Disarming Hezbollah: will Lebanon seize or squander its opportunity?

After Israel dealt Iran and its regional axis a string of crippling blows last year, Lebanon now finds itself better-positioned to reclaim its eroded state sovereignty. Will it grab the chance?

Pep Boatella

Disarming Hezbollah: will Lebanon seize or squander its opportunity?

A half-century after the start of a horrific civil war—one that lasted 15 years and paved the way for foreign occupation, armed conflict, and economic collapse— Lebanon has been presented with a rare opportunity to move toward genuine statehood.

Will it be seized or wasted? Although Lebanon's army, government, and people will be vital in determining the answer to this question, the intentions and actions of outsiders will also be critical—namely Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States.

One day after Hamas infamously attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah—acting in its role as the Lebanese arm of Iran—launched its so-called "war of support" against Israel. Daily rocket and drone attacks from across the border left 80,000 Israelis displaced from their homes in the north. Israel responded by razing Lebanese villages seen to be Hezbollah strongholds, causing much of the country's southern population to flee north.

The war stretched for nearly a year until Israel dealt a crippling blow to Hezbollah when it killed its iconic leader Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. Despite the huge losses it sustained, Hezbollah remains armed, and its key ally, Iran, is determined to replenish its arsenal that was either exhausted or destroyed.

The stakeholders' view

Tehran may well recognise that the days of Hezbollah serving as its Lebanon-based deterrent against Israel are over. But it may still see the organisation as an important tool to maintain influence in Lebanon and regain its foothold in Syria. Meanwhile, the US and many of its Arab partners see stopping the vicious cycle of Iranian aggression in the Arab world as an important objective.

Here, Hezbollah is mulling the strategic choice of whether or not to urge its base to view themselves as Lebanese citizens rather than proxies of Iran. There seems to be momentum for the former ever since their false claim to be the "resistance" against Israeli occupation of Lebanese land lost the buy-in of Lebanese society—and even of some of its own base.

IBRAHIM AMRO / AFP
A driver holds up portraits of Hezbollah's slain leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine as people return to Beirut’s southern suburbs on November 27, 2024, after a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect.

While many Lebanese Shiites still see Hezbollah's weapons as a shield against attacks not only from Israel but also jihadist groups in Syria and even other antagonistic Lebanese—and rely on the social services provided by the group in absence of the state—some may yet become convinced that peaceful politics, rather than armed resistance, is the best way forward.

Thus far, Hezbollah has refused to disarm. That means US and Western efforts to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are essential to prepare them in the event that the stand-off ends up in a military confrontation between the two sides.

For its part, post-Assad Syria can, if it wishes, play a significant role in helping Lebanon evolve toward statehood and enable that state to establish a monopoly on weapons of war. While the intentions and capabilities of Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, are not yet clear, his scheduled state visit to Beirut later this month will be telling. There, he is expected to declare his commitment to Lebanon’s independence and Syria’s readiness to demarcate land borders with its neighbour so that jihadists, terrorists, and drug traffickers can be jointly suppressed.

Following Hezbollah's 2023 "war of support for Hamas" against Israel—and after nearly six decades of dealing with armed, non-state actors operating on Lebanese soil—Israel now views Hezbollah's disarmament as non-negotiable. To this end, it plans to continue striking at Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, despite the ceasefire—as well as maintain its occupation of several points in southern Lebanon—until the group either voluntarily lays down its arms or is forcibly stripped of them.

And while the LAF is doing a decent job of securing Lebanon south of the Litani River, Israel could directly coordinate with it to transition the Israeli army out and the Lebanese army in its place. It could also permit LAF military engineers—reinforced, perhaps, by Jordanian military engineer units—to restore vital infrastructure in destroyed Lebanese villages adjoining the Blue Line separating Israel and Lebanon.

Pressure to disarm Hezbollah would be more effective if accompanied by complementary diplomacy in the region. Key stakeholders all have important roles to play.

Additionally, Israel could agree to launch talks with Lebanon under the auspices of the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement—still recognised by Lebanon as valid—with a view to reformulating the armistice to reflect current security challenges. It could also bypass it altogether and opt for a permanent agreement instead—one that could end Lebanon-Israel hostilities once and for all.

Many former Lebanese officials I've spoken with—across the political and sectarian spectrum—have expressed support not only for a permanent end to hostilities, but a scrapping of the law forbidding Lebanese contact with Israel. But they also worry that Israel would see these moves as insufficient in the place of Hezbollah's immediate disarmament and Lebanon's quick accession to the Abraham Accords.

While I understand why Israel wants to see Hezbollah disarmed quickly, it should tread carefully on how to go about it—especially given the fragile state of Lebanon's current politics. It may also come to see that carrots rather than sticks could be a more effective way to get what it wants.

And finally, Saudi Arabia has a key role to play here as well. Indeed, its leaders want the government to move decisively on disarming Hezbollah and implementing key political reforms and have said that reconstruction funds would be withheld if Iran maintains its armed political-military proxy in Lebanon.

Indeed, as a practical matter, no one will invest heavily in Lebanon absent a governmental monopoly on military weaponry and on decisions on war and peace. While President Joseph Aoun and others are trying to make the case to all Lebanese that the state, as it is, will protect them and secure the funds for reconstruction, the truth of the matter is that the state simply doesn't have the funds to do this. Moreover, even if money were to pour in, the government's current sclerotic bureaucracy would be unable to deploy funds effectively.

If it is expected to disarm Hezbollah, then the Lebanese government will certainly need help. To this end, discrete reconstruction projects can be identified and financed, perhaps with funding sometimes going directly to Lebanese engineering firms willing to operate under the state's authority. As noted above, military engineer units from Jordan could be deployed to the south under the operational control of the LAF.

Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Reuters
People visit the site damaged by an Israeli airstrike that killed Lebanon's Hezbollahleader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh, Beirut's southern suburb, on 6 December 2024.

Ultimately, it may require tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars in aid and investment to rebuild Lebanon. Yet, this will require political conditions deemed safe by those providing the capital. Achieving those conditions will, in turn, require targeted funding for projects that highlight both the intentions of the emerging Lebanese state and its ability to deliver results.

Modest levels of Saudi technical assistance and funding can make a significant difference for the better and help grow public support for Hezbollah's disarmament, as well as public confidence in the state's ability to reform and perform competently.

Here, the US has a key role to play in fostering the kind of stability needed to build a modern state at peace with all its neighbours. But pressure to disarm Hezbollah would be more effective if accompanied by complementary diplomacy in the region. Here, key stakeholders all have important roles to play:

For its part, the US should make it explicitly clear to Iran that it will no longer accept interference in Lebanon's internal affairs and also boost security assistance to the LAF.

Syria should work with Lebanon to demarcate and secure its shared border and even coordinate closely with Lebanon toward eventual peace with Israel.

I understand why Israel wants Hezbollah disarmed quickly, but it should do so carefully—especially given the fragile state of Lebanon's current politics

Israel should be encouraged to work with the LAF to end its occupation of Lebanese territory in a way conducive to peace and security for citizens on both sides of the border, ideally in the form of either an armistice or a permanent end of hostilities between the two countries.

Saudi Arabia could play a leading role in funding high-visibility and relatively low-cost reconstruction projects in Lebanon.

And finally, Lebanon must act decisively if Iran elects to continue using Hezbollah as its armed proxy and if the group's leaders prioritise loyalty to Iran over the Lebanese state. Moreover, Lebanese—both officials and citizens—must take greater responsibility for their country's future.

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