Syria and the future of Iran

If it's not careful, Tehran could soon experience what their Syrian client just did: the sudden implosion of a rotten regime 

An Iranian man reads a newspaper with a picture of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran, Iran December 8, 2024.
Majid Asgaripour/Reuters
An Iranian man reads a newspaper with a picture of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran, Iran December 8, 2024.

Syria and the future of Iran

The departure of Bashar al-Assad from Damascus and the apparent termination of his regime are major setbacks for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Combined with the removal of Iranian air defences by Israel, the defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the longstanding dissatisfaction of Iranians with the competence of those purporting to lead them, and the pending return of Donald Trump to the White House, it would be more than reasonable for leaders in Tehran to fear a fate like that visited upon their Syrian client.

Slightly more than 13 years ago, this writer engaged Bashar al-Assad in a conversation centring on what would be required of Syria to regain territory lost to Israel in June 1967, mainly the Golan Heights. In a peace mediation that had gathered strength beginning in the fall of 2010, Israel had indicated its willingness to part with occupied Syrian territory provided Syria terminated its military relationships with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

Al-Assad told me then—on 28 February 2011—that he would do what was expected of him. He assured me that Iran and Hezbollah would yield their interests to those of Syria by agreeing to end military relations with Syria if a Syria-Israel peace treaty were arrived at. I had my doubts, but al-Assad was insistent: Iran would yield on the military relationship, and Hezbollah, once Lebanon joined with Syria in making peace with Israel, would become a Lebanese political party. Indeed, al-Assad also assured me that the “Shebaa Farms” were Syrian, undermining the rationale for the “Lebanese Resistance.”

When I reported the essence of the conversation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu two days later, he gave the green light to move with full speed toward a treaty.

In mid-March, however, al-Assad slammed on the brakes by authorising deadly force against peaceful Syrian demonstrators protesting police violence and illegal detentions. Al-Assad’s violence would ultimately produce conditions that would all but ruin Syria, leaving it a smoking wreck to be looted by the ruling family and its entourage. By choosing violence over domestic diplomacy and conciliation, al-Assad also ceded the Golan to Israel and subordinated Syria to Iran and Hezbollah.

AFP
Hezbollah fighters step on an artillery gun with the group's flag flying by, in a mountainous area around the Syrian town of Flita near the border with Lebanon in August 2017.

Iran's instrumental role

Iran was instrumental in saving al-Assad from a revolution that began peacefully but became armed due to regime violence and al-Assad’s release of Islamist criminals from his prisons. In 2013, Iran ordered Hezbollah to intervene decisively on behalf of regime forces at Qusayr. In 2015, Iran persuaded Russia to intervene on al-Assad’s behalf with its air force. And over time, Iran has created predominantly Shiite foreign fighter militias under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to supplement al-Assad’s army in Syria.

But Iran, along with Russia, proved powerless to save al-Assad when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched its offensive beginning on 27 November of this year. My sense is that HTS—reacting to Hezbollah’s defeat in Lebanon and Iran’s loss of its (ineffective) Russian air defence system to Israel—decided to expand its local rule of northwestern Syria to Aleppo. It did so almost effortlessly, and it noticed something surprising as it took Aleppo: al-Assad regime forces were simply melting away—a phenomenon that repeated itself in Hama and Homs. The gate to Damascus was wide open, and no one was obstructing the road ahead.

Naturally, Tehran and Moscow wanted to save their client. For Iran, Syria was the vital land link to the jewel in the crown of its hegemonic pretensions: Hezbollah. Tehran knew that no one other than al-Assad would subordinate Syria to it and its Lebanese proxy. And it hoped to rebuild that proxy in the wake of its devastating defeat.

As for Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Syria was much more than a Mediterranean military base. It was his “evidence” to the Russian people of Russia’s supposed return to great power status. Moscow had, after all, “saved” al-Assad from the alleged regime change machinations of President Barack Obama.

A hollow Syrian army

But when they attempted to prop up the Syrian military, Iran and Russia found their hands gripping empty uniforms. Years of combat inactivity, filled with crime, corruption, theft, and amphetamine production, had hollowed out the Syrian military and its morale, rendering it unfit to fight.

The Trump policy of "maximum pressure" will return, and his administration will not shrink from military measures if Tehran invites them

Russia knew that tactical airpower would not suffice to stop the rebels. Moreover, Russian pilots had spent years in Syria targeting defenceless civilians, developing a deadly speciality of destroying medical facilities.  And Iran knew its militia auxiliaries would not suffice. Indeed, Hezbollah forces have been spotted leaving Syria through Qusayr—the place of their 2013 victory over Syrian rebels.

Question marks over what next

Ideally, those assuming power in Syria will try to create a governance system based on Syrian nationalism and Syrian citizenship. Minorities are no doubt terrified of what may come next.  But making Iran's defeat in Syria permanent will require something approaching national unity, and unity will not be attainable if sectarian agendas are pursued and human rights are violated. 

The record of HTS in Idlib province is not promising in this regard. Washington, Ankara, and others might well give HTS the benefit of the doubt to influence its behaviour in the proper direction. But Tehran is hoping and praying that the Al-Qaeda roots of HTS come to the fore, eventually restoring to Syria a regime friendly to Iranian regional hegemony.

For decades, Tehran has counted on American fear of a regional war to "punch above its weight" and use a boxing expression.  As early as 1983, it orchestrated attacks on the American Embassy in Beirut and on the headquarters of US peacekeepers in Lebanon, killing 241 Americans in the latter.  This was, in Lebanon, the equivalent of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour. To this day, the leaders of the Islamic Republic cannot believe they got away with it.  And ever since, with rare exception, they have assumed that Washington's top priority is to avoid war with Iran.

The return of Trump

The incoming Trump administration will not seek a pretext for going to war with Iran. Indeed, it will be open to an agreement with Tehran that would lift all American economic sanctions in return for a strong, verifiable, and long-term nuclear accord and specific Iranian actions indicating an end to hegemonic adventures in the Arab world. 

Reuters
US President-elect Donald Trump waves his hand during his meeting with Republican representatives in the Capitol building, in Washington, DC, November 13, 2024.

Read more: Trump's return to the White House means Iran must tread carefully

But there should be no illusion in Tehran: The Trump policy of "maximum pressure" will return, and the Trump administration will not shrink from military measures if Tehran invites them by move toward nuclear weaponisation, by attacking US allies and partners in the region, or by attacking US forces in Iraq or Syria.

Brutality, corruption, and incompetence are all features of governance in Iran, as they were in Syria under al-Assad.  These features account for the clerical regime's greatest vulnerability: The people of Iran. Bashar al-Assad proved to be some combination of uninterested and incapable when it came to meaningful reform. 

One suspects the mullahs and their enablers are similarly uninterested and incapable. They may yet experience that which their Syrian client experienced: The sudden implosion of a rotten regime. 

Yet another major setback

For Tehran, Syria's loss is the latest piece of unanticipated bad news.  Only a few months ago, it seemed as though its encouragement of Hamas to "do something big" in Israel was a thing of strategic brilliance, having seemingly destroyed the prospect of Israel-Saudi Arabia normalisation. 

But now, all is ashes, and all it can rely on to recoup its fortunes is for players as disparate as Benjamin Netanyahu, HTS's Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and Donald Trump to misplay the cards in their hands.  Tehran's fate is indeed in those hands.  No doubt, this is an uncomfortable feeling for people who have grown accustomed to having the initiative.

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