Mustafa Al-Kadhimi on why he returned to Iraq

What is the state of Iraq's relationship with Iran?

This must be founded on constructive engagement and genuine good neighbourliness, rooted in mutual respect for sovereignty and the distinct identities of each nation, with the aim of achieving the best for both sides. There should be no interference in Iraq's internal affairs, and Iraq should not be treated as a subordinate to Iran.

I therefore call on our counterparts in the Islamic Republic to reconsider their approach to the region—and Iraq in particular. We need to move to a relationship based on the logic of the state, governed by institutions and clear frameworks for bilateral cooperation.

Our region is undergoing significant and rapid transformation. All actors must adapt to this new reality. We must collectively work towards economic cooperation and regional integration, models that can reinforce stability and prevent reckless miscalculations that risk plunging the region into destructive and unnecessary conflict.

What about the issue of arms outside the control of the state?

This is a potentially fatal threat to Iraq's sovereignty and stability. Other countries are understandably wary of engaging with a state in which non-state actors and militias can decide on matters of war and peace, independent of the state, its institutions, or the will of its people.

Regrettably, many of these weapons are controlled by actors whose decisions are dictated from beyond Iraq's borders, and they have frequently been used to serve agendas that lie well outside the scope of Iraq's national interests. This is wholly unacceptable.

You helped facilitate the Saudi-Iran talks in Baghdad, which eventually paved the way for the Beijing Agreement. How do you view that agreement two years on?

Those talks were characterised by a sincere exchange of goodwill. Owing to its geographical location and its deep ties with both Riyadh and Tehran, Iraq was able to provide a neutral and conducive environment for dialogue. Five rounds of negotiations were marked by frankness and transparency and touched on nearly all contentious issues between the two sides.

Iraq served as an earnest mediator—committed to bridging gaps and bringing the parties closer—but Iraq cannot act as a guarantor for the outcomes. That role must be filled by a global power. That is precisely what China provided when it stepped in.

In light of the sweeping changes our region has experienced, I hope this dialogue is seen not as a temporary arrangement to navigate a moment of crisis but as a foundational step toward a new regional strategy that serves all sides. I still believe that both Saudi Arabia and Iran possess the goodwill necessary to build upon this agreement and transform it into something enduring and transformative.

Iraq shares a border with Iran. President Trump has revived his "maximum pressure" campaign on Iran. How do you see this policy and its impact on Iraq?

President Trump's strategy includes the threat of force to compel behavioural change, yet this approach is even more precarious today owing to the volatile context in which it is being deployed: a region already shaken by the seismic events of October 7.

This escalation has heightened tensions between Washington and Tehran, with direct implications for both the Iran–Iraq relationship and Iraq's ties with the US. Whatever the trajectory of this confrontation, it is imperative for Iraq to mitigate its negative fallout.

We must take a proactive and constructive role, opening avenues for dialogue not only between Iran and the US but also among key regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Iraq is well-positioned to serve as a bridge-builder. Its geographic and historical realities make it uniquely suited to mediate in the US–Iran standoff.

To do so effectively, Iraq must protect our vital national interests, safeguard our national security, and reaffirm our Arab identity. Likewise, I call upon our partners in the Islamic Republic to reassess their regional posture—particularly in Iraq—and to begin crafting a comprehensive vision based on the logic of resolution, not exploitation.

This vision must be anchored in the concept of the state and its institutions, replacing the export of revolutionary ideology with stable, neighbourly relations that do not ignite crises for short-term gains.

There is talk of a new regional order taking shape after October 7. What's your view?

Undeniably, the region we knew before October 7 is not the same as the one now taking shape. The reverberations of that day extended far beyond the immediate theatres of conflict, casting long shadows over the entire regional order. That said, it is still too early to say a new system has emerged. What we urgently need is a sober and honest reassessment of recent events by all regional actors.

If we do not draw the necessary lessons now, we will find ourselves trapped in a landscape shaped by strategic weakness following prolonged cycles of war. Rather than perpetuate instability, we must lay the groundwork for a new political logic rooted in cooperation and responsive to the complex, multidimensional realities of our societies.

This requires embracing strategic choices that balance realism with responsibility to establish lasting political and security stability—now more essential than ever—as the foundation for the economic and developmental renaissance already underway in several countries across the region.

We now have a rare opportunity to create new spaces for cooperation, interaction, and interconnectedness among the region's states. By doing so, we can significantly enhance our collective economic influence on the global stage. But this demands a new approach—one genuinely embraced by regional powers and capable of generating a new reality with the strength to assert itself.

It is incumbent upon Iraq—its state, its government, its institutions, and its leading actors—to fully comprehend the significance of this moment and respond with clarity and conviction.

All of this is unfolding as 'Trump 2.0' begins. How do you assess his return and its implications for our region?

There is little to differentiate President Trump's second term from his first when it comes to the Middle East. His foreign policy largely continues along established lines: that of 'America First,' an emphasis on economic interests, and the use of "maximum pressure" as a deterrent strategy.

His approach is rooted in what is often called "coercive diplomacy"—a method aimed at containing adversaries without necessarily resorting to direct military confrontation. What sets this new (presidential) term apart, however, is the political atmosphere and strategic upheaval following October 7.

