Attacks on Iran make a nuclear bomb more likely

Since 13 June, Israel has been carrying out a major military campaign against Iran, with the stated aim of destroying the country’s nuclear programme. Although the United States first distanced itself from the strike, US President Donald Trump later embraced it, posting on social media that he had warned Iran about the consequences of not making a deal. He also claimed that the strike was “excellent” and said it could make it more likely that Tehran accepts an agreement.

It is impossible to predict at this point how the war will evolve, let alone conclude. But chances are good that Israel’s attack on Iran will not have the effect that Trump hopes. Instead, it will make reaching a diplomatic agreement harder and increase the chances that Iran eventually builds a nuclear weapon.

While Iran’s nuclear programme was advanced—and was advancing—there has been no evidence presented so far that Iran was dashing for a bomb. In his speech defending the military campaign, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Iran had recently taken “steps to weaponise” its “enriched uranium.” But he also said that Iran’s timeline to a bomb “could be a year; it could be within a few months.”

Indeed, as recently as March, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon” and said that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003.” Nor had talks between the United States and Iran collapsed, which was the other rumoured red line for an Israeli strike. The next round of the US-Iran meetings was scheduled for Sunday, though Iran cancelled following the Israeli attack.

The extent of damage to Iran’s programme and what this means for its ability to build a bomb are unclear. Iran has two operational, deeply buried enrichment facilities—Natanz and Fordow. Israel struck Natanz, destroying above-ground equipment and reportedly cutting power to the underground cascade halls. Such an abrupt loss of power could have damaged the centrifuges.

Fordow, where Iran has thousands of advanced centrifuges producing near-weapons-grade uranium, is buried even deeper, and thus an even tougher target for the Israeli military. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated on Monday that there was no observed damage at Fordow, suggesting that unless there has been an unreported act of sabotage, the centrifuges underground remain intact and operational.

Read more: Beyond Fordow

We also do not know the status of Iran’s stockpiles of 20% and 60% enriched uranium, which it would need to feed into its centrifuges to produce the weapons-grade uranium for bombs. If that stockpile has been eliminated or is inaccessible, that would pose a significant barrier to Iran’s ability to build a bomb in the near term.

This is especially true given that Israel has reportedly destroyed the facility that Iran would use to produce more gas that can be enriched. Finally, Israel has also assassinated a number of the scientists who would have actually built a nuclear device and destroyed the facilities where that could have taken place.

So, where does this leave Iran? Tehran could swallow its pride and dismantle its enrichment programme before the current conflict escalates and threatens the regime’s survival. There are historical precedents—most notably, the Iran-Iraq War—that occurred when Iranian leaders were under extreme pressure and made major decisions that were once unthinkable. That is certainly the outcome that Trump appears to be hoping for.

But the United States and Israel have given Iran little reason to believe that giving up its enrichment programme will solve its problems. There’s a significant risk that Iran believes that the US efforts to negotiate a deal were simply a ruse—a delaying tactic for Israel to prepare its military attack.

The widespread nature of Israel’s assault, which included attacks against senior Iranian officials and energy infrastructure, may also convince Iran that Israel is targeting the regime itself, not pushing Iran toward a nuclear deal. Indeed, in his address aimed directly at the Iranian people, Netanyahu described the Israeli operation as “clearing the path” for the overthrow of the regime.

If Iran believes that there are no restraints on Israel’s violence, then it has little incentive to make a deal. More fundamentally, however, Israel is not likely to be a party to any nuclear agreement with Iran. As Israel’s rhetoric and actions make clear, its issue isn’t just with the nuclear programme, but also the Islamic Republic itself.

Even if Washington and Tehran can hash out an arrangement, the risk of Israeli military action or sabotage would remain. The fact that this month’s Israeli attack began while talks with the United States were ongoing underscores that risk. That continued threat would make it very hard for Iran to give up what is arguably the last remaining element of its deterrent—its nuclear threshold capability.

Instead, this conflict could well push Iran to rebuild its programme in ways that are harder to monitor, then attempt to build a bomb, either now or in the future. With its proxy forces defanged by Israel, its conventional military capabilities degraded, and its adversaries closing in, Iran may see producing even a rudimentary bomb as the only option that it has left.

Doing so would be consistent with the creeping “militarisation” of Iran’s nuclear programme that has followed in the wake of the October 7, 2023, attacks carried out by Hamas against Israel. As threats to Iran escalated and its traditional tools for defending against those threats weakened, Iran fell back on its nuclear programme for security.

Since 2023, Iran has engaged in new, dual-use weaponisation work. Late last year, it was reportedly exploring faster pathways to a crude nuclear device—perhaps in preparation for a scenario such as the one that it faces today. Iran also tried to publicly leverage threats to use its threshold capability to build a bomb in order to deter Israeli strikes.