Abdullah Gül reflects on the crises in the Middle East

Do you believe there is no rule of law at the moment?

The failed coup attempt in 2015 and various external political and economic factors have impacted progress in this area. When I left the presidency in 2014, we had already made significant progress, but since then, there has been a regression due to differing factors. Returning to correct and rational policies is essential to effectively address these setbacks, as they are happening now.

How do you assess the current social situation in Turkey, and where do refugees fit in within the social fabric of Turkish society?

In just two years, Turkey received as many refugees as Germany did in 30 years. It has one of the highest refugee populations in the world, which has naturally impacted the country's social fabric in significant ways.

Do Syrian refugees pose a real problem, or is their presence in Turkey being exploited for political gain?

There hasn't been widespread conflict in the country over refugees, only some isolated incidents. Over the past several years, Turkey has held more than five local, presidential, and parliamentary elections, and no political party has exploited the refugee issue. In the most recent election, it did surface somewhat, but the Turkish people have generally been humanitarian in their approach.

In fact, I commend opposition parties—particularly the main opposition party—for not weaponising this issue during the elections. The same cannot be said in Europe, where the issue of migration has been extremely politicised.

Do you think Syrian refugees should go back home?

I have addressed this issue on several occasions, emphasising that refugees in any country never truly feel at home. Naturally, they yearn for their homeland, their houses, fields, and schools. Some may choose to go back home, where they feel more at ease, while others may choose to stay.

However, the host country can only provide refuge for so long before social tensions surface, as locals could come to view foreigners as economic competition. The return of refugees should be handled in a way that ensures both foreigners and locals feel secure and comfortable.

President Erdoğan recently expressed his willingness to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and it is said that one of his key concerns is discussing the return of Syrian refugees. What's your view on this?

I welcome President Erdoğan's proposal to have a meeting with President al-Assad. If peace and social harmony are restored in Syria, then most refugees will naturally be inclined to return to their homeland voluntarily. However, if the conditions are not conducive to return, then what do you expect them to do? This is my personal view, but I'm not in a position of authority to make any decisions on the matter.

Would you welcome a meeting between al-Assad and Erdoğan, or do you have reservations?

If both sides genuinely want to meet, then the situation must be carefully managed. If there is a mutual will to engage in dialogue, they could potentially overcome past grievances and open a new chapter in their relationship. However, for the meeting to be fruitful, thorough preparation is essential. This might involve meetings at various levels—diplomatic, ministerial, political, and security—to first ease tensions and lay the groundwork for a productive discussion. That way, when the two presidents finally meet, they would have already made significant progress in resolving these matters. Without such preparations, a meeting discussing opaque issues could derail the process.

Public and secret meetings between Turkish and Syrian officials have taken place in Baghdad, Moscow, and along the two countries' borders, and political contact has been established.

However, al-Assad insists that he will not personally meet with Erdoğan until there is an announcement—at least in principle—of withdrawing Turkish forces from Syrian territory. What do you think of al-Assad's demand?

Turkey is fully committed to Syria's territorial integrity—a principle reaffirmed numerous times. The idea of 'neo-Ottomanism' or similar rumours is baseless. Turkey wants a free, sovereign, and unified Syria—both territorially and socially.

But why are Turkish military units present in Syria? This is primarily due to the internal security and terrorism vacuum that has emerged in the country. Turkey has no intention—nor has it ever had—to harm Syria's security or to alter its territorial map. The international community and our Syrian brothers need to understand this. The president, foreign minister, and all relevant officials have been very clear on this point.

As for when and how the withdrawal of Turkish military units from Syria will occur, that is a matter for discussion. I am not in a position of responsibility to provide specific details on how or when this will take place, but I sincerely hope it will be conducted in a smooth and transparent manner that satisfies all parties involved.

The same applies to Iraq. Turkey's involvement there also stems from the security vacuum that exists. If the Iraqi and Syrian governments could fully address these security issues, there would be no need for a Turkish military presence in either country.

The comparisons between Iraq and Syria are indeed relevant. For example, Turkey maintains a military presence at the Bashiqa base in Iraq and is engaged in ongoing negotiations with the Al Sudani government regarding the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). As for Syria, do you think there is potential for cooperation between Damascus and Ankara in combating terrorist groups or the Kurds, particularly the PKK and its affiliated Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG)?

First and foremost, we must acknowledge that the Kurds are a significant ethnic group in this region—in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. I believe they should be equal citizens in their respective countries, enjoying freedom and all the rights guaranteed by law. While there are challenges in some countries, it is important to recognise that, as I remember it, certain Kurdish communities in Syria were historically marginalised; many of them did not even have identity cards. However, we must make a clear distinction between the Kurdish people as a whole and the PKK as a terrorist entity.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the terrorist group PKK had a presence in Syria, and Abdullah Öcalan operated from Syrian territory. The group enjoyed safety and stability until 1998, when the Adana Agreement was signed between Ankara and Damascus. Regarding the issue of joint action or cooperation between Turkey and Syria against terrorist groups, this is both possible and necessary. The provisions of the Adana Agreement can serve as a basis for such collaboration. However, it is essential to distinguish between terrorists and Kurdish citizens living in the country.

