Why Trump's bid to peel Russia from China won't work

Enter Trump

In 2017, Trump's first presidential term began. Ironically, he shares a common vision with Xi and Putin: to dismantle the post-Cold War US-led global order. For his second term, beginning in January 2025, Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine. He has done so by suspending US support to the country, which was invaded by Russia in 2022. 

Throughout his first presidency, Trump maintained an amicable relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and undermined the US defence commitment to NATO. His second term has begun in a similar vein, pushing for Ukrainian territorial concessions in Russia's favour. 

The logic behind Trump's détente with Russia seems clear: to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Trump believes that by removing Western sanctions on Russia, and by reassuring it over NATO expansion, Russia will pivot away from China.

Trump has his eye on others in China's orbit of influence, including Iran. He believes that negotiating an end to Iran's nuclear programme will allow him to lift sanctions on Tehran, allowing it to rejoin the global economy and wean itself of reliance on China. The feasibility of such a strategy is questionable, however. 

The Russian economy is increasingly dependent on Chinese trade and technology. Trade between Moscow and Beijing now tops $200bn. China imports Russian energy, while Russia buys Chinese technology and manufactured goods. In short, Moscow could not afford to ditch Beijing, even if it wanted to.

Different times

Will Trump's 'reverse Kissinger' work? Kissinger exploited the Sino-Soviet split because by 1970, Moscow's relations with Beijing were at a nadir, after armed clashes along the Ussuri River in 1969. Nixon and Kissinger capitalised on this divide, opening China to the West to counterbalance Soviet power. Today, the situation is markedly different. 

China and Russia, while not formal allies, share a deep strategic partnership underpinned by economic interdependence and a shared opposition to US hegemony. Unlike in 1970, when China feared Soviet military encirclement and Communist bloc isolation, today's Russia sees China as an indispensable economic partner and geopolitical supporter. 

Likewise, China sees Russia as an energy lifeline. If the US imposes a naval blockade in the Strait of Malacca (the maritime route for 70% of China's energy imports), Russia will be China's only reliable energy supplier, so maintaining a strong relationship with Russia is a Chinese priority. 

In recent years, China and Russia have formed the nexus within various international groupings, in part to counter US hegemony. For instance, they are at the core of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (a Eurasian security pact) and BRICS+ (an economic grouping of the Global South, originating with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

Trump appears to believe that an alternative global power structure can be engineered, one in which Russia—incentivised by Western reintegration—distances itself from China. Yet he and his team underestimate the depth of Chinese-Russian shared interests, which range from defence to AI and semiconductors.

Times were different during the Cold War, when China and the USSR were economically isolated and hostile to one another to such an extent that the Soviets even considered a nuclear attack. Today, their economies are highly complementary. Russia supplies raw materials and energy, while China offers technology and capital.

Stronger together

Both China and Russia see the US as a superpower in decline, one whose legitimacy arises from the dominance of its military, the dollar, and the world's rules-based institutions, all three of which China and Russia see as having been weaponised. This strengthens their resolve to work together to change the global order.

Moreover, Putin fundamentally distrusts the West. Even if Trump offered a détente, the Russian leader would question whether the West would honour what it offered, citing the collapse of previous arms control agreements and NATO's continued expansion eastward despite private assurances to the contrary. Putin will also know that the offer of détente may last only as long as Trump's presidency. 

A weakened Russia would embolden NATO and encourage greater Western influence in Central Asia. This would worry China, which does not want to see NATO expand eastward towards China's western doorstep. 

Yet Russia is not as isolated as China was in 1970. This was a key factor in Kissinger's success in the 1970s, when Beijing had no formal alliances, was cut off from Western trade, and was still recovering from the self-imposed devastation of the Cultural Revolution. It was desperate for an opening to the world. 

While Moscow has been hit hard by Western sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine, it remains deeply embedded in the global system through strong bilateral ties with key players in the Global South. India remains a military and energy partner, not least as a major importer of Russian oil.   

The Middle East sees Moscow as a necessary actor in shaping oil policy, while many African rulers continue to rely on Russian security engagement (typically via non-state Russian outfits) to stabilise their rule. Furthermore, Russia still sits on the United Nations Security Council, one of the five permanent members. This means that Moscow is not desperate for a US rapprochement in the way that China was in 1970.

The 20th-century Sino-Soviet split was both ideological and strategic. By the late 1950s, Khrushchev and Mao Zedong were feuding over Marxist doctrine, nuclear strategy, and the USSR's perceived condescension toward China. The rift worsened when the USSR cut off technological and military support to Beijing. From that moment, China was forced to seek a new patron—and the United States seized the opportunity.

Deepened cooperation

Today, the China-Russia relationship is fundamentally different. Beijing is not only Moscow's largest economic partner but also its financial backer in times of crisis. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China has been Russia's economic lifeline, ensuring continued trade despite Western sanctions. Unlike in the Cold War, when the USSR turned against China, Beijing has not turned against Moscow. 

Instead, it has deepened strategic cooperation—sharing technology, enhancing trade ties, and offering Russia an alternative to the US-dominated financial order. Moscow understands that its long-term survival depends on maintaining that partnership, welcoming but no longer chasing an unreliable US détente.

Such a thaw assumes that Russia can be tempted back into the US-led global system with the right incentives (lifting sanctions, letting Russian banks return to the SWIFT financial system, etc) and that this would lead to China's alienation. That assumption is naïve. For Moscow, the lesson from this latest sanctions blizzard is clear: the Western-led financial order is weaponised and cannot be trusted. 

Even if the US were to lift sanctions tomorrow, the Kremlin will know that they can be reimposed at any time—perhaps by a new administration, or shifting Congressional dynamics—and that they could once again cripple Russia's economy. In the 1970s, China saw American engagement as a permanent escape from Soviet dominance. In 2025, Russia sees American engagement as temporary and conditional.

A different world

Perhaps the most fundamental flaw in the Trump team's strategy is its assumption that we still live in a binary world in which Russia must choose between the US and China. That was true during the Cold War, but today, the world is no longer bipolar—it is multipolar. 

The distinction is crucial. While the logic of splitting China from Russia would make sense in a rigid bipolar structure (such as that of the Cold War), today's multipolar reality renders such a manoeuvre impossible. 

In a multipolar world, Russia does not need to join a US-led alliance to counterbalance China. Instead, it can leverage its relations with China, the Middle East, India, Europe, and others to maximise its strategic national interests. Trump, for all his unpredictability, seems to understand this. 

He also seems sceptical about the idea of a US-led global order. He, like Putin and President Xi Jinping of China, sees the current international post-war system as obsolete and in need of a restructure. In short, the global paradigm has shifted, and all three recognise it.

Unlike for much of the past 80 years, the world is no longer structured around strict alliances that demand absolute ideological and strategic loyalty. Unlike in the bipolar world of the 20th century, during which states aligned either with Washington or Moscow, today's great powers are increasingly focused on maximising national interest.  

Those pushing 'America First' should abandon the illusion that history can be repeated. Trying to drive China and Russia apart is both impractical and a strategic miscalculation that fails to recognise today's global reality. This is not 1970. Kissinger played the hand he was dealt against the opponents at the table. Half a century later, the hand, opponents, and table have all changed. So must the strategy.