Iraq’s al-Sudani becomes the latest Turkey-Syria mediator
Muhammad Shia al-Sudani is hoping to help Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad mend fences, yet it is precisely the issue of fence security that means he will struggle.
Six months after Iraq formed a new government, Iraqis have mixed views on al-Sudani's performance.
Iraq’s al-Sudani becomes the latest Turkey-Syria mediator
In early June, Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani announced that he was trying to reconcile Turkey and Syria, whose relationship broke down in 2011, as fighting flared within Syria. Success would be a prize for the whole region.
The two states share a 900km border. It was in this border region, with an epicentre in Turkey’s south, that the two states shared in misery in February last year, when one of the strongest earthquakes ever to hit the Middle East killed around 53,000 Turks, 8,000 Syrians, and affected around 14 million in both countries.
At the heart of their feud are the Kurds in Syria’s north, the Syrian regime’s inability to govern the region, the threat Turkey sees the Kurds as posing, and Turkey’s response to that threat, which has been to invade Syria three times since 2016.
Its latest operation was launched in October 2019. The first was in 2016-2017, and the second was in 2018. North-east Syria is ostensibly governed by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD).
The PYD is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is considered a terrorist group not only by Turkey but by the US and the EU. Combatting the PKK has long been a Turkish national security priority.
The latest to try
An Iraqi government official revealed in an interview on 5 June that al-Sudani’s mediation efforts had been “warmly welcomed” by both Ankara and Damascus. Baghdad said it would host talks soon.
Yet al-Sudani is not the first to dip his toes in the water. Others have sought a rapprochement between the two rivals, including Russian diplomats, whose efforts have failed to yield much progress, despite holding lots of meetings.
Observers now wonder whether al-Sudani’s latest effort stands more chance. This time last year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won another presidential election, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad now looks secure, so there has been no change of personnel to alter the dynamics.
Al-Sudani is not the first to dip his toes in the water. Others have sought a rapprochement between the two rivals, including Russia.
The platform al-Sudani chose to announce his initiative was noteworthy, using Turkey's Habertürk TV to reveal that he had been in contact with al-Assad and Erdogan.
This may have been designed to generate momentum in the Turkish media and further encourage Erdogan to engage. Al-Sudani is believed to have discussed reconciliation with Erdogan when he visited Baghdad on 23 April.
Similarly, al-Sudani reportedly discussed reconciliation with al-Assad on the phone on 5 June. In April, the head of Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), Falih Al-Fayyadh, visited Damascus to do the same.
Leveraging relations
A Shiite politician, al-Sudani has now served almost two years as Iraq's prime minister, a similar duration to the tenures of his two predecessors. The high recent turnover of Iraqi prime ministers may factor into the thinking in Turkey and Syria.
Yet with aspirations for a second term in the upcoming elections and keen to play the statesman, al-Sudani likely sees a political opportunity, if he succeeds in defrosting relations with his two neighbours.
By positioning himself as a regional peacemaker, he will be aiming to win support to help him counter any potential challenges when his first term is over.
Iraq has a good record on reconciliation, having played a crucial role in facilitating discussions that led to the normalisation deal struck between Tehran and Riyadh last year, with China having later taken the lead on mediation.
Al-Sudani sought to channel this momentum, explaining that he was "working towards establishing a similar framework for reconciliation and dialogue between Syria and Turkey".
Al-Sudani will be relying on his relationship with both al-Assad and Erdogan to pull it off. He became the first Iraqi prime minister in 13 years to visit Damascus in July 2023, and hosted Erdogan in March, the first such visit in over a decade.
Subtly changing stance
His diplomacy has earned him credit in both capitals. This may have facilitated a subtle change in al-Assad's stance. Until now, he has insisted that all Turkish troops must leave northern Syria before talks begin.
Turkish President Erdogan (L) with the Iraqi prime minister in 2022. Al-Sudani will be relying on his relationship with Erdogan and Syria's Bashar al-Assad to end their feud.
On 4 June, however, Syria's foreign minister said Ankara must publicly declare its willingness to leave Syria before talks begin. That shift is important.
Syria's government has also previously insisted on a second precondition to talks: that Turkey stop supporting opposition forces in Syria. That condition appears to have been quietly dropped.
The Syrian foreign minister's comment was curiously timed, too, because a few days earlier, Turkish Defence Minister Yasar Guler suggested that Turkish troops could be withdrawn from Syria once its border security could be guaranteed.
If there is genuine readiness to participate in al-Sudani's initiative, the credit is not his alone, because the hand of Iran is reportedly being felt strongly behind the scenes. Analysts think this explains why it did not falter at the outset.
Iran and Russia
In terms of timing, the Turkish and Syrian ministerial comments coincided with the regional visit of Iran's acting Foreign Minister, Ali Bagheri Kani.
The pro-government Al-Watan newspaper reported that it was Kani's visit that prompted Turkey to declare its readiness to normalise ties with Syria and withdraw its troops once it felt confident in border security.
Likewise, the Syrian foreign minister's comments were made in a joint Damascus press conference with Kani. The involvement of PMF leader al-Fayyadh in the mediation efforts further indicates that Iran is rallying its allies to support it.
Iran's backing is no surprise. Any Turkish-Syrian thaw would be a triumph for Tehran, enhancing its regional influence, increasing its importance to Syria, and potentially even reshaping Turkey's position to more closely align with Iran's.
Turkish and Syrian ministerial comments coincided with the regional visit of Iran's foreign minister. A Turkish-Syrian thaw would be a triumph for Tehran.
Just as with Russia's doomed mediation efforts, it shows that in the Middle East, the intervention of foreign powers on its own does not guarantee results. External influence may help bring parties to the table, but getting an agreement is a completely different challenge.
Moscow initiative two years ago progressed through several stages before being elevated to foreign minister level in December 2022, two months before the earthquake. With other priorities, the talks lost momentum and ended late last year.
A bridge too far?
The gap between Ankara and Damascus is still yawning in places, so most hold little hope of al-Sudani succeeding. Al-Assad still wants a Turkish withdrawal and an end to Turkey's support for what he sees as terrorists.
Erdogan will be reluctant. Al-Assad does not have control of Syria's north, so Turkish boots on the ground are seen as a matter of national security. Withdrawal would only take place when Turkey felt the Kurdish threat in Syria had gone.
Turkey also wants the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees currently based in Turkey to be able to return home, with legal protections.
US soldiers working with a unit of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in the north-eastern Syria in November 2019.
Yet even if al-Assad were willing to address Turkey's Kurdish concerns (which is not the case), he would find it difficult do so because the United States also has a military presence in northeast Syria.
It is difficult not to room for optimism. Al-Assad refused to make any genuine concessions during the Russian-led talks, or in talks with the Syrian opposition in Geneva, or in meetings with the Arab League Ministerial Contact Group. His is a zero-sum approach and he refuses to deviate from it.
This underscores the enormity of al-Sudani's challenge. While he may make incremental progress, such as altering the parties' tone or arranging for face-to-face discussions, it remains unlikely that he will pull it off.
