Just when it seemed that the storm might pass, dark clouds gathered once more. Initial reports following Israel’s 26 October strikes on Iran suggested that Tehran might refrain from retaliating, offering a fleeting sense of relief in a region already strained by months of tit-for-tat hostilities, each exchange edging closer to full-scale war.
However, that reprieve now appears short-lived. New intelligence suggests Tehran's position has shifted; after assessing the extent of damage caused by Israel's strikes, Iran is reportedly preparing a response, rekindling fears of a prolonged cycle of retaliation.
Iran, however, is well aware of the risks posed by a direct response. A face-to-face confrontation could invite more Israeli attacks on its strategic sites, a costly scenario that Tehran is eager to avoid. According to sources familiar with both Iranian and Israeli officials, Tehran is exploring a more strategic approach: deploying drones and ballistic missiles from Iraqi territory rather than Iranian soil. Meanwhile, Iraq finds itself entangled in an increasingly perilous situation. Unable to control the militias acting on Iran’s behalf, Iraq risks being drawn deeper into the conflict, potentially becoming a new battleground.
As the situation threatens to expand, Syria, too, faces renewed instability, given the thousands of Iraqi fighters stationed there who could join Iran's response or face retaliation from Tel Aviv. Once again, the region teeters on the brink of a volatile new chapter, with the brief sense of relief vanishing as swiftly as it had arrived.
A shift in calculations
On 31 October, The New York Times reported that three Iranian officials indicated Tehran is preparing a response to Israel’s recent attacks. According to the report, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, instructed the Supreme National Security Council to formulate a retaliatory plan.
Khamenei reportedly made this decision after reviewing a comprehensive report from senior military commanders, which detailed extensive damage to Iran’s missile production facilities, air defence systems near Tehran, critical energy infrastructure, and a major southern port. The assessment underscored that the scope of Israel’s strikes—and the casualties, including at least four Iranian soldiers—was too significant to ignore. Khamenei concluded that not responding would be tantamount to admitting defeat.
Recent public statements from Iranian officials echoed this shift. Ali Fadavi, the deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, announced on Lebanon’s Al Mayadeen television that “Iran’s response to the Zionist aggression is definite.” This was the first official indication that Iran intended to retaliate for Israel’s 26 October strikes on Iranian soil. That same day, Axios reported that Israeli intelligence had picked up indications that Iran was preparing to launch an attack, citing two unnamed Israeli sources.
Delegating the response
The details surrounding Iran’s potential response—specifically the timing and manner—remain unclear. Israeli sources cited by Axios suggested that the attack could happen within days, possibly before the US elections on 5 November. Conversely, Iranian officials, as referenced by The New York Times, speculated that the response might occur after the American election due to concerns that escalating regional tensions could benefit former US President Donald Trump’s re-election bid. Despite differing timelines, both reports suggest that an attack is imminent.
Operationally, sources indicate that Iran’s response will likely be delegated to its Iraqi allies to mitigate the risk of direct Israeli retaliation on Iranian soil. Choosing Iraqi factions to carry out this mission aligns with Iran’s strategy of using proxy forces in the region. Not only are these groups closer to Israeli-held territories, whether they attack from Iraq or Syria, but they also appear increasingly committed to escalating their operations against Israel. Known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), these factions began claiming attacks against Israel in November 2022, and in June 2023, they partnered with Yemen’s Houthis to conduct joint operations, signalling a deepening cooperation within Iran’s "axis of resistance."
Uptick in IRI attacks
The IRI has significantly ramped up its operations against Israel following a 20 September air strike—likely conducted by Israel—that killed a commander of Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah faction in Syria. In response, IRI retaliatory strikes have not only intensified but have also demonstrated increased success in penetrating Israeli-held territory and striking intended targets.
The most destructive incident to date occurred on 4 October, when the Israeli military reported a drone attack launched from Iraq that killed two soldiers and injured more than 20 others. While the IRI has claimed responsibility for attacks on Israeli-held territories for nearly a year, this was the first instance in which the Israeli army publicly acknowledged that Iraqi groups had inflicted casualties and injuries among its forces.
This development raises the possibility that the IRI has either made substantial advances in its operational capabilities or is receiving support from more sophisticated actors, such as Iran, Hezbollah, or the Houthis. Another possibility is that the IRI has possessed these capabilities for some time but chose not to fully deploy them. In any case, the IRI now appears both capable and willing to inflict greater damage on Israel than ever before, which explains Iran’s decision to delegate its response to these factions.
Powerless Iraqi government
For months, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the IRI to cease its rocket and drone attacks on Israel. According to sources cited by Reuters, the Kataib Hezbollah and Nujaba groups, leading the attacks, have warned the prime minister against pressuring them to stop. They have reportedly vowed to continue their actions as long as Israel maintains its operations in Gaza and Lebanon.
This situation highlights the limited influence of the Iraqi government over these groups despite the fact that they operate within Iraq’s borders and are nominally under its jurisdiction. It also underscores where the IRI’s loyalties lie, suggesting that their instructions come from outside Iraq.
After failing to influence the IRI, Iraq turned to Iran, the factions’ primary backer, for assistance. Reuters reported that Iraqi security officials made two recent visits to Tehran, seeking Iran’s help in reining in its allied Iraqi factions. However, the Iraqi delegation was reportedly met with a cold reception, as Iranian officials asserted that these groups make their own decisions and will independently determine how to “support their brothers in Lebanon and Gaza.”