In the late 1990s, Turkey was involved in the coordination between Syria, Turkey, and Iraq to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish entity in northwestern Iraq, in what was known as "trilateral coordination".

Despite current tension between Turkey and Syria, there are joint efforts underway to prevent the formation of a Kurdish entity in northeastern Syria. You've mentioned the presence of Kurds in four countries: Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Do you believe there should be coordination among these four countries to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state?

Naturally, coordination among all these countries to combat terrorism and terrorist groups is possible while making a clear distinction between terrorists and the citizens living in these countries to be treated equally.  However, if there are separatist movements or terrorist organisations that threaten the national security of these nations, then coordination among these countries becomes essential.

Including coordination to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state?

We must recognise that all citizens in any country must enjoy security, freedom, and all their sovereign and legal rights. All citizens, including Kurds and non-Kurds, must be granted their fundamental rights, but terrorist or separatist movements cannot be regarded as legitimate defenders of human rights. From time to time, these movements have been used as proxies by external forces such as Russians and Americans. In addition, Israel will consider such a Kurdish entity if established as its potential ally. Therefore, all separatist and terrorist movements that threaten the national security of the respective nations must be firmly addressed.

I will return to the topic of Israel, but I wanted to ask if you were surprised that al-Assad was the only leader from the 'Arab Spring' countries who managed to remain in office.

I wouldn't say it's a surprise. I see that the countries in the region that witnessed Arap Spring have changed in one way or another, whether negatively or positively.

When was your last contact with al-Assad?

It was in 2011 when the 'Arab Spring' began. The last thing I ever wanted to see in Syria was the Syrian army face off against an armed faction of its own people.

When the events began to unfold, by 2012, and I saw that Russia and Iran were also involved in their own interests, I had doubts about a quick regime change in Syria. Russia's traditional Mediterranean policy is well-known. Iran has its own agenda of national interest. It was clear that Russia and Iran would keep supporting the regime.

On the other hand, the armed movements in Syria lacked the same level of substantial support. There was an unbalanced calculation. I shared with my government and voiced in international platforms that this conflict would not be resolved without moving toward a diplomatic or political solution. I anticipated that the situation would eventually lead to the current outcome, with things remaining as they are.

I remember the last serious attempt came from Kofi Annan, who was appointed as the joint special envoy of the UN and the Arab League for Syria in 2012. In my speeches at international platforms, such as the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, I stressed that this effort was Syria's last chance and hoped a political process would follow. It deeply saddened me that the situation reached this tragic point. With over 400,000 dead, the situation is truly heartbreaking.

Looking back on 'Arab Spring', what is your view 13 years later? Was it truly an 'Arab Spring' or was it more of a 'dark winter'?

The Arab youth and people's demands were certainly legitimate. I viewed it as a noble movement by young people and citizens striving for a dignified life and asking for good governance. Some countries, including monarchies, managed the crisis by trying to address and fulfil many of their citizens' legitimate demands. On the other hand, it was the 'elected' dictators who failed to handle the situation properly.

Was the 'Arab Spring' a failure?

When I reflect on how it began in Tunisia and compare it to where the country stands today, it's hard to view the outcome as a success. In the most recent Tunisian elections, voter turnout was around 27%. How can that be considered a success? Rached Ghannouchi, who is now 83 years old, was a key figure in previous elections. Today, he is in prison.

Is it a disappointment for you?

It's not a disappointment but rather regret for how things turned out afterwards. The Arab people wanted better economic and social conditions and sought accountability from their governments. Don't the Arab people deserve the right to live like the Germans, French, British, and others, with guarantees for their economic, political, and social rights? Seeing things reach this point fills me with sadness.

Moving on to Israel and the potential for further regional escalation. Israel is bombing Damascus, Beirut, Hodeidah, Iraq, Iran, the West Bank and, of course, most of all Gaza. What is your view on what is happening?

I feel deep sorrow. The Islamic countries in the region are not united; they are deeply divided. Even within Palestine, there is a fragmentation on two fronts, whether in the West Bank or Gaza. This division has afforded Israel the ability to act as it has. The lack of unity and coherence among the region's nations has essentially given Israel a historic opportunity to behave this way.

What do you think of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel?

I do not support attacks on defenceless, unarmed civilians in any way. But what UN Secretary-General Antonio Gutteres said is very important to understand: These attacks did not happen in a vacuum.

Israel has illegally and unjustly occupied the lands of the Palestinians for decades. Israel has been carrying out a cruel settlement policy in the West Bank despite the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Israeli authorities have forced Palestinians to leave their own land in a systematic and permanent way. In addition to all these oppressions, when people are constantly deprived of their dignity and fundamental rights, they may feel, "Let's die together because we are already heading toward the end." When people are denied their rights or are not treated as human beings, it is only natural that resistance movements will rise up. And that is what happened.

