Should Syria have centralised or decentralised governance?

Fragmented landscape

Since 2011, Syria has experienced fragmented governance, with various factions exerting control over different regions, each imposing its own administrative framework. The Assad regime maintained authority over key areas, including Damascus, enforcing a centralised, authoritarian system that tightly controlled political life and public policy. Meanwhile, opposition-held territories developed their own governance structures, repurposing state institutions under competing political and ideological models.

In the northwest, governance evolved into two distinct models. The first, found in areas controlled by Turkish-backed factions, operates through semi-independent local administrations under Turkish supervision. The second, centered in Idlib, is dominated by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-backed Salvation Government, which has consolidated authority over governance, the judiciary, and economic affairs, functioning much like a centralised state.

In the northeast, the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) presents itself as a decentralised governance model, but in practice, power remains concentrated in the hands of an informal leadership network dominated by Kurdish commanders known as "kadros."

Conflicting positions

Following the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December, 2024, the HTS-led Salvation Government quickly seized control of formerly regime-held territories, positioning itself as the de facto leader of Syria's transition. However, the country remains fragmented, with multiple governance structures and overlapping administrative systems still in place. This reality has raised pressing questions about how Syria will unify its divided administrative landscape.

While many Syrians await the much-anticipated national dialogue process to voice their perspectives on the future governance model, some de facto authorities have already made their positions clear. The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration has insisted that decentralisation is a non-negotiable condition for its integration into the new government. Similarly, Druze religious leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri has emphasised decentralisation as a cornerstone of his vision for Syria's future.

However, these calls for decentralisation directly clash with HTS's vision of centralised control. This is especially evident in al-Sharaa's stance, which firmly opposes decentralised governance.

For al-Sharaa, centralisation is essential to preventing further fragmentation and dismantling competing power structures. By consolidating authority under a strong central state, he seeks to maintain control over security, political, and economic decision-making, ensuring the transitional authorities retain dominance over Syria's future direction.

Weighing pros and cons

Determining the right governance model for Syria's post-Assad transition is a complex challenge, with both centralisation and decentralisation offering distinct advantages and significant risks. While centralisation promises efficient governance, streamlined decision-making, and a unified national policy, it also risks deepening ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions.

In a country that has suffered from decades of authoritarian rule, an overly centralised system could replicate the same patterns of exclusion and repression that fuelled the previous conflict, potentially leading to renewed instability, governance paralysis, or even conflict relapse.

On the other hand, decentralisation provides a more flexible governance model that empowers local communities, enhances regional representation, and improves service delivery by aligning policies with local needs. By granting greater autonomy to different regions, it could help ease sectarian and ethnic tensions and ensure that historically marginalised groups play an active role in shaping the country's future.

However, for decentralisation to be effective, it requires a strong legal framework, equitable resource distribution, capable institutions, and a cooperative relationship between the central government and local authorities. Without these safeguards, decentralisation could lead to administrative fragmentation, inefficiency, or competing power centers that undermine national cohesion.

To avoid repeating past mistakes, Syria must establish a governance system that genuinely reflects its people's aspirations, embraces its diverse communities, and remains flexible enough to navigate future challenges. This requires not only legal and institutional reforms but also a political culture that prioritises cooperation, representation, and long-term stability over short-term political gains.

Ultimately, Syria's successful transition hinges on adopting a governance framework that is both adaptable and sustainable. A rigid, one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to succeed. Instead, a pragmatic model—one that upholds national unity while accommodating regional diversity—offers the best path forward.

By striking this balance, Syria can move beyond conflict, foster reconciliation, and lay the groundwork for a more stable and prosperous future.