The fall of the Syrian regime on 8 December was met with widespread relief—not only among Syrians but also among others in the region who were tired of Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian-backed allies' destabilising activities. Many were hopeful the regime's fall meant that these nefarious activities—especially those linked to Hezbollah's smuggling—would come to an end.
Being aware of these regional hopes and priorities, the transitional authorities in Damascus have repeatedly vowed to sever Hezbollah’s reliance on Syria as a key smuggling corridor. For over a decade, the group has freely moved drugs, money, and weapons through Syrian territory to finance and arm itself. In an effort to translate promises into action, the new authorities have ramped up border security with Lebanon, dismantled drug trafficking infrastructure, and intercepted arms shipments destined for Hezbollah.
While these measures have disrupted Hezbollah’s illicit operations—especially compared to the days of the Syrian regime—completely eradicating smuggling will be hard. Hezbollah’s entrenched networks, the economic drivers of illicit trade, the transitional authorities’ limited security capacity, and the sheer scale of the porous border all make total elimination unlikely. Without a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy, cross-border smuggling—including Hezbollah’s activities—will persist in post-Assad Syria.
Prime target
Given its longstanding alliance with the Assad regime and direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah has become a prime target for Syria’s new leadership. Despite the group’s withdrawal from Syria following al-Assad’s fall, the country’s new authorities have taken a firm stance against Hezbollah and its smuggling operations. Since the regime’s defeat, transitional authorities have reportedly intercepted weapons bound for Hezbollah and arrested individuals involved in arms smuggling.
The frequency of these interceptions—estimated at nearly 20 since December—indicates that, despite al-Assad’s fall and Hezbollah’s reduced influence in Syria, smuggling remains persistent. Similarly, security forces have seized large quantities of narcotics prepared for smuggling and dismantled drug production facilities supplying cross-border operations.
Recognising the limitations of ad-hoc counter-smuggling efforts, security forces have shifted toward a more systematic approach, focusing on Hezbollah’s cross-border access. On 6 February, they launched a large-scale security operation in Qusayr—a strategic Hezbollah stronghold along the porous Syrian-Lebanese border. The operation targeted more than a dozen villages that had remained under Hezbollah’s control even after al-Assad’s fall. These areas are home to Lebanese Shiite clans with longstanding ties to the group.
Syria’s Ministry of Defence stated that the campaign aimed to sever key smuggling routes in this critical region, which—according to the Homs border security chief Major Nadim Madkhana—had served as ‘an economic lifeline for Hezbollah and traffickers of drugs and arms.’ In intense battles lasting several days, security forces uncovered over 15 drug production facilities, stockpiles of illicit materials, and a counterfeit currency printing press producing fake $100 bills.
