What does Israel want from Syria?

The more contacts are made between Syrian and Israeli officials and the more field dynamics are tested in south Syria, the more confusion arises over Israel's true objectives

What does Israel want from Syria?

The fall of the Assad regime at the end of last year was the biggest blow yet to Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance.” For decades, Syria had served as the conduit for weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the strategic hinterland for Iraq, a base for Palestinian factions backed by Tehran, and a training ground for the Houthis and militias tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

It was therefore unsurprising that Israel targeted Iran to prevent its military intervention in support of al-Assad following the launch of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) “Deterring the Aggression” campaign in late November. Israel also targeted Iraqi militias attempting to cross the border to bolster the regime during the fall of Aleppo that same month. Even before the campaign officially began, Israel had launched precision airstrikes in November, destroying a joint operations room belonging to Hezbollah and the IRGC in Saraqib, the first such strike in Idlib province since 2011.

However, the arrival of HTS in Damascus in December brought an end to Israel’s long-standing “Syrian certainty”, which had endured for 50 years under the Assad regime. The Golan Heights had remained a dormant front since the 1974 disengagement agreement, and strategic weapons, including missiles, chemical agents, and barrel bombs, had been tightly controlled, used against Syrians but never deployed on the southern front or in any conflict with Israel.

Faced with “uncertainty” surrounding the new Syrian leadership, Israel did several things:

First: It conducted 700 airstrikes in a short span, targeting and destroying all strategic military assets, on land, in the air, and at sea.

Second: It advanced to occupy the buffer zone in the Golan Heights, established under the 1974 disengagement agreement.

Third: It seized a strip seven kilometres deep into Syrian territory, running parallel to the buffer zone from the northern to southern Golan.

Israel wants the Syrian army out of the area between the outskirts of Damascus and the disengagement line

Fourth: It took control of the Mount Hermon Observatory – the highest strategic peak in the area.

Fifth: It declared the area between Damascus and the Golan a "security zone," barring Syrian army presence.

Sixth: It established aerial dominance over the three southern provinces, and effectively, over most of Syrian territory.

Seventh: It bombed sites and airfields in central Syria that Ankara had intended to use for Turkish military deployments.

Eighth: Amid developments in Syria, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he wanted to "protect the Druze." Israeli forces struck Syrian sovereign facilities, including the presidential palace entrance and the Ministry of Defence, to pressure Damascus in this regard.

Ninth: Tel Aviv declared its intention to establish a humanitarian corridor from the Golan to Sweida.

As for Syria's new leadership, its key figures declared upon arriving in Damascus that they had "no intention of posing a threat to any neighbouring country, including Israel." President Ahmed al-Sharaa later announced in Paris that "indirect negotiations" were underway with Israel. This was followed by a foreign ministry statement confirming meetings with Israeli officials in the French capital. And when the White House revealed that President Donald Trump, during his meeting with al-Sharaa in Riyadh on 14 May, had requested Syria join the Abraham Accords, Damascus issued no formal denial.

Syria's preferred option is to negotiate either the reaffirmation of the existing disengagement agreement or the conclusion of a similar accord, paving the way for a political process that could eventually lead to a peace agreement, and possibly even accession to the Abraham Accords. But Syria is not like other Arab states that have joined the accords: it has territory occupied by Israel (the Golan Heights), and directly borders Israel, whose army is now active deep within Syrian territory. 

Sharaa's stated "zero-problems with neighbours policy" and desire to clinch a disengagement agreement with Israel hasn't satisfied Netanyahu

But all of this doesn't seem to satisfy Netanyahu. Instead, he keeps adding to his list of conditions, prompting Damascus to speculate over his true objectives. Is he being difficult in order to negotiate more favourable terms for a disengagement agreement? Does he harbour expansionist ambitions? Or is he solely focused on dividing and fragmenting Syria?

At the outset, Israeli officials stated they had no interest in reviving the 1974 disengagement agreement negotiated between Hafez al-Assad and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. They argue that it is effectively outdated, having been signed under conditions that no longer exist. 

More troubling still, Israel wants the Syrian army out of the area between the outskirts of Damascus and the disengagement line. Additionally, it wants to put early warning systems in place there, and have full aerial control and freedom of movement there to "prevent another October 7 in southern Syria."

Indeed, the more contacts are made between Syrian and Israeli officials and field dynamics are tested in southern Syria, the more confusion arises over Israel's true objectives and whether Prime Minister Netanyahu's vision aligns with that of Israel's military and intelligence leadership.

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