Ending wars in exchange for minerals: a new US model?
Three decades of fighting in eastern Congo involving Rwanda and others was supposed to have come to an end in June. Is US economic engagement the magic wand its wielder says it is?
Junior KANNAH / AFP
Dela wa Monga, an artisanal miner, holds a cobalt stone at the Shabara artisanal mine near Kolwezi in the Democratic Republic of Congo on October 12, 2022.
Ending wars in exchange for minerals: a new US model?
On 27 June, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, brokered by the United States, with Qatar acting as an observer. They agreed on mutual troop withdrawals, the return of refugees, and the disarmament and integration of armed groups. At the heart of it all are minerals.
US President Donald Trump and his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said they had “put an end to a 30-year war” and opened the path to economic cooperation with the United States as outlined in the Declaration of Principles dated 25 April 2025. To understand this is to understand Trump’s model of ‘transactional diplomacy,’ the aim of which is to secure American interests.
Eastern Congo is rich in mineral resources, but the long-running conflict there has recently escalated dangerously, with armed ethnic groups such as the Tutsi-led M23 and the Hutu-aligned FDLR involved in the fighting, with foreign involvement from Rwanda and Uganda.
Numerous UN resolutions have called for an end to the violence, but to no avail, and international peacekeeping efforts have been ineffective. Peacekeepers have been insufficiently resourced in a country known for its corruption, inefficiency, armed groups, lack of national infrastructure, and widespread human rights abuses.
At the heart of the agreement lies the assumption that the economic benefits for both the DRC and Rwanda, in cooperating with the US, outweigh the incentive to fight
Earlier this year, M23—which is backed by the Rwandan Armed Forces—pushed the Congolese military out of vast areas in the east of the country, seizing control of major territories, including the key administrative centres of Goma and Bukavu.
Formal invite
Peace talks that began in Angola in 2022 and continued in Kenya in 2023 had stalled, with Angola—a key mediator—having withdrawn from the process earlier this year. The baton was passed to Togo, representing the African Union, although few had hopes of progress. A breakthrough came in February, when DRC President Félix Tshisekedi spoke to The New York Times, openly inviting European and American companies to participate in the development of the DRC's mineral resources.
Weeks later, he issued a direct proposal to the US: access to strategic resources in exchange for support against M23 and Rwanda. The US had just struck a deal with Kyiv to help in return for access to Ukraine's minerals. Kinshasa felt something similar could be agreed upon in the DRC. In a White House obsessed with China's near monopoly on rare earths that power the technologies of tomorrow (such as cobalt, lithium, and tantalum), Tshisekedi found a willing partner.
Chinese companies currently control 67.5% of cobalt extraction and 69.3% of copper production in the DRC, most of which is processed in China. The dominant player is Shanghai-based China Molybdenum (CMOC), responsible for 19.3% of Congolese copper and 48.2% of its cobalt output. The US wants to muscle in.
An aerial view reveals the environmental toll of artisanal cobalt and copper mining on May 24, 2025, in Kolwezi, Democratic Republic of Congo.
Investor interest
The June 2025 deal may breathe new life into the 'Lobito Corridor', a large-scale US-led infrastructure initiative that envisions a 1,300km railway linking Angola's Lobito port to mining regions in the DRC and Zambia. The opportunities are well-known, as evidenced by the presence of several of Trump's business associates at the signing ceremony (who, coincidentally, contributed to his election campaign). Gulf states keen to invest in rare earths are also interested in the Congolese market.
The Emir of Qatar has been a key mediator, not least between representatives of M23 and the Congolese government. Formally recognising M23 as a negotiating party helped de-escalate tensions and paved the way for Rwanda's official involvement in the peace process. A senior US presidential advisor for Africa visited Kinshasa in March, and on 19 June, Congolese and Rwandan delegations agreed on the text of a peace treaty in Washington. The treaty was signed a week later.
The agreement establishes a 'joint security coordination mechanism' and commits to the creation of a 'regional economic integration framework' (to be formalised separately). Trump said he believes the signing will grant the US "many rights to develop mineral resources in Congo," but Rubio was more cautious, adding that there was "still much work to be done" by all parties.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio stands with Rwanda's FM Olivier Nduhungirehe and Democratic Republic of Congo's FM Therese Kayikwamba Wagner, after signing a peace agreement in Washington on June 27, 2025.
Reasons for caution
There are sceptics aplenty. This is a complex, internal conflict involving multiple actors and intertwined alliances, and armed clashes continue in parts of eastern Congo, with no sign of stopping. Business activity remains severely constrained in the conflict zone. In its place, a sprawling criminal economy has emerged.
More than 120 illegal armed groups control mining sites, extraction, and the smuggling of minerals. They work with companies in Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC itself. Breaking this entrenched 'conflict economy' ecosystem will be extremely challenging in a region where state institutions have long ceased to function, and where the antagonism between Rwanda and the DRC is likely to persist, despite the agreement having been signed.
To stabilise the situation, and to maintain a level of security needed to preserve a business-friendly environment, will require a security force capable of enforcing, maintaining, or restoring peace and safeguarding the state's institutional framework. Does the Washington Agreement mean that US political will can help shift an ideological and ethnic conflict into an economic framework?
Mutual benefit
At the heart of the agreement lies the assumption that the economic benefits for both the DRC and Rwanda, in cooperating with the US, outweigh the incentive to fight, including through proxies. A clearly defined and well-structured mechanism for agreements, incorporating profit-sharing and a social dimension through anticipated investments, aims to ensure the broadest possible participation of the region's entire population.
Gulf states keen to invest in rare earths are interested in the Congolese market, which could be why Qatar has has played a key mediating role
Trump's 'transactional diplomacy' is resource development that relies on a crucial US export: security. This differs from the Russian model, where military priorities take precedence and subsequent resource development is often only implied. Trump, by contrast, treats resource exploitation as the primary motivator, with military and administrative components serving a supporting role.
This is expected to lead to the creation of a hybrid public-private military-administrative structure that would serve as a security export provider tasked with restoring and maintaining institutional frameworks, operating under clearly defined bilateral agreements outlining its legal status and functions (including arbitration).
How the State Department and the Department of Defence work together in this will be explicitly established in spheres of operation and areas of responsibility. If it works, the implementation of such an agreement could represent a blueprint for developing countries, particularly in Africa.
Back in the 18th century, Madame du Deffand, the famed Parisian hostess, said of a new movement: "Il n'y a que le premier pas qui coûte." It translates, roughly, as 'Only the first step will be difficult.' Kinshasa will hope that this applies to the Washington Agreement of 27 June 2025.
