Minor obstacles pose major risk to Syria-Turkey reconciliation

Despite Ankara's significant influence in the opposition-held region— derived from its military presence and substantial financial support for governance structures and opposition groups—Turkey has been unable to successfully reopen the crossing.

Reports suggest that Turkey tried to leverage its influence over the opposition, including the interim government and the Syrian National Army, to gain support for the move. Additionally, Turkey sought to win public favour by framing the reopening as a tactical measure aimed at improving local living conditions, insisting it carried no political implications. However, Turkey's clear signalling of its intent to restore ties with al-Assad has left little doubt about its true motives.

A step too far

The backlash against the reopening reveals a wider truth: many in the opposition-held areas—including those who have historically aligned with Turkey—see this move as a step too far. In their eyes, the reopening is not merely an economic transaction that would benefit both sides but a dangerous confidence-building measure that could accelerate normalisation talks between Ankara and Damascus. They fear it might open the door to the reopening of the M4 highway—a critical artery for direct trade between Turkey and regime-controlled areas, thus laying the tracks for full-blown normalisation between the Turkish government and al-Assad's regime.

At present, Turkey's strategy for addressing these challenges seems limited to offering reassurances to the official Syrian opposition—whether political, civilian, or armed—that any agreement with al-Assad will not be at their expense.

However, these assurances ring hollow, as the formal Syrian opposition lacks the authority and legitimacy to bring about meaningful change on the ground. It's like trying to build a house on shifting sands; the foundation is simply too unstable to support the structure Turkey envisions.

The issue extends to the Syrian National Army as well. The latter struggles to maintain discipline within its ranks, let alone exert meaningful influence over the residents in its areas of control. More critically, imposing such agreements on the residents of opposition-held areas—whether through coercion or violence—is likely to yield counterproductive results for Turkey's core objectives, particularly those related to refugees and border security. In essence, such actions risk setting fire to the very ground Turkey seeks to stabilise.

Greater transparency

To navigate this quagmire, Turkey must embrace transparency in its normalisation talks with al-Assad, fully lifting the veil on negotiations that impact millions of lives. It must also ensure that any agreements genuinely address the concerns and fears of residents in opposition-held areas. Ankara's strategy cannot rely on temporary fixes or half-measures; it must involve irreversible steps, robust monitoring mechanisms, and clear accountability measures to prevent backsliding.

Attempting to parachute in secretive agreements brokered behind closed doors will only exacerbate the issues Turkey seeks to resolve through normalisation with al-Assad. This approach risks leaving Turkey with little more than a hollow victory devoid of meaningful gains.

Ultimately, Turkey must recognise that it cannot impose normalisation with al-Assad from above. Like all complex negotiations, this process requires the engagement of all stakeholders and a clear understanding of the realities on the ground. Anything less could turn what might have been a genuine diplomatic breakthrough into an illusion.