Are Israel and Türkiye heading for a showdown over Syria?

Ankara's drive to reintegrate Kurds into a centralised state clashes with Tel Aviv's preference for a weak, fractured Syria

Syrians celebrate at Umayyad Square in Damascus on December 20, 2024, after the ousting of Syria's Bashar al-Assad on December 8.
REUTERS/Ammar Awad
Syrians celebrate at Umayyad Square in Damascus on December 20, 2024, after the ousting of Syria's Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

Are Israel and Türkiye heading for a showdown over Syria?

Türkiye viewed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s downfall as a strategic opening to advance long-standing ambitions in Syria: suppressing Kurdish autonomy on its own terms and expanding its military footprint across the Levant. Yet Ankara has come to realise that these ambitions are increasingly challenged by a new rival—Israel.

Israel frames its operations in Syria as strictly defensive, focused on protecting its borders. Yet the pattern of operations, combined with political messaging, reveals a broader agenda: ensuring that no single regional power dominates post-war Syria.

Several Israeli strikes have hit sites tied to Turkish interests in rural Damascus, Hama and Homs, signalling a deliberate effort to restrain Ankara’s ambitions. Equally important is Israel’s narrative of minority protection, which undercuts Türkiye’s drive to dismantle Kurdish autonomy.

For now, Ankara has opted for silence—avoiding humiliation at home while quietly recalibrating its options. But without a mechanism to manage this rivalry, the risk of miscalculation looms. As Syria struggles through a fragile transition, renewed regional competition could once again turn the country into a proxy battlefield.

Türkiye's interests

For Ankara, Syria is both a strategic frontier and a domestic political imperative. Kurdish self-administration is viewed as inseparable from the PKK insurgency inside Türkiye. Allowing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to entrench autonomy would, in Ankara’s view, pose a direct threat to national security.

Militarily, Türkiye seeks forward bases and intelligence outposts across Syria. Sites such as Hama Air Base and Palmyra’s T4 facility were scouted by Turkish teams as anchors for long-term strategic depth in Syria and across the Levant.

Without a mechanism to manage the Israel-Türkiye rivalry in Syria, the risk of miscalculation looms

Politically, Ankara wants a centralised Syrian state capable of managing refugee returns, stabilising the economy, and giving Türkiye a leading role in reconstruction. A fragmented Syria, in its view, would invite unending instability with direct spillover effects across the border.

Read more: Should Syria have centralised or decentralised governance?

With more than 3 million Syrian refugees already inside Türkiye and mounting political and economic pressures at home, President Erdoğan faces mounting pressure to ensure that Syria's future eases—rather than exacerbates —Türkiye's burdens. For a moment, with al-Assad gone, these goals seemed achievable.

Israel's priorities

Israel's priorities, however, differ sharply. Its core military objective is to prevent hostile forces from establishing a permanent presence near its borders. Just as critical is preserving freedom of action in Syrian airspace to pre-empt threats and project deterrence.

From this perspective, fragmentation serves Israel better than centralisation. A Syria divided into autonomous zones, weakened institutions, and minimal foreign military presence gives Israel flexibility.

By contrast, a strong Turkish foothold in central and southern Syria would constrain its freedom of action while extending Ankara's surveillance reach.

Türkiye's drive to reintegrate the Kurds into a centralised state also clashes with Israel's preference for a weak, fractured Syria. It also undermines its efforts to maintain a de facto buffer zone along its northern frontier.

AFP
An Israeli soldier stands at an observation post in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights, overlooking southern Syria, on March 25, 2025.

Israel has not been shy in voicing opposition to Türkiye's expanding role. Since early 2025, Israeli officials and analysts have accused Ankara of building a "proto-state" inside Syria—an entity that could both extend Türkiye's influence and evolve into a rival regional power centre.

By April 2025, Israel had shifted from words to action. A series of airstrikes targeted Syrian air bases that Turkish teams had reportedly scouted for future deployment. The attacks on the T4 and Palmyra bases in Homs, along with Hama's main airport, were widely read as warning shots.

These attacks were far from being one-offs. In August 2025, an Israeli strike in Kiswa, south of Damascus, destroyed a facility said to house Turkish-supplied surveillance systems. This month, strikes in Homs reportedly hit sites linked to Turkish-provided weapons systems.

While Israel has not formally claimed responsibility for these operations, Israeli Army Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir recently stated that the military had "neutralised capabilities threatening our freedom of operation"—a remark widely interpreted as indirect confirmation.

Fragmentation strategy

These strikes fit neatly into Israel's broader political vision: a weak and divided Syria. Its pledge to protect the Druze minority complicates both Damascus's and Ankara's efforts to reintegrate regions outside government control.

Emboldened by this protection, prominent Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri has established parallel political and security structures in Sweida and begun calling for southern independence. While outright statehood is unlikely, momentum toward de facto autonomy is real, especially under continued Israeli protection.

Though Israel has not formally extended its pledge to protect Syrian Kurds, its rhetoric appears to have indirectly emboldened them. Leaders of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast have reportedly hardened their positions in negotiations with the transitional government. In a recent interview, President al-Sharaa noted that the Syrian Democratic Forces had become more rigid in talks, complicating efforts to fold them into a unified state framework.

Read more: Heading for a showdown? SDF conference riles Damascus

Continued deadlock risks cementing Syria's fragmentation, the scenario Ankara most fears. The more Syria fractures along ethnic and sectarian lines, the harder it becomes for Türkiye to repatriate refugees, stabilise the economy, and neutralise Kurdish ambitions.

Calculated silence

For now, Ankara remains strategically silent. By refusing to acknowledge Israeli strikes, it avoids admitting weakness and shields Erdoğan from nationalist backlash that could force escalation.

But restraint has limits. If an Israeli strike were to kill Turkish personnel—or if indisputable evidence of destroyed Turkish equipment emerged—domestic pressure could compel a response. Ankara might also conclude it must act pre-emptively to deter further strikes, risking a cycle of retaliation.

The absence of a formal mechanism to manage tensions makes miscalculation especially dangerous. Without clear boundaries or communication, the rivalry could spiral into direct confrontation—dragging Syria back into its role as a proxy battlefield.

In such a scenario, the prospect of building a stable, unified, and prosperous Syrian state would all but vanish. Once again, it would be ordinary Syrians—already battered by years of war—who pay the heaviest price.

By refusing to acknowledge Israeli strikes, Erdoğan avoids admitting weakness and shields himself from nationalist backlash that could force escalation

Calculated silence

For now, Ankara remains strategically silent. By refusing to acknowledge Israeli strikes, it avoids admitting weakness and shields Erdoğan from nationalist backlash that could force escalation.

But restraint has limits. If an Israeli strike were to kill Turkish personnel—or if indisputable evidence of destroyed Turkish equipment emerged—domestic pressure could compel a response. Ankara might also conclude it must act pre-emptively to deter further strikes, risking a cycle of retaliation.

The absence of a formal mechanism to manage tensions makes miscalculation especially dangerous. Without clear boundaries or communication, the rivalry could spiral into direct confrontation—dragging Syria back into its role as a proxy battlefield.

In such a scenario, the prospect of building a stable, unified, and prosperous Syrian state would all but vanish. Once again, it would be ordinary Syrians—already battered by years of war—who pay the heaviest price. 

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