Hezbollah and the end of the militia era

The choice is between the logic of the state and the logic of the militia

Hezbollah and the end of the militia era

On 30 September 1989, Lebanon’s warring factions met in the Saudi city of Taif and agreed on the “National Accord Document”. On 22 October of the same year, the Lebanese ratified the document, which, among other provisions, stipulated “the dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the handing over of their weapons to the Lebanese state within six months after the ratification of the National Accord Document”.

On 7 August 2025, nearly 36 years later, the Lebanese government met and approved the termination of all armed presence across Lebanese territory, including that of Hezbollah, and the deployment of the Lebanese army to border areas. The government thereby endorsed part of the plan proposed by United States envoy Tom Barrak.

It took Lebanon 36 years after the end of the civil war to begin implementing one of the clauses of the Taif Agreement, which has since become the country’s constitution. Several other clauses remain postponed, with some not even discussed.

This is not the first time Lebanon has sought a solution to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons or the arms of Palestinian militias inside and outside the camps. Nor is the United States the first to raise the matter of extending state authority across the entire territory. The journey has been long and costly for Lebanon.

Pretexts and excuses

Whenever the weapons question arose, Hezbollah would produce a pretext to justify keeping its arms. These ranged from the fabricated Shebaa Farms claim to the refusal to allow the Lebanese army to deploy along the borders in order to avoid becoming Israel’s border guard, to arguments about the army’s weakness and its inability to protect Lebanon from Israeli aggression. Among these excuses was the infamous phrase “weapons to protect the weapons”, uttered by the late Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah when he declared war on the Lebanese state on 7 May 2008.

The shift is broader than Lebanon itself. The age of militias is over.

What has changed today is not simply an American proposal or a government suddenly brave enough to apply the Constitution. The shift is broader than Lebanon itself. The age of militias is over. It is true that Hezbollah's current leaders, from Secretary-General Naim Qassem to the head of its parliamentary bloc, still issue threats of "death" and refuse to hand over their weapons, which in practice means war.

It is also true that the party's supporters still block roads in protest at the decision to disarm. Yet does any of this change the equation today? Can the narrative of Shiite victimhood still resonate after all that Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement, have done to the Lebanese state and nation, including harm to the Shia community itself?

Part of a regional trend

What happened in Lebanon is an echo of regional events, particularly since 7 October 2023 and the so-called "support war" that shattered the myth of Hezbollah, alongside the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. Even Iraq has begun debating the legalisation of the Popular Mobilisation Forces—a move met with an explicit United States threat should it proceed.

Hezbollah could plunge Lebanon into another civil war, but to what end? Will this help it rearm or restore the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut supply line reopened? Would the captagon trade once again flourish to finance its activities? Would the Americans and Israelis stand idly by? This is a moment for Hezbollah to decide whether, for the first time since its founding, it will be Lebanese in character, or whether it will drag the country into strife and wars. The clock will not turn back. Time now moves to the pace of the region and the world, not merely to Beirut's clock.

The party and its supporters can produce endless justifications for keeping their weapons, the latest being an attempt to link the need for arms to recent events in Syria's Suweida. The same applies to all militias in the region. The choice is between the logic of the state and the logic of the militia. The option that kept Lebanon in limbo for 36 years is no longer available. Whether some insist on it in one place and others reject it in another, they must recognise that once the dominoes begin to fall, they will fall one after another.

font change