These developments demand a more assertive and sustained American engagement in redrawing the region's balance of power. US foreign policy is not defined by the president alone, particularly in relation to major international questions. Rather, it is shaped by the deeper structures of American institutional power. These prioritise national interests and the preservation of US security on the global stage.

At this critical historical juncture, we must think seriously about cultivating a mature and strategic partnership with the United States—one that supports peace and stability throughout the region. Such a partnership should be harnessed to advance developmental objectives and long-term progress, thereby offering future generations the chance to build sustainable, forward-looking futures.

President Trump seeks rapprochement with Russia's Vladimir Putin while intensifying competition with China. How do you interpret the triangular dynamic between these three powers and its global implications?

The past three decades have been defined by ongoing efforts to reshape the international order in ways that reflect the post–Cold War reality and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, despite these efforts, it has been a largely unipolar system dominated by the United States.

Replacing this with a multipolar world order has long been a central objective of China and Russia. Both seek to restore their influence on the world stage and challenge American dominance, particularly in strategically vital regions. For Washington, China now represents the foremost geopolitical challenge of the 21st century, a view publicly confirmed by CIA Director William Burns.

The US regards Beijing as a more formidable rival than Moscow, yet the Sino-Russian alliance has a shared goal: to redefine the international system and transition from a US-led unipolarity to a multipolar world, both economically and militarily.

The war in Ukraine and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria show that while Russia continues to project global ambition, it functions more as a regional power with international reach than as a true global peer to the United States.

In practical terms, Washington has succeeded in disrupting the strategic coherence of the Russia–China axis, creating room to recalibrate its global agenda—most notably by prioritising the containment of China's rise. In this context, the US is trying to reduce its entanglements to focus its strategic energy on curbing China's ascent.

This explains its renewed diplomatic overtures to Vladimir Putin, along with Trump's firm belief in transactional diplomacy and confidence in managing situations using his personal rapport with adversaries.

Ultimately, Trump appears determined to act decisively to impede China's long-term ambition to shape the global economic order. He seems intent on securing a legacy as a transformational figure, one who led the United States from a period of immense challenge into a new era of durable opportunity.

Read more: Why Trump's bid to peel Russia from China won't work

How do you view the contours of the emerging global order?

The United States wants to sustain its leadership of the international system and maintain its technological, economic, cultural, military, and diplomatic advantage through its command of global institutions, its leadership of NATO—uncontested since the 1990s—and by preventing emerging powers from becoming its global equals.

Yet, the world today is marked by complexity and fluidity. The US faces structural challenges that call into question the future of its global leadership. It is increasingly evident that power is no longer concentrated in a single pole but rather is dispersed across three principal axes.

In military terms, the United States remains the dominant global force. Its unmatched defence expenditure, advanced technological capabilities, and extensive network of overseas bases continue to underpin its hegemonic status. Yet China is quietly and steadily expanding its military capacity and building credible deterrent capabilities—unlike the openly confrontational Soviet Union of the past.

Economically, we have already entered a de facto multipolarity. Other major economic blocs, such as the European Union, China, and Japan, have become increasingly influential, while emerging powers like India and Brazil are gaining traction, reshaping the economic architecture of the global system.

Today, power is increasingly diffused, wielded not only by states but by non-state actors (whether terrorists or criminals, sometimes posing cybersecurity threats) and other non-state threats (such as pandemics and climate change). These all require multilateral coordination. No single state can face them alone, no matter how dominant they are.

What is the role of the Arab world in this emerging global order? What should its position and contribution be?

The most effective path for the Arab world to gain meaningful influence on the global stage commensurate with its vast potential, abundant resources, and rich civilisational legacy lies in the project of Arab integration.

This would unify efforts, manage internal contradictions, and harness latent capabilities to re-engineer the Arab political fabric and unlock its immense kinetic potential—energy that could let the Arab world shape global affairs.

Some time ago, I proposed the New Levant Project, an initiative designed to transcend the chronic crises afflicting our region. It is not utopian. It is a pragmatic framework grounded in the fluid, interconnected realities of today.

It envisages strategic and constructive integration among key regional players: Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan. Iraq has a wealth of natural resources, Egypt has a large population and considerable industrial expertise, while Jordan has a crucial geostrategic position.

Together, these three nations could form a collaborative axis, one that maximises their respective strengths and lays the foundation for a new regional trajectory based on self-reliance and mutual reinforcement, offering a renewed sense of purpose, collective identity, and belief in the importance of solidarity for structural renewal.

Integration as a principle has regrettably become more rhetorical than practical in much of our regional discourse, but in my view, this initiative presents real opportunities to build a new Middle East rooted in cooperative Arab action, one that complements the vision of our brothers in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Together, they would constitute the two pillars of a shared Arab depth.

The developmental achievements of the Gulf Arab states are commendable. They represent significant leaps forward and should serve as an inspiration and catalyst for a broader unified project that would garner pan-Arab support.

The ultimate goal would be to forge a more secure, prosperous, and future-oriented environment that guards against conflict, which has produced only paralysis. This, in my view, is how the Arab world moves from passive observer to active, credible, and capable contributor on the global stage, reclaiming its rightful place.