Assad's fall: The end of an era

In just over a week, a lightning rebel offensive has collapsed five decades of draconian Assad rule. Al Majalla looks back at the political career of the former Syrian president.

A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama following its capture.
OMAR HAJ KADOUR / AFP
A portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is pictured with its frame broken in a Syrian regime's Political Security Branch facility on the outskirts of the central city of Hama following its capture.

Assad's fall: The end of an era

It might be safe to say that every world leader who took part in Hafez al-Assad’s funeral back in 2000 was, one way or another, also blessing the succession of his son Bashar. Jacques Chirac was there, who had been the first Western leader to welcome al-Assad even before the latter became president. The same was true for US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, whose attendance was seen as a blessing by the Clinton Administration.

Many went as far as to describe the new president as pro-West, given that he had studied in the UK, where he met his British-born Londoner wife, Asma al-Akhras, who hailed from a respected Sunni Muslim family from Homs. Al-Assad began his tenure by visiting Paris and London, where he met with Queen Elizabeth II.

A 'reformist'-turned-autocrat

He also initiated a series of domestic steps that reflected his desire to shake off decades-long socialist Baathism. Domestically, al-Assad allowed world-famous cartoonist Ali Ferzat to establish Syria’s first independent newspaper since 1963, only to close it down not because it criticised him but rather for nailing then-prime minister Mohammad Mustapha Miro. The message was: criticism is forbidden in Assadist Syria.

He then decreed private universities only to milk their coffers through excessive taxes or destroy their curriculum through daily interference by the Syrian Students Union—a Stalin-style Baath Party organ. Then we had the Damascus Spring of 2001, which ushered a series of intellectual saloons debating “reform” rather than “regime change.” That, too, was too much for al-Assad to tolerate, and he began to arrest every person who attended those forums or spoke at any of them.

While he seemed to like the idea of reform, he soon realised that any real change—a free press, a free judiciary, quality education, etc.—could possibly bring down his regime.

Finding his foreign footing

On foreign affairs, al-Assad swung between Europe and the US and between the Arab world and Iran before falling into the lap of then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He would become his personal friend and sound ally until politics drove them apart in 2011. But it wasn't until a few days ago that Erdoğan dealt him the final blow.

AFP
President Bashar al-Assad (R) welcoming Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at Damascus airport on January 17, 2011.

Al-Assad also tried to build bridges with Arab leaders who had sour relations with his father, like Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. He sent Prime Minister Miro to Baghdad to help break UN-imposed sanctions before receiving a Godsend: the second Palestinian intifada of 28 September 2000.

Early into his tenure, it gave him the opportunity to market himself as an Arab nationalist “committed” to the region’s number one cause: Palestine. This period saw him cosy up to Hamas and Hezbollah—and, by extension, Iran. It was originally a relationship on equal footing before shifting in Iran’s favour after 2011, enabling him to position himself as the “voice of reason” in the so-called Axis of Resistance.

He would help negotiate the release of European hostages held by Iran-backed Iraqi militias in post-Saddam Iraq and, in 2007, used his influence with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to secure the release of 15 British sailors abducted in Iranian waters.

At the same time, he sent jihadist militants to fight in Iraq in 2003 and sharply criticised countries that had normalised ties with Israel, with the exception of Qatar, due mainly to his friendship with its emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani.

He trashed the Muslim Brotherhood and described them as the “Brotherhood of the Devil” but meanwhile was hosting Hamas on Syrian territory until the anti-regime riots broke out in 2011. And when he got the chance to establish his own talks with Israel in 2008 – under Turkish auspices – he didn’t hesitate.

One year after the second intifada came the twin attacks on 11 September 2001. Again, this was another Godsend, giving him the chance to mend relations with the US. And for a brief moment, that is exactly what he did, sharing intelligence with the FBI on Muslim Brotherhood Syrians who had joined al-Qaeda, prompting a senior State Department adviser to say that Syria had “saved American lives.”

Al-Assad did not request a dignified departure. Instead, he fled under the cover of night, caring little for Syria and everything within it.

This Syrian-US cooperation was short-lived, however, and it would collapse after al-Assad refused to join the US-led war on Afghanistan in October 2001, followed by his haughty attitude towards British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who came to visit him days after the Afghan War.

US invasion of Iraq

Al-Assad's regional policy heavily revolved around Iraq during his 24-year rule. He inherited an openness policy towards Saddam from Hafez al-Assad, which he tried to expand from 2000 to 2002. He was very vocal in criticising the US-led invasion of 2003.