Even though Israel has decapitated Hezbollah's leadership, it has not ceased its bombing all across Lebanon. What do you think is their goal?

All Israeli policies are aimed at avoiding the issue of withdrawing to the 1967 borders. In 2006, UN Resolution 1701 was passed, calling for Israel's withdrawal and for Hezbollah to disarm. However, since the occupation did not end, resistance and armed struggle continued. These issues are deeply interconnected.

So, does the solution lie with Resolution 1701?

Not solely through 1701, though it's the most recent resolution on this matter. The solution's foundation lies in the 1967 borders (UN Resolution 242). I mentioned 1701 specifically in the context of Lebanon.

What's your take on recent Turkish statements that Israel is seeking the 'Promised Land'? We know the Turkish parliament recently held a session discussing their concerns over this and how it could even pose a threat to Turkey. What's your view on this?

I don't attach importance to such ideological or mythological claims, as these are outdated dreams. Israel doesn't dare to display hostile behaviour against Turkey.  

Israel and Iran have long been engaged in a shadow war, but that came to a crashing halt in April when Iran struck Israel directly with a missile salvo for the first time in response to an Israeli strike on its consulate in Damascus. It did so again on 1 October in retaliation for Israel's assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut. Are you worried about the possibility of a regional war or an Iran-Israel war?

As I said earlier, the region is not unified. Unfortunately, there is a division within the Islamic world in the Middle East. Iran's hawkish policies have changed threat perceptions in the region. While traditionally, the Arab world perceived Israel as the primary threat, Iran has taken its place. This has led Arab countries to establish direct or indirect relations with Israel. Israel, which desired such a division, has achieved its ambitions.

This situation has affected the region and its overall cohesion. I believe the only positive development in recent times is the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, facilitated by China. This has benefited the region.

Iran's aggressive rhetoric and slogans about wiping Israel off the map and ending the Israeli state have benefited Tel Aviv. Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric serves as a pretext to justify unlimited military support of the US and some European countries.

Israel wants to spread the war to the region. It sees this as being in its own interest, and for this purpose, it provokes the actors in the region, especially Iran.

You mentioned the Saudi-Iranian agreement brokered by China. We have also seen a new approach from President Erdoğan, improving relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. How do you view the Turkish president's new regional approach?

I fully support these steps and regret losing a decade in our relationships with these brotherly nations. I wholeheartedly endorse this direction. The solidarity between Turkey and these countries will have positive repercussions on the security and prosperity of the region.

Turning back to the Palestinian issue, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that there is a major weakness in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is the division among the Palestinians. Much effort has been made to eliminate this division, notably through the initiatives of Saudi King Abdullah. I also took initiatives to bridge this division in my previous capacities on different occasions. This division weakens the strength of the cause. Gaza and the West Bank are not made up of different people. They are all disenfranchised Palestinians. With so much suffering, it is time to unite.

We must also recognise that the Arab Peace Initiative, previously presented in Beirut in 2002 by King Abdullah and endorsed by the OIC, which Iran is a member of, remains a critical effort for an effective and meaningful solution to the Palestinian issue. Without finding a lasting solution based on a two-state format to this issue, it is difficult to ensure regional peace and security in the Middle East.

Amid global shifts—with China's rise, Russia's involvement in Ukraine, and a weakening US role—what does the emerging international order look like to you? And how do you anticipate this will affect the region?

In today's circumstances, universal values and standards, that the Western world claim to be ardent defenders, such as human rights, rule of law, democracy are trampled on by the Western actors.

In the case of Israel's occupation of Palestine and aggression toward Palestinians, the West has clearly not applied the same standards. In Gaza, the failure of the international system has been demonstrated with great suffering. The stance of the Western actors, mainly the US, on the war in Gaza does not match with their arguments for the Russia-Ukraine war. This hypocrisy decreases their credibility as well as their persuasiveness. Regrettably, this double standard could encourage some countries to gravitate toward authoritarian regimes, be it in China or any other, to confront this demonstrated bias by the West.

The current struggle between the US and China, mainly on economic issues and with regard to the spheres of influence, will definitely lead to a new era of polarisation in the world over the next ten years. This will certainly play out challenging outcomes for the Middle East and beyond.

The Western world needs to revise itself and its practices and return to fair, participatory and transparent policies based on dialogue and honesty, respecting the requirements of international law and universal principles. If they do so, they can restore the trust they have lost and regain the confidence of the peoples of the Arab World and the wider region, from Asia to Latin America. Such an understanding can, once again, make the Western world and its institutions a source of inspiration. Otherwise, they will continue to be remembered as a disappointment.

Such a positive transformation and increased awareness will also lead many countries—whether in the West or the East—to turn inward and rethink their socio-economic policies. This will lead to the implementation of an approach based on good governance.