be based in Damascus, not Al Hasakah? How is it going to work?

I don't know. I'm not sure it's going to change dramatically from one day to the next, because you still need to complete the integration. If you speak with any military expert who has worked on integrating a militia into a national force, it is a very complex process. These are fighters who have 10 years of experience in fighting IS—a level of experience and capability unmatched by any other forces in Syria.

Do you anticipate that US forces and the international coalition will move gradually from Iraq to Syria?

Not exactly. IS is still most potent in those two big pieces of territory (Eastern Syria and Western Iraq). It has not gone from Iraq. There are still cells that the Iraqis target on a regular basis.

Over time, the ideal situation will be a seamless networking of efforts across the border between Syrian and Iraqi forces. It's not the case yet. In a sense, the coalition is the glue that will ultimately hold them together, and they're talking with an understanding that that's what they need to move to.

As far as I know, the border remains closed, having been shut since 8 December, as the Iraqi government gains more confidence in Damascus. When speaking with Iraqi officials, I sense that they remain nervous, as it has been less than a year since this government took office. What if it falls? What happens? What is Syria going to look like if this government doesn't last? There's instability.

No one wants that scenario.

Exactly. President Trump has made it clear that he wants regional actors to assume more responsibility for their own security. Don't put it all on us. However, I do think that al-Sharaa, by having Syria formally join the coalition, gains an important vote and voice in how and when the US forces and coalition forces transition away. And maybe in effect, this lengthens the time that the US forces are there. They're not in huge numbers, nor are they in huge numbers in Iraq.

Trump generally doesn't like to see a lot of US troops overseas. I think he will be satisfied hearing that this is a way, over time, for Damascus to take more responsibility, for Syria to take more responsibility, just as Iraq has been able to take more and more responsibility for its own security. 

Do you think the Israelis are on board? And what do you think? Are we close to a deal?

I think there is a 50/50 chance. We're getting close.

Seriously?

Not to normalisation, just security arrangements.

Do you think we are close?

Yes. I can't tell you how close, but it's getting close. It's a priority of the administration, and it goes hand-in-hand with the economic underpinnings to stabilising Syria, making sure that Iran and other actors cannot re-enter and that it won't be a feeding ground for IS.

You've seen over and over again the push by the administration, mostly through Tom Barrack, to get the Syrians and Israelis in a common set of arrangements so that there will be no more military action, and I assume, over time, a pullback of Israeli forces, but that is going to take more time. The administration wants to find a formula where there are no more Israeli military strikes

Maybe like the de-confliction communication system?

That's right. I think it's extraordinary that you have these direct and publicly acknowledged discussions between Syrian and Israeli officials at a high level.