When Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stepped into the hall where the foreign ministers of the Arab League convened earlier this month in Cairo, his Syrian counterpart walked out in protest, highlighting the strain that remains between the two countries despite internationally-backed moves toward normalisation.
The 10 September summit was Turkey's first invitation to participate in an Arab League event in 13 years. Damascus had not objected to the invitation—probably holding off from doing so at the request of its Egyptian host and other members. But the visible demonstration of distaste followed nonetheless, highlighting doubts over efforts to restore ties.
At the end of August, Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad opened a legislative session of the People’s Assembly in Damascus. He pledged to continue with the reconciliation process with Turkey—set up in 2017 by Russia, Iran and Iraq—despite his own misgivings.
It was taken as a sign of top-level readiness to engage without preconditions. But there were clearly defined objectives, including a call on Ankara from Damascus for the “withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syrian territory and stopping its support for terrorism.” Although al-Assad held a grudge over Ankara’s backing of Syrian opposition forces during his country’s civil war, this seemed to be his way of lending tacit support for normalisation.
Course change
Although Ankara initially was not interested in normalisation in the hey-day of Syria’s civil war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—coming to terms with the fact that al-Assad had won the war after being backed by Russia and Iran—changed course. This realisation was detailed in the recently published memoirs of US General H.R. McMaster—one of Trump’s national security advisors—who said that Erdoğan had admitted this to the former US president in a phone call between the two leaders in November 2017.
Syria had become the most acute foreign policy failure of Erdoğan’s government. The Turkish electorate—including the president’s base—became increasingly critical of his policies, leaving him with a clear political liability he needed to address. To this end, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation, MİT, was ordered to open a channel of communication with Syrian counterparts toward resetting relations.
After progress was made, the defence and foreign ministers of the two countries met, but not the presidents. The lack of top-level contact was noteworthy, given the urgency to show clear progress in improving relations before parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2023. But there was not enough time to work through the many issues. Meanwhile, al-Assad was betting on Erdoğan losing the election and didn’t want to give him any political boost to improve his chances.
But Erdoğan won, and rapprochement efforts were again resuscitated after a more than one-year hiatus, although some contact was maintained during this period. Turkish and Syrian intelligence officers and others continued to meet cautiously. Ankara used this period to try to clarify what looked achievable in terms of re-engagement with Damascus. At the same time, it also tried to persuade Syrian opposition groups there—who harbour deep grievances and distrust al-Assad—not to stand in the way of the process.
In early September, Ankara officially confirmed that it had made overtures to Damascus. In response to a question about relations with Syria, the AKP’s Deputy Chairman and Party Spokesperson Ömer Çelik confirmed the process and outlined a road map toward normalisation.
Russian push
Further details emerged later in a press conference held by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He indicated that work was underway on the return of refugees and measures to suppress the terrorist threat—steps seen as necessary before Turkey would agree to withdraw its troops. Russia, Turkey, Syria and Iran would hold another meeting over the process in the near future, Lavrov added.
Russia views normalisation between Syria and Turkey as a strategic benefit and has publicly and privately doubled down on its efforts towards reconciliation. Any meeting between Erdoğan and al-Assad will largely depend on whether current negotiations make any progress. But given the unresolved grievances and complexities at play, any immediate breakthrough is unlikely.
Solving one problem could cause a new and different problem. The fact that so many international powers and non-state groups are involved in the process further complicates the issue. As the well-known saying goes, “Too many cooks spoil the broth.”
Challenges and non-starters
But one element has remained consistent throughout: the Syrian side still wants a withdrawal of Turkish troops first, as Mekdad stated in his press conference in Cairo, but Turks view the matter differently. Its officials have stated publicly on more than one occasion that while they don’t intend to keep their troops in Syria forever, they need security guarantees over what they view as a cross-border threat from groups operating within Syria before they will pull out.
Ankara also needs to secure the backing of armed militias opposed to the Syrian regime, which number in the tens of thousands. For his part, al-Assad would have to grant these groups amnesty and allow them to reintegrate into society. Whether or not he would accept remains unclear. In any case, blanket acceptance is unlikely, which raises the question of what to do with those he does not accept.
Terrorism is another top issue for both nations. For Turkey, the priority is over how the YPG, the People’s Protection Unit formed of Syrian Kurds, should be dealt with. Ankara considers the YPG, which is in control of around 25% of Syrian territory, to be a terrorist organisation.
For its part, Syria describes all armed groups as terror groups. It believes Turkey is backing such militias in north-western Syria and that some of them could not exist without Ankara’s support, including the Idlib-based Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Agreement on which groups should be defined as terrorists will be an important issue in the talks.
The other big issue is refugees. Turkish society is generally in agreement that Syrian refugees living in their country should return. The exception comes from some Islamists—and some other ideological groups—who say the concept of ummah means they should be allowed to stay. On its part, the Turkish government has been stricter. Syrians without proper documents, or those who have broken the law, are being sent back.
However, Syria’s dire economic, social and security landscape—along with fears of government reprisals—gives very little incentive for refugees to return home. For his part, Al-Assad himself is in no rush to return Syrians who oppose his rule. International sanctions and pressure have done little to change his position.
And while the US has remained adamant that it will not lift sanctions or engage with Damascus, several European countries, including Italy, Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia, have begun normalising their relations with Syria. The issue is expected to be discussed in a meeting of EU member states this month.
Rump state
Even with diplomatic moves underway, al-Assad remains beset by a range of major problems. Around 35% of Syria remains outside of his control. Foreign troops remain stationed in many corners of the country. There are militias with tens of thousands of members in the north and northeast. In the south, serious tensions are rising in As-Suwayda and Dara’a. In parts of the country, the YPG and the Islamic State (IS) are strong.
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Meanwhile, the economy is in dire straits. Under such bleak circumstances, it will be difficult for Assad to claim any meaningful victory. As overtures toward diplomatic normalisation continue, some observers doubt if al-Assad even wants all of his country—and its refugee population—back. It may be that he is content with controlling an area extending from the border with Jordan as far as Damascus and on to Homs, Hama, Aleppo city and the coastline including Tartus and Latakia.
With his enemies fighting each other in the rest of Syria, al-Assad will continue to need Russia and Iran to protect him. Rapprochement between Syria and Turkey will help, to some extent, but it will not be enough to ensure peace and stability in Syria. Unless an inclusive political solution can be achieved, the risk of renewed conflict and even civil war will continue to hang over the war-torn country.
