The US-Iran war could empower the IRGC

US intelligence assessments have reportedly reached similar conclusions, warning that even a large-scale military campaign would not necessarily topple the Islamic Republic because authority is dispersed among multiple centres of power. The key question, therefore, is not simply whether the regime is weakened, but how the balance of power within it will shift as the war unfolds. Here, President Masoud Pezeshkian's position is revealing.

Recent debates inside Iran over the president's diplomatic messaging toward neighbouring states underscore the narrow boundaries of civilian authority during wartime. When Pezeshkian used language that critics interpreted as conciliatory, hardliners in the Majlis (parliament) quickly pushed back, criticising his rhetoric, in part as a reminder that the presidency does not determine Iran's strategic posture, even before any successor to Khamenei had been chosen.

Pezeshkian's prudence

Khamenei's sudden removal from the political system has not elevated the presidency's role. In practice, the influence of the presidential office depends heavily on the personality and political ambitions of its occupant, and Pezeshkian has shown little appetite for challenging other centres of power or for asserting a more independent decision-making role. That restraint may reflect prudence. Any attempt to distance himself too quickly from Khamenei's legacy could provoke a backlash from hardliners who remain deeply loyal to the ideological framework that defined the late leader's rule.

In wartime conditions, the limits of civilian authority have become even clearer. The presidency can influence tone and communication, but decisions about war, deterrence, and retaliation are made by the military and security establishment. This dynamic sharply narrows the political space for diplomacy. Furthermore, officials seen as overly accommodating toward Washington or Israel risk not only political marginalisation but also severe backlash from powerful institutions still invested in a narrative of resistance.

Seen from this perspective, the Revolutionary Guards are well-positioned to gain influence as the conflict continues. The IRGC oversees Iran's missile forces, much of its asymmetric warfare strategy, and ties with Iran's remaining proxy network, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Guards also have vast economic and political clout within Iran, with a presence in construction, energy, telecoms, and finance, effectively creating a parallel system of power.

War tends to amplify such structures. When states are attacked, authority gravitates towards institutions capable of mobilising resources, enforcing discipline, and coordinating a military response. In Iran, that means the IRGC. Even if war further damages Iran's economy and military, the Guards could emerge more powerful. Much will depend on how long the war drags on and the extent to which the United States and Israel remain focused on the IRGC.

Looking ahead, there are several possible scenarios. One could be described as controlled continuity. Khamenei's successor is now appointed, but real decision-making authority increasingly shifts to a security-oriented leadership coalition. Another possibility is a gradual transition toward a more overtly militarised system in which the Revolutionary Guards exercise dominant influence over both national security and economic policy.

Accelerating an existing trend

Such outcomes would represent an acceleration of trends already visible over the past two decades. The Islamic Republic has steadily become less clerical and more security-driven. The IRGC's economic expansion, its growing role in regional policy, and its influence over key state institutions have already reshaped Iran's political landscape. Prolonged war could push that evolution further.

None of this means that the regime is invulnerable. Authoritarian systems often appear stable until elite cohesion begins to fracture. The most dangerous moment for any such system is not external pressure but internal fragmentation among the institutions responsible for maintaining order. In Iran's case, a genuine power vacuum would require splits within the security apparatus itself, particularly among IRGC factions, or between the Guards and other state institutions.

Assuming there are no such fractures, the Islamic Republic is more than able to endure. The regime has spent decades preparing for precisely this kind of moment, with multiple layers of deputies and parallel chains of command designed to keep operations running even if senior leaders are killed. That, combined with layered intelligence networks and pre-designated succession plans for military leadership, all reflect an effort to ensure continuity under attack.

The irony is that the very external military pressure intended to weaken the regime could reinforce its hardest elements. If Iranian leaders conclude that the war is aimed not merely at changing policy but dismantling the state itself, arguments for compromise will become politically toxic. The Guards will argue that Iran faces an existential struggle requiring unity, resistance, and security dominance.

The result may not be the collapse of the Islamic Republic but its transformation into a more militarised version of itself. A weakened Iran could still become a more security-driven Iran—poorer, more isolated, and more dependent on the institutions best equipped to operate under siege.