Trump's opportunity in a 'New Middle East'

None of this happened covertly. King Abdullah of Jordan and his Saudi counterpart were warning US visitors repeatedly by 2005 of a growing "Shiite Crescent" in the Levant. But the far more powerful informal alliance of America, Arab states, Israel, and, at times, Turkey, was generally inattentive to the Iranian regional threat. No one was innocent, but the main offender was the US over four administrations (with a limited exception in the late Trump administration).

Following 9/11, Washington was consumed with other regional counter-terrorism, regime change and democratisation programmes while increasingly prioritising China and then Russia. Any attention given to Iran was focused on its nuclear programme. Meanwhile, decisions such as overthrowing Saddam and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza eased Iran's regional advance.

Washington, while responding vigorously to other challenges from Saddam to the Islamic State (IS), botched the Iran containment mission by relying on a standard "game book" throughout this period. The major elements of that game book were, first, to respond to Iran's and proxies' forays by denying the problem (President Obama on sharing the region with Iran) or, if acknowledged, avoid military force (the 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco), or, if force were used, with minimal impact (the Red Sea operation).

As Iran and proxies' strategy was to move in cautious, asymmetric steps—none alone seriously threatening the regional order—partners' use of military force in response was discouraged, with Washington, for example, pressing Israel for de-escalation five times between 2006 and 2021 against Hezbollah, Syria and Hamas, the Iraqi government in 2004 and 2008 against pro-Iranian militias, and the Saudis and Emiratis against the Houthis in 2018 and 2021.

While partners usually went along, Israel's strike on Syria's al Kobar nuclear site in 2007 was the exception. Notably, it did not produce the regional catastrophe Washington had warned, only the end of a dangerous Syrian initiative.

But on October 7, one proxy, Hamas, abandoned that cautious asymmetric strategy and pursued a regional order-changing success. Israel thereby learned the consequences of the American game book, while the Biden administration did not.

Israel saw that its very existence was at stake (as the New York Times reported, Hamas leader Sinwar sought to recruit his more powerful allies, Hezbollah and Iran itself, in the October strike into Israel). It thus launched a furious counter-offensive.

The United States, concerned about civilian casualties and still wedded to its "game book" (failing manifestly against the Houthis' Red Sea attacks and Hezbollah with Amos Hochstein's negotiations), nevertheless reluctantly acquiesced to the Israeli offensive.

That offensive over the past year has turned the tide in the region. Militarily, Hamas (and much of Gaza with it) has been irreparably smashed. At the same time, Hezbollah has had most of its leadership and the majority of its combat power at least temporarily eliminated. Iran has been shown to be a paper tiger by allowing its proxies in Gaza and Lebanon to be hammered for a long time.

When it did act, launching in April and then in October massive missile barrages against Israel, they were impotent, while Israel's October counter-strike demonstrated its escalation dominance over Iran. Apart from a suicidal attack on Gulf targets such as GCC oil infrastructure and US bases, Iran is left virtually defenceless.

Stabilising the region: In the short term

This, thus, is the new geostrategic environment in which the Trump administration will find itself. The first priority for Trump— signalled already by some reporting, and certainly for the outgoing Biden administration—is to end the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon and see Israeli troops withdrawn. That will only occur, however, if Israel is convinced that Hamas and Hezbollah will not reconstitute and, in some years, threaten Israel again.

According to David Ignatius, writing in the Washington Post on 7 November, Biden and Blinken are pushing for an international peacekeeping and stabilisation presence in Gaza, along lines proposed by the UAE, with some Palestinian Authority role, for long-term interim security and reconstruction.

Simultaneously, Washington is pressing for Lebanon to return to an enhanced UNSCR 1701 from 2006, which would keep Hezbollah off the Lebanese-Israeli border and perhaps limit arms shipments from Syria to Hezbollah. Next on the agenda is an effort to constrain Iran's nuclear weapons options. This will require reiteration by the Trump administration of President Biden's 2021 pledge to use force if necessary to stop an Iranian bomb, but will also require—sooner or later— negotiations with Tehran.

Read more: The eventuality of US-Iran negotiations

And in the long term

President Trump will certainly continue what he started and what Biden continued with the Abraham Accords, with the big prize being Saudi-Israel diplomatic relations. This will require, however, progress on true peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Trump advanced an impractical way forward in his last administration. While it didn't work, it established his willingness to at least think about a broader settlement.

For its part, Israel—having regained deterrence domination and perhaps permanently eliminated threats on its border and under the right leadership—can take risks for peace with the Palestinians.

Arab states, meanwhile, also have a key role to play. Those states—reminded this past year of Iran and proxies' dangers, with Iranian pressure on Jordan out of Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis' shutting down much Arab world sea transport and impacting Egyptian canal earnings—can work to deepen the military-trade relationships among themselves, Israel and the US. But, the Trump administration must recognise that this optimistic scenario requires the end of killing in Gaza and Lebanon and a way forward between Israelis and Palestinians.

The New York Times reported on 11 November that Iranian government circles are thinking anew about diplomatic moves not only with Arab states, building on recent initiatives involving China, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and others, but also a dialogue with the US. Certainly, a return to the relatively calm relationship in the 1990s between Iran, its neighbours, and the US is possible—especially as, once again, Iran's military adventurism has been decisively defeated.

Nevertheless, the danger is that Iran will allow its "official" personality in the form of the president and foreign minister to pursue "diplomacy," while the real power centres—the Supreme religious leader and the IRGC—continue to "unofficially" pursue their aggressive, expansionist agenda, on the nuclear account and with their regional proxies. The Obama initiative with Iran largely failed due to an inability to distinguish between these two elements of the Iranian "state."

While it is too much to expect that the Iranian people will overthrow the religious regime, and no one beginning with the Trump administration will pursue war or serious regime change, a gradual softening of Iran's hegemonic foreign policy, along with eventual liberalisation of its internal governance, is possible, and obviously would be much welcomed. But to ensure that such shifts are real and not propaganda to hide continued IRGC advances, an Arab-US-Israeli alliance must ensure that Iran is permanently stripped of a militant alternative option.