Many drew parallels between him and Saddam, believing that he would come next, given that both were Baath-led regimes. But when the regime collapsed, al-Assad benefited greatly from the post-Saddam era due to a handful of Shiite politicians who had been his allies when part of the opposition under Saddam, like Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Malki.

Heavyweights from the Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq were either based in Damascus or linked to Damascus for most of the 1980s onwards. They would soon create Shiite militias to strike at the Sunnis of Iraq, like the Mehdi Army and the Badr militia. And when the Syrian revolt broke out, followed by the rise of the Islamic State (IS), new names emerged like al-Hashd al-Shaabi, Kataib Hezbollah, and al-Nujabaa, who all found sectarian common ground with the Syrian regime.

Ironically, none stepped in to save him in his final hour, hastily speeding his downfall. Also, in 2024, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani tried to mediate talks between al-Assad and  Erdoğan, but the former turned him down.

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Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (C) holds a reception in honour of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (L) with the presence of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah (R) on February 25, 2010 in Damascus, Syria.

Hariri assassination

In Lebanon, al-Assad was also a main ally of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who also never got along with former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri. He never liked Hariri, who, in turn, never took him too seriously and considered him a political amateur. Many would recall that he once said: "We used to visit Hafez al-Assad, and he had the ability to wrap everybody with his cloak. This young man is just not like that."

Relations would spiral downwards with the passing of UNSCR 1559 in 2004, which called for the disarming of Hezbollah and an exodus of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Al-Assad accused Hariri of being behind UNSCR 1559, threatening him with his life. So did the Syrian security chief in Lebanon, Rustom Gazaleh. And when Hariri was assassinated in a massive explosion on 14 February 2005, fingers immediately pointed to al-Assad and Hezbollah. A Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was created by the UN, which came out with a verdict in 2020 blaming Hezbollah operative Salim Ayyash for Hariri's murder. However, Nasrallah refused to surrender him.

One of those who were killed during the Hariri probe was Syrian Interior Ghazi Kanaan, who committed suicide on 12 October 2005, shortly after being interrogated by German persecutor Detlev Mehlis. Kanaan was one of the most prominent Alawite officers in the Syrian Army, who would have been perfect to stage a coup had it not been for his 2005 death, just like al-Assad's brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, who was killed at the start of the Syrian revolt in 2012.

The 2011 Syrian uprising

When popular demonstrations broke out against al-Assad on 15 March 2011, many thought the "reformist" president would lead a "correction movement" against corruption, nepotism, embezzlement, and the economic monopoly his cousin Rami Makhlouf established. However, he waited until the end of March 2011 to deliver his first speech, and rather than accommodate the demonstrators and submit to their demands—which back then did not call for regime change yet—he ridiculed them, harassed them, and threw them in jail where they were beaten, tortured, and killed.

He then unleashed his sectarian militias, and when major cities began to fall, one after another, he called on Iranian militias to support him, followed by Hezbollah ones, and finally, on the Russian army. 

AFP
Russian President Vladimir Putin (2nd-R) and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad (2nd-L) preside over a military parade in the Russian air base in Hmeimim in the northwestern Syrian province of Latakia. December 11, 2017.

Vladimir Putin helped him regain rural Damascus, the ancient city of Palmyra, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor, and he would then try to breathe life into his regime, asking him to sit down with Erdoğan to reach a political settlement. Al-Assad said no. The same request was made by Iraqi Prime Minister Al Sudani and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman. Once again, he refused to budge.

Russia was supplying him with military cover while the Iranians were helping him economically until they decided to abandon him right after he had abandoned them during the latest Lebanon war. On 7 December 2024, he collapsed, apparently unaware that continuing to enslave a population and force it to live with little money, no electricity, and no fuel while he and his cronies were enjoying them all would not work. It never did. And yet it became part of day-to-day life in al-Assad's Syria.

What was notable about his sudden departure from Damascus is that he did not bid his supporters a farewell speech or opt for a peaceful handover. He also did not take with him anybody except for a small handful of family members.

To compare him with other Arab leaders who suffered a similar fate, one might recall Egyptian King Farouk's departure in 1952, who insisted on full military honours and that the highest rank of his opponents, General Mohammad Neguib, accompany him to the ship sailing from Egypt and salute him militarily.  He also asked for official stationery so that he could write a proper resignation fit for a king. For his part, Al-Assad made no such requests for a dignified departure. Instead, he fled under the cover of night, caring little for Syria and everything within it.

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