Gaza crisis shows Washington badly missing Iran strategy

Obstacles must be overcome

Of course, it's hard to come up with an Iran strategy when the United States has telegraphed its intentions to deemphasise the whole region and pay much closer attention and devote more resources to the Indo-Pacific.

It's hard to come up with an Iran strategy when the commander-in-chief is in the midst of a re-election campaign. And finally, it's hard to come up with an Iran strategy when shots are getting fired in Israel-Palestine, and the spectre of a larger war looms.

But America must. Or at least, it should start thinking about dealing with the Iran challenge beyond pinprick US strikes that do nothing but embolden Tehran and its regional axis.

Let me be crystal clear: I am not calling for a US war against Iran. But I am suggesting a more strategy-driven approach that addresses the totality of the Iran challenge.

The United States recognises the huge problem Iran's regional proxy network poses to the region, to US partners, and to US interests. And yet, it has chosen to do very little about it for fear of having to go to war against Iran.

This US fear of escalation, while understandable from a political point of view, is precisely why Iran has managed to build over the years an impressive arc of influence that has sabotaged all US attempts to stabilise the Middle East.

The region can't wait for the US election season to be over. The makings of a new Iran strategy should be apparent right now. The US bureaucracy should start working on it right now. It'll take time to reach a political consensus on, fully develop, and fine-tune the strategy, but that's exactly why further delays should be avoided.

For any strategy to succeed, it must be informed by a clear strategic objective or set of objectives. The United States' ultimate objective regarding Iran is to cause a noticeable and durable change in Iranian behaviour while avoiding a large-scale military conflict. It is a difficult balance, to say the least, but Washington must do everything it can to achieve it.

Containment, pushback, and loosening of rules of engagement

The United States can pursue a strategy of containment like it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but one can argue that Washington has pursued a version of that option over the years with no success.

Given the increase in Iranian influence across the region, it stands to reason that a strategy of pushback is more apt. The Trump administration talked about pushback against Iran and applied sanctions against its regime but never really formulated a coherent strategy of pushback.

Pushback suggests challenging Iran more forcefully in areas where Tehran is trying to spread or deepen its influence and where US interests are at risk. It envisions more direct involvement by the United States against Iran.

To be clear, it would not mean that the United States would go it alone or escalate to a ground war in the Middle East by sending thousands of US soldiers to do battle with the regionally deployed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces and Shiite militias.

It should, however, go hand in hand with more serious investments in capabilities that allow the US military to operate in grey zones to fight back against Iran's preferred mode of warfare.

Moreover, the United States might loosen its rules of engagement in the Gulf, encouraging American naval vessels not to back down from Iranian provocations, enforcing the law of the sea and freedom of navigation more robustly, and standing their ground when Iranian naval vessels harass them and otherwise act in an unprofessional and dangerous fashion.

Pushback could mean taking more aggressive steps to undermine Iranian allies across the region, such as the al-Assad regime, Hezbollah, and Hamas. It would likely mean finding creative new ways to sanction Iran or impose additional financial costs on it.

Pushback would certainly mean bolstering US regional partners under pressure from Iran, although such assistance should focus on enabling defence reform more than anything else.

This would solidify the United States' relations with regional partners most concerned about Iran and encourage them to offer not only greatly increased cooperation on a range of issues but also more substantial payoffs from those commitments.

Hybrid warfare

Last but not least, pushback would much improve the readiness of the US military with respect to today's and tomorrow's military challenges, which most likely will include a heavy dose of sophisticated hybrid warfare.

This option would give strategic planners and defence policy officials at the Pentagon the opportunity to adjust various US military postures around the world and make them more dynamic, flexible, and capable of effectively addressing the challenges of hybrid warfare.

Of course, pushback is neither cheap nor risk-free. It would entail tens of billions of dollars over several years for asymmetric warfare, covert action, tighter sanctions, expanded military assistance to regional partners, and stabilisation operations.

Such a muscular policy might also provoke Tehran to challenge aspects of it—especially in the early phase of its implementation. This could escalate tensions rather quickly and encourage Iran to dial up its destabilisation campaign and even hurt the United States in places where it has vital interests, such as in Iraq and the Gulf.

But these financial costs and military risks are worth taking because the alternative – allowing Iran to spread its destabilising influence and dominate the region – has been far worse.

Israel's current war on Gaza will eventually end, but as long as Iran is there, providing money, weapons, and training to its proxies, and so long as Washington doesn't have a strategy to counter Iran's method, a more powerful Hamas will rise and a new and perhaps bloodier conflict will ensue.