In his standoff with the SDF, Sharaa has the stronger hand

Riding high from his forces' lightning coup, most analysts agree that al-Sharaa holds a good hand at present. Likewise, some think Abdi may be holding tightly to old arguments without acknowledging the shifting regional and international landscape. Moreover, within Syria, the new rulers appear to have popular support.

Abdi wants to preserve the status quo i.e. the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which holds broad administrative powers, including the authority to engage in diplomatic relations and sign agreements with foreign governments. 

Yet the AANES does not represent a homogenous ethnic or religious bloc but rather is a politically engineered structure based on the concept of a 'democratic nation.' Despite its Kurdish leadership, the region is predominantly Arab. Many residents oppose the SDF's Kurdish nationalist ambitions. 

Abdi also wants to maintain the SDF's independence as an autonomous military force, with only symbolic affiliation to Damascus's Ministries of Defence and Interior. That effectively creates a parallel army—an outcome that al-Sharaa rejects.

Carrots and red lines

In return for agreeing to let the SDF remain intact, Abdi has offered Damascus a share of the oil and gas wealth from the eastern Euphrates, permission to deploy Syrian forces along the Turkish and Iraqi borders, and the transfer of IS detainees and certain government institutions to state control. 

Despite the SDF's only nominal subordination to the central government, Damascus would still be expected to protect the SDF from aggression by Türkiye, which has troops in the north and backs the increasingly well-armed Syrian National Army (SNA). Al-Sharaa was disappointed because the SDF offering was exactly what it offered al-Assad. This suggests that Abdi and his advisors are stuck in the past. 

Al-Sharaa put forward an alternative vision: disarming the SDF, incorporating its fighters into the Syrian army under the Ministry of Defence, removing all foreign fighters from the eastern Euphrates, transferring government institutions as well as oil and gas resources in the region to Damascus, and managing the transfer of IS detainees in coordination with international partners.  

In return, Damascus has pledged to secure Syria's borders, regularise the status of Syrian SDF members affiliated with the PKK, and prevent Türkiye from prosecuting Syrian PKK members by recognising them as Syrian citizens. Al-Sharaa also offered to facilitate the return of displaced Kurds to Afrin and other areas they were forced to flee. 

Additionally, and importantly, he has guaranteed the cultural and political rights of Syria's Kurds and their participation in the upcoming national dialogue and the broader political process. Washington and Brussels seem to think all this sounds reasonable. Ankara is less convinced.  

Alliances and factions

The SDF is on thin ice. It risks losing Western political and military support if it rejects an initiative from Damascus that the West collectively feels is fair. To date, the Kurds' American support has afforded protection. Turkish troops arriving near the border appear to suggest that Türkiye's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has a Plan B.

If negotiations with the SDF reach a deadlock, Damascus has several options. One is to press the US and EU to end their support to the SDF. Another is to seek an alternative Kurdish political partner, such as the Kurdish National Council (KNC). Another option is limited military pressure, which can be achieved by using the well-motivated Türkiye and its SNA militia to force the SDF back to the negotiating table. 

Alternatively, Damascus may exploit internal SDF divisions, particularly between the Qandil-aligned faction—which follows directives from the PKK leadership in northern Iraq—and the Syrian-affiliated faction. Strengthening the latter could weaken the SDF's current leadership structure and bring parts of the force under Syrian state authority.

Furthermore, Damascus could establish direct ties with Arab factions within the SDF, such as the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, the Raqqa Revolutionaries, and Al-Sanadid, which together constitute more than half of the SDF's total fighters. By offering them a path to integration into the Syrian army, Damascus would effectively bypass Abdi.

Looking for friends

The SDF faces growing internal challenges. It is increasingly vulnerable to a potential Arab rebellion from local tribes that do not align with its governance model, which they perceive as serving non-Syrian nationalist agendas. Even within the Kurdish community, many Syrian Kurds view the SDF's project as externally imposed.

Abdi's recent visit to Erbil in Iraq and his meeting with Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani was an attempt to unify Syrian Kurdish demands behind the SDF. It proved unsuccessful. Likewise, the SDF is growing increasingly concerned that American backing may be subject to change. Without US protection, the Turkish military could launch an operation to dismantle the SDF in its entirety.

Since 12 December, fighting between the Turks, their SNA partner, and the SDF has intensified. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 520 people have been killed in Syria's northeast since al-Assad fled. The SNA has seized Tel Rifaat, a town close to the Turkish border, and Manbij, another SDF stronghold. They now want to take the city of Kobani.

Under Turkish pressure, the SDF is retreating from Deir ez-Zor and elsewhere, but the internal wrangling is of its own making. The dominance of the SDF's Qandil-aligned wing, which maintains strong ties with Iran, is of concern to Western analysts. If Western support evaporates, some warn that the SDF could quickly become another Iranian proxy force—an outcome few Arab states would relish.

Faced with mounting threats, the SDF is running out of options. It may simply be hoping that al-Sharaa and his ministers agree to leave the SDF effectively alone, but that is fanciful because the Syrian government sees the eradication of all non-state armed groups within Syria as a key priority.

Running out of options

The time to make political concessions may be now. The country badly needs money for rebuilding, and Syrians know that the oil and gas fields under SDF-controlled territory could provide it. Likewise, if the SDF continues to hold out, it will be seen as depriving the Syrian people of their own resources.

The SDF may seek a new regional ally in the form of Iran to compensate for the potential loss of US support. There are already unconfirmed reports that Tehran has provided the SDF with air defence systems to counter the effective Turkish Bayraktar drones. If it does form such an alliance, this would be a huge strategic miscalculation, given how drastically Iran's influence in Syria has declined. 

For now, the SDF has to resolve its internal crisis. One wing advocates for rapprochement with Damascus, de-escalation with Türkiye, and integration into Syrian state institutions, while the other (which dominates decision-making) seems intent on transforming northeast Syria into a battleground for regional actors, as evidenced in the SDF's intransigence during negotiations with Damascus.

The SDF's strategy of obstructing state-building and leveraging its control over resources as a bargaining chip in negotiations could backfire spectacularly: Syria's new rulers are intent on dismantling all armed non-state entities, irrespective of their ideological, ethnic, or sectarian affiliations. They only hope the militias 'come quietly'. It seems that, for the SDF, that is a step too far.