Frederic Hof has played a key role in recent Syrian history, serving as the last Washington diplomat to handle direct mediation between Damascus and Tel Aviv. His experience in Syria, the region, and those talks provides a unique and crucial perspective on the opportunity now before Syria—to rebuild itself and redefine its role in the Middle East.
Hof has spoken to Al Majalla about this moment in history. The scale of the opportunity was highlighted worldwide when US President Donald Trump met Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh.
As Trump announced the lifting of sanctions on the country, with the regime of Bashar al-Assad consigned to the past, a new diplomatic dynamic was in the spotlight: peace in exchange for legitimacy—one of Washington’s central conditions.
Damascus continues to face a series of major challenges in running the country on a day-to-day basis, including rebuilding its economy. There are equally serious problems over security, politics and social issues for a government led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, a group with jihadist roots.
Hof, a former ambassador, spoke about Washington’s move to “open the door” to Syria’s return to international legitimacy, and pointed to the first essential steps: a ceasefire with Israel.
It is a perspective shaped by deep personal experience. Hof reveals some of the behind-the-scenes details which have shaped it, including those from his direct meetings with al-Assad. He points to the agreement he drew up that was on the table in February 2011, before the potential deal collapsed with the outbreak of a civil war that would last fourteen years.
And Hof addresses a pressing question over the future: what will happen now that the door to a new Syria has been unlocked? This is the exclusive conversation, which has been edited for clarity.
Trump’s visit to Riyadh, his meeting with al-Sharaa, and the lifting of US sanctions marked a pivotal shift. You described it as an “open door” for Syria, but the question remains: who, if anyone, will walk through it? Why do you remain sceptical about the lasting impact of Trump’s decision on Syria and the wider region?
I try to temper my scepticism with a bit of optimism. The main development happened late last year with the fall of the Assad regime, a regime that had literally tortured Syria for over half a century. The end of that regime is a good development. But it is still going to be extraordinarily difficult for the new administration in Syria.
For al-Sharaa and his colleagues to really stabilise the country and begin what will have to be a very long process of political and economic reconstruction, the barriers are very, very, very high.
There has been a flurry of diplomacy—from the events in Riyadh to a foreign ministers’ meeting in Türkiye—to what extent has the path to a post-Assad Syria been smoothed? What are the core US conditions for Sharaa?
These are essential steps. At least in principle, they will shorten what will still be a long road for Syria’s full recovery. The US still has some demands on al-Sharaa, ridding Syria of all terrorist elements, including some that still have an affiliation with HTS.
There’s a strong desire on the part of the US government that the new Syrian administration include all Syrians. I would say that what the US is hoping for in Syria is a system based on citizenship, Syrian citizenship.
There are serious obstacles here. In some cases, where do these people go? But this is not the US's problem, it's al-Sharaa's.
There are two particularly politically-sensitive US demands, relating to territory: recognising the Golan Heights as de facto Israeli land; and affirming that the Shebaa Farms belong to Syria, not Lebanon, in a shift that could undermine Hezbollah. You were directly involved in this matter in the Assad era. What did the then-president tell you in those days?
The origin of the Shebaa Farms issue goes back 25 years, when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000. It should have meant the end of the Lebanese resistance, the end of Hezbollah. In a sense, Hezbollah had accomplished its political-military mission. The Israelis were gone. But Hezbollah did not want to give up its resistance status. It did not want to give up its arms.
So, with the help of somebody in the Lebanese army, Hezbollah discovered this issue of the Shebaa farms, where Lebanon, before 1967, had had some discussions with Syria about the sovereignty of this thin strip of land on the Golan.
Those discussions were inconclusive. The land was left under Syrian administration as part of Syria. Israel took the Golan during the 1967 war.
Between the years 1967 and 2000, Lebanon never claimed that its territory was being occupied by Israeli forces in terms of the Shebaa Farms. It was administered as part of the occupied Golan, and even the UN forces would occasionally patrol in the area.
Read more: The winding history of the Lebanese-Syrian border
Fast forward to the year 2011. The last day of February, I had been conducting a very quiet, back-channelled peace mediation between Israel and Syria. I had a meeting, a one-on-one meeting, with al-Assad, a meeting that lasted about 50 minutes.
And this subject came up. I had to ask the president, if you succeed in reaching a peace treaty, and Israeli forces begin to withdraw from the Golan, what do we do about the Shebaa Farms? Because Syria has said verbally that this land is Lebanese. Do we have to involve the Lebanese army in all of this?
And al-Assad said, Mr. Hoff, no, no, there is no role for Lebanon here. This land is Syrian. Once we recover it from Israel, I’m open to the possibility of having some discussions with Lebanon about the issue of sovereignty.
The issues of the Shebaa farm and Hezbollah’s arms are high on a list of factors making Lebanon fragile, including stalled reconstruction, deep economic collapse, and a shaky ceasefire. Do recent regional developments offer Lebanon any realistic hope?
I think developments in Syria overall give Lebanon, and particularly its new administration, a degree of flexibility on these matters that it never had before. For as long as I have been working on these issues—and it has been many, many, many years—the assumption was always that Lebanon cannot take any step at all with respect to Israel without the permission of Syria. Syria's permission was always very hard or impossible to get.
I think now there are persistent reports of Israeli-Syrian discussions taking place, perhaps in the Emirates. It is not clear to me if these are discussions between officials or if this is a so-called track two diplomatic effort between former officials, former military officers, but the fact that this is taking place and is being widely reported, gives a degree of almost unprecedented flexibility for the government of Lebanon to pursue a formal armistice with Israel.
The 1949 armistice is upheld by the Taif Agreement, so Lebanon can perhaps move in that direction. What must happen first is that the terms of the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel must be observed rigorously by both sides.
Lebanon does not have stabilised land or maritime borders. You were the architect of the 2012 maritime demarcation proposal, the so-called “Hof Line”. A decade later, the 2022 agreement was signed, but tensions persist. Could these matters finally be closed? And can Lebanon play a role in a broader regional accord?
When I proposed my compromise, there was strong support from the Lebanese government for implementing it. Unfortunately, a series of events took place that really destabilised the Lebanese government and prevented the prime minister at the time, Najib Mikati, from submitting the compromise to a vote in the cabinet. But there was strong support for it.
I’m happy that with the passage of ten years, an agreement was reached. In some respects, the lines that were agreed to in 2022, from Lebanon’s point of view, are an improvement on the so-called Hoff Line. But on the other hand, ten years were lost. And these were lost years that Lebanon could not afford to lose, given the economic situation.
My hope back in 2012 was that if we had a compromise agreement on the maritime issue, we could then move toward Blue Line disputes between the two countries. That hope, I understand, is now on the verge of being fulfilled.
