Heading for a showdown? SDF conference riles Damascus
Syria’s government needs to centralise decision-making and bring armed groups to heel, but Kurds in the north-east want to establish a ‘coalition of the unwilling’ with Druze and Alawites. What now?
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The "Unity of Position" conference, held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Hasakah on August 8, 2025.
Heading for a showdown? SDF conference riles Damascus
Back in March, after talks between the new leadership in Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the country’s autonomous north-east, there appeared to be an encouraging general agreement over the latter’s integration into a national project. Five months later, things appear to be far less rosy.
On 8 August, the SDF convened a ‘Unity of Position’ conference in Al-Hasakah that marked a significant turning point in the negotiation process. Clues could be found within the conference slogan of ‘Together for Diversity that Strengthens Our Unity and a Partnership that Builds Our Future.’ It elevated the Damascus-SDF talks to an entirely new and more contentious level that risks a rapid collapse of the process.
Last week’s conference drew around 400 figures from east of the Euphrates, along with video participation from Druze Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and Alawite Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, signalling that the SDF was now reaching beyond its traditional geographic framework and engaging other Syrian actors at odds with Damascus. Both sheikhs share the SDF’s vision of a decentralised system of governance for Syria.
Al Majalla understands that in the days leading up to the conference, the SDF lobbied Arab tribal leaders and political figures, dispatching delegations to Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Al-Hasakah to convince sheikhs and religious figures to attend. For the SDF, the conference was projected as proof of a cohesive internal alliance, strengthening its hand in talks with Damascus and signalling to foreign states that decentralised governance has support beyond Syria’s Kurds.
The conference marks the start of a new phase in Syria's internal negotiations, with the SDF now trying to speak for a broader coalition advocating decentralisation
In parallel, the Syrian government intensified its own outreach to tribes and Kurdish and Arab figures in the east of the Euphrates, arguing that the conference's objectives were not national in nature, but would instead deepen internal divisions, obstruct the unification of Syrian territory, and undermine stability.
Given the recent regional and international efforts to bridge the gap between Damascus and the SDF, the timing of the conference was notable. Indeed, the SDF no longer even frames these as 'SDF–Damascus' talks, but as 'Decentralisation Alliance–Damascus' talks. This raises serious questions about future mediation efforts.
The SDF's decision to broaden its Syrian alliances complicates matters for the negotiation's guarantors, including the Gulf states, Türkiye, and Western powers, which have sought to broker a deal that safeguards Syria's territorial integrity and preserves the unity of its armed forces. None of this will reassure Türkiye, which sees the armed, autonomous Kurdish groups in Syria as a national security threat.
Despite drawing around 400 participants, representation at the 'Unity of Position' conference was more omissions than other SDF gatherings in recent years. Absent, for instance, were the Assyrian Democratic Organisation, the Kurdish National Council, and the more senior sheikhs from major tribes such as al-Jabour, al-Bakara, Tai, al-Akidat, al-Walda, and Shammar. Prominent families—including al-Jarba, al-Bashir, al-Hifl, al-Muslat, and al-Assaf—were also conspicuously missing.
Al Majalla understands that of the 50 tribal leaders and notable figures invited from Deir ez-Zor, only seven attended, and that the (virtual) participation of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal prompted another six would-be attendees to withdraw. Others attended but were left disgruntled, saying the conference meant to focus on the east of the Euphrates and its future in the context of talks with Damascus.
Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi during the signing of the agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, Damascus, March 10, 2025.
Notable absences
The SDF sought to compensate by giving Arab tribal representatives prominence in delivering the final statement, but this had only a limited effect, because the heavyweight tribal figures that the SDF had traditionally relied upon were simply not there, nor was SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi, whose absence raised eyebrows. Many of the participants had expected to hear from him, given his role as chief negotiator and signatory to the 10 March 2025 agreement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Some saw his absence as a sign of internal SDF divisions, while others attributed it to the absence of other senior representatives. Still others felt Abdi was being careful not to burn his bridges with Damascus, framing the conference as a local initiative, not a political platform. Ultimately, however, he will know that both Damascus, the SDF, and other regional actors are increasingly preparing for a military confrontation, given that the SDF's integration into a national army is a Damascus red line.
Despite the tensions, the SDF continues to present a vision for Syria's future based on decentralised governance and is understood to remain committed to its strategy. To this end, it is trying to influence international opinion by showcasing 'an alliance' beyond its geographical confines (hence the inclusion of al-Hijri and Ghazal) and the wording of the final statement, which referred to practices "affecting our people in the coast, Suweida, and among Christians," adding that these "constitute crimes against humanity… crimes against the entire national fabric".
For the conference, "the solution lies in a democratic constitution that enshrines and promotes national, cultural, and religious diversity, establishing a decentralised state that ensures genuine participation of all components in the political and administrative process, in harmony with freedom of belief, social justice, and good governance".
The view from Damascus
According to the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Syrian officials said the conference was "not a national framework, but a fragile alliance" of parties harmed by the Syrian people's victory and the fall of the former regime, adding that certain actors were trying to monopolise representation of Syria's components through de facto control and foreign backing and "hosting separatists involved in hostile acts" in clear violation of the 10 March agreement.
Altered 'rules of engagement,' coupled with the SDF's expansion of its alliances beyond the north-east, bring the prospect of confrontation with Damascus nearer
The conference, they argued, was "an attempt to internationalise the Syrian file, invite foreign intervention, and reimpose sanctions"—a course, they said, echoed the pre-independence conferences aimed at partitioning Syria, which the Syrian people had defeated before and "will defeat again".
The government said the conference could undermine the formation of the Transitional Justice Commission and the launch of the National Dialogue process in February, both of which Damascus sees as key to steering the country to safety. According to informed sources, the government considers the 'Unity of Position' conference as an attempt to change the rules of negotiation and rejects "any scheduled meetings in Paris", arguing that talks about the future of Syria among Syrians should take place in Syria.
Deep divisions among actors east of the Euphrates have not been lost on Damascus, which is seeking to forge stronger alliances with Arab, Kurdish, and political figures opposed to the SDF's approach. Officials believe that this will weaken the SDF's claim that there is consensus on decentralisation and that it negotiates on behalf of others.
For Damascus, the SDF's alliance with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal—figures in areas not entirely under government control—will lead it to consider new options, knowing that it must assuage Turkish security concerns, because Ankara has repeatedly said it will not allow Syria's fragmentation. Arab and Western capitals also seek stability, as do foreign investors.
The "Unity of Position" conference, held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Hasakah on August 8, 2025.
The conference marks the start of a new phase in Syria's internal negotiations, with the SDF now trying to speak for a broader coalition advocating decentralisation. Yet by bringing Druze and Alawite representatives into the fold, it will have lost some support from its rank-and-file.
After the violence in Suweida, international actors, including the United States, Türkiye, and Jordan, are mediating, but the government in Damascus knows that it must dismantle Syria's armed non-state actors if they will not voluntarily do so, while also preventing any domestic or foreign actor from re-emerging as a destabilising force.
Although both the SDF and Damascus are prepared to fight if need be, neither has yet closed the door to negotiations. Abdi's conference absence—and the SDF's decision not to formally endorse its outcomes—suggests there may still be room for dialogue, just as Damascus has limited itself to unofficial statements rejecting talks in Paris.
Neither side has ruled out regional or international mediation, so negotiations remain possible, but the altered 'rules of engagement,' coupled with the SDF's expansion of its alliances beyond the north-east, bring the prospect of confrontation nearer, all of which bodes ill for Syria's political future.
