In the aftermath of the US attack on Iranian nuclear sites on 22 June, the world will be anxiously watching Iran's next moves. Does it want to get into a protracted war with the United States, affecting its relations with regional countries, many of whom host US bases? Or will it seek to do the opposite: reach a historic deal with the US that will get it out of a war that most analysts would agree has been paused rather than ended?
There can, of course, be middle paths. If anything, the entire history of the Islamic Republic has shown how it can chant Death to America while occasionally collaborating with Americans. Iran may once more find a way out of this bind, avoid a broader war with America and Israel, and continue to survive as an anti-Western state while licking its wounds. But such a double game has become increasingly harder to maintain, especially when faced with an impatient American president, who is now already musing on what he had sworn off before: pursuing regime change.
The policies of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have brought Iran to this precarious moment. The country has found itself attacked by three nuclear-armed countries since last year: Pakistan in 2024 and now Israel and the US. It now suffers from the full brunt of Israeli attacks and a mercurial Donald Trump, who might retaliate harshly should Iran miscalculate its next moves.
Faced with such odds, the Iranian military, financial and political elites are asking themselves if it makes sense to follow the anti-American policies of their Supreme Leader. At 86, Ali Khamenei is at the twilight of his career. Ironically, he has frustrated not just those factions who dream of a day when Iran could have full relations with the US but those who seek a more muscular Iranian policy in the region. He has been ideologically rigid and uncompromising in hostility to the West, yet tactically cautious to the point of cowardice.
As a result, he has lost the respect of all major factions of Iran's ruling establishment. Removing him might prove too much of a shock to the system and its institutions. Many might prefer to simply wait for him to die. But it’s quite possible that he will be sidelined with real power lying elsewhere in the government.
But whoever calls the shots in Tehran, two broad futures could be imagined for Iran after this war. First, it could dig its heels in and continue its rejectionist foreign policy. It could escalate the conflict with the United States, potentially attacking its interests in the region and globally. Such a path would undermine the good relations Iran has established in recent years with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as with countries such as Türkiye and Qatar, which have been close to it for longer.
Rebuilt goodwill at risk
This is no trivial matter. Mending ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi significantly reduced Iran's isolation and could be considered its primary foreign policy win of the past few years. For its part, Saudi Arabia has shown principled leadership by condemning both Israeli and American attacks on Iran, despite the close ties they have with the US. Iran has also been moving toward re-establishing diplomatic ties with Egypt and Bahrain, having already held several meetings at the foreign minister level.
The sight of Abbas Araghchi, Iranian foreign minister, touring Cairo and gushing about how much he loves Egyptian food has now become commonplace. To risk all that rebuilt goodwill in the Arab world by embarking on an incendiary regional war would be foolish.
It would also be a war in which Iran would be sorely alone. Russia and China are unlikely to rush to Iran’s help. Even at the closest moments of their partnership, Russia allowed Israelis to hit Iranian forces in Syria and refused to provide Tehran with the air-defence systems it requested. If China were to fight a global war with the US, it wouldn’t be over Iran —something it didn’t even do over Ukraine. Iran would be strategically alone, fighting a war that would surely also be unpopular at home.
Iran's supporters boast about its ability to sustain itself in long asymmetric battles. However, Iran is no longer the same agile enterprise it once was. Its so-called 'Axis of Resistance' has been badly beaten. The heart of the 'Axis', and its proof of concept, was the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, which was toppled in December of last year.
Israel has helped batter other members of the 'Axis', too. In Iraq, pro-Iranian Shiite militias might help attack the US bases, but they are loath to be seen as getting their country back into the quagmire of a broader war, especially since Iraq is headed for national elections soon.
