Will Iran-Israel strikes derail Trump's Mideast vision?

Looking at Iraq and Afghanistan, Trump in Riyadh last month decried American "experts and interventionists" who aimed to build democratic nations but did not understand the societies of the region or how to build political and economic systems. Trump had emphasised in 2017 that his administration would avoid inflexible liberal ideologies and strive to achieve pragmatic outcomes, guided by experience rather than rigid thinking. In 2025, Trump and Secretary of State Rubio eliminated or reduced the size of large bureaucracies at the former Agency for International Development and the Department of State, as well as consulting companies that worked on institution-building and democracy; thousands of project officials lost their jobs.

Gradual reforms, Trump said in 2017, were better than "radical disruption." Building off this approach, eight years later in 2025, Trump praised Gulf states for following a path for "safe and orderly societies with expanding personal freedoms", and he emphasised that this path came not from American guidance but from decisions made in those Gulf states themselves. The result, Trump stressed, is that the Gulf states have achieved stability, economic growth, and opportunities, making them strong and stable partners for Washington's efforts to ensure security and shared commercial interests.

Realism and Syria

Trump likewise is applying his doctrine of restraint and realism to Syria. First, it is important to note that in June 2017, early in his first administration, Trump shut down the failing CIA programme to send arms to Free Syrian Army groups in Syria. In Idlib and Aleppo provinces, Ahmed al-Sharaa's Nusra Front had already overtaken and, in many instances, subjugated armed rebel groups that the Americans had supported.

The American programme was slow, its Free Syrian Army partners were often more interested in getting rich than in fighting the regime's army, and al-Sharaa and his fighters were more committed to fighting al-Assad and less corrupt. In June 2017, during his first term as president, Trump admitted defeat, and in May 2025, Trump shook al-Sharaa's hand, demonstrating that Trump was willing to look past his affiliation with al-Qaida and "strong past."

Trump did not understand exactly the tactics that enabled al-Sharaa to first beat the CIA-backed groups and later the Assad regime. Trump would argue that Americans could not understand how to win in Syria better than someone like al-Sharaa, who he described as "young and tough". It is worth noting that the American acquiescence to Damascus integrating foreign fighters from the Turkistan Islamic Party into the Syrian Army is a strong indication that, rather than trying to micromanage the Syrian security transition, the Trump administration prefers to let al-Sharaa try to implement a gradual Syrian approach.

Washington's emphasis on stability is evident in the change in tone regarding Syria from Marco Rubio, now the most influential foreign policy official on Trump's team. In his December 2024 confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rubio had suggested that sanctions on the Syrian government could be used to secure US goals for respect of the rights of Kurds and other minorities in Syria. Similarly, during a January 23 telephone conversation, Rubio urged Turkish President Erdogan to encourage al-Sharaa to form an "inclusive" government in Damascus, continuing the Biden administration's policy of securing positions for Syrian women and minorities.

However, Rubio in May justified Trump's decision to grant at least temporary relief from sanctions by emphasising that Syria risked falling into a new civil war and instability. Instead of discussing human and political rights of minorities with Damascus, the Trump administration is emphasising security, such as the expulsion of Palestinian terrorist groups and foreign fighters from Syria, the future of camps holding Islamic State (IS) detainees in eastern Syria and merging the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who led the fight against terrorist group into the new Syrian Army.

When he appointed businessman Thomas Barrack as the US ambassador to Türkiye, Trump said the two countries could work together to "stop radicalism" and secure peace in the Middle East. At the 28 May signing ceremony of an agreement to rebuild Syria's electricity sector, Barrak stated that the multinational deal represented the kind of cooperation and focus on economic growth that Trump wants to see throughout the region. And, of course, the Trump team want Damascus eventually to sign a peace agreement with Israel and join the Abraham Accords as part of their vision of a Middle East that focuses on business deals between existing states.

Realism, restraint and Iran

Trump's emphasis on pragmatism in his Middle East strategy was also evident in his remarks about Iran during his speech in Riyadh on 14 May last month. He highlighted that he has no permanent enemies; Trump is not talking about regime change, unlike many conservatives in the United States. Instead, he said, "We want them to be a successful country".

Trump genuinely wants a negotiated deal with Iran to resolve "profound" differences. However, he emphasised that Iran could never have a nuclear weapon, and Washington would not allow it to threaten it or its allies with terrorism or a nuclear attack. Moreover, Trump has warned that the time to reach an agreement about Iran's nuclear programme is running out.

In his speech, he boasted about US military strength and briefly mentioned that the US was ready to take all action to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, although his preference for restraint was clear. He spoke about using stronger sanctions to drive Iranian oil exports to zero than he did about military action.

At the end of May, he urged Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu not to strike Iranian nuclear facilities while US-Iran talks with Iran were still underway. While Trump and Netanyahu agree that Iran is weaker now than it was a year ago, they do not agree on whether now is the time to resort to military force to stop the Iranian nuclear programme.

This could be why both Trump and Rubio made it a point to publicly distance themselves from Israel's 12 June attack on Iran. Washington took a step back and accepted that Israel would act without an official American blessing, and Rubio emphasised that the US was not involved in the attack. Part of Trump's mentality of America First and realism is that allies—like Israel or Europeans—should take the lead on their own security problems without direct American intervention.

Trump's visit to the Gulf in May should not overshadow his primary focus on trade, the American economy, and competition with China, both commercially and militarily. The last president to focus on a confrontation in Asia was Richard Nixon, during the intense fighting in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam. Elements of Trump's strategy remind of Nixon's policy in the Middle East. Nixon and his key advisor, Henry Kissinger, identified two countries, the Iran of Reza Pahlavi and Saudi Arabia, to lead regional defence efforts.

Sixty years later, Trump emphasised his appreciation for working with Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and his close attention to the concerns of Turkish President Erdogan. For example, he stated that their concerns directly influenced his considerations regarding Syria. Like Nixon, Trump has confirmed that Washington will help defend its allies against aggressors: Nixon was thinking of the Soviet Union, but Trump is thinking about the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Similarly, like Nixon and Kissinger, Trump and his team want countries in the region to assume a greater role in their own defence. More than Nixon and Kissinger, Trump also emphasises the importance of weapons deals and business profits as a key American national interest. Trump's vision is for a Middle East that cooperates pragmatically against outside security threats and internal extremists and, through the expansion of the Abraham Accords, brings Israel into regional security and economic arrangements.

Trump's choice of visiting the Gulf first for his overseas travel fits with this vision. Of course, the Gulf, with its vast resources, differs significantly from other parts of the Middle East. The path to stability and "orderly societies" is not clear in countries like Libya and Yemen, and remains a big challenge in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

In addition, Trump and his team have not identified where the Palestinian people fit into the president's vision. But he will likely listen to leaders from the Gulf and Türkiye as he considers future steps, probably more carefully than he listens to American government analysts whom he disdains and distrusts.