Countless unknown factors make it impossible to predict how developments will unfold in post-Bashar al-Assad Syria. With the new government not controlling large swathes of Syrian territory, whether the central authorities in Damascus will eventually rule all the country’s land remains an open question.
An important variable in the equation relates to Syria’s oil and gas reserves and which entity will ultimately take control of these resources and reap the economic and political benefits. Given the external actors with stakes in post-Assad Syria, it is necessary to consider how their interests in relation to the country’s oil and gas resources will factor into the wider geopolitical equation.
Until the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011, the hydrocarbon sector was key to Syria’s economy. That year, 63% of Syria’s oil exports went to Germany and Italy, while almost all the rest went to France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Spain. Oil accounted for a quarter of the country’s GDP. Yet, after the conflict broke out, Western sanctions on Damascus prevented Syria from exporting its hydrocarbons.
Consequently, Syria grew dependent on Iranian oil, which Tehran sent to the conflict-ridden country to help it meet its energy needs. At various stages of the Syrian crisis, different actors have taken control of Syria’s oil and gas reserves.
From 2014-17, the Islamic State (IS) took over most of the country’s oil wells, and while production plummeted during that time, much of that oil was consumed locally, with roughly $2-3 mn sold to the Assad regime, Türkiye, and Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) via black markets. Since 2017, the US-backed YPG-dominated coalition of Kurdish and Arab forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has been governing most of north-eastern Syria, and today, the SDF and the US control roughly 70% of Syria’s oil and gas fields.
The YPG supplied al-Assad’s regime with oil but has not done so for the current authorities in Damascus. Iran, too, stopped exporting oil to Syria since al-Assad fell. While still under Western sanctions, Syria suffers from significant energy shortages that have the potential to severely dim the prospects for stability and a smooth political transition into the post-Ba’athist period.
Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his government seek an arrangement whereby the YPG integrates into the Syrian state. The new government in Damascus firmly opposes any plans that would entail a Kurdish enclave formally separating from Syria or even a federal arrangement in which there is an autonomous Kurdish-majority entity like Iraq’s KRG.
This vested interest in preserving Syria’s territorial integrity stems from many factors, with the Sharaa government’s determination to secure control of Syria’s hydrocarbon resources being an important one. Syria’s rebels-turned-rulers will not accept any armed groups, such as the YPG, operating in the country outside of Damascus’s control, meaning that a refusal on the YPG’s part to align with this vision of a unitary state will invite further conflict between the central authorities and the organisation.
The actions and interests of foreign powers with stakes in Syria’s transition will greatly affect the struggle over the country’s oil and gas fields.
United States
Multiple factors explain why the US has kept its forces on the ground in north-eastern Syria. At least officially, since 2014, Washington has justified this occupation on counter-terrorism grounds. The US has maintained that its presence prevents IS from once again usurping control of Syria’s oil and gas fields. At the same time, another justification used by the US—at least up until late last year—was the perceived need to keep these resources out of al-Assad’s control.
Today, as in previous points, the issue of US and SDF/YPG control over the majority of Syria’s oil and gas fields is a bargaining chip that Washington can use in negotiations with al-Sharaa’s government. The US will use this leverage within the context of political talks between the SDF/YPG and Damascus.
Türkiye
Within two months of al-Assad’s ouster, all indicators are that Türkiye is the “big winner” and Ankara is best positioned to gain from the regime’s fall late last year. The Turkish leadership sees a valuable opportunity to eliminate—or at least severely degrade—the YPG, which Ankara views as merely the PKK’s Syrian offshoot and, thus, an existential threat to the Turkish state.
While intensifying its own direct military intervention against the YPG and supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA), frequently understood as Ankara’s Syrian “proxy”, Türkiye desires a strong unitary Syrian state that is Ankara-oriented. Turkish companies eye lucrative opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction phase. Such plans will be far more realistic if the Damascus government has a revenue stream from Syria’s oil and gas fields to help pay for such redevelopment and the West lifts its crippling sanctions.
These are among the key factors influencing Türkiye’s ability to reap long-term awards from al-Assad’s fall. Therefore, from the standpoint of the US-Türkiye alliance, it is difficult to overstate the importance of how the second Trump administration approaches the YPG/SDF issue, the US military presence in Syria, and the Caesar Act sanctions.
Trump’s administration will be responsible for decisions vis-à-vis the “New Syria” that will have significant implications for Ankara’s geopolitical, security, and economic interests in its southern neighbour amid this delicate political transition to the post-Assad era.
Israel
As a cloud of uncertainty hangs over Syria, Israel is concerned about various developments that Tel Aviv perceives as a threat. At the same time, Israel seeks to opportunistically take advantage of Syria’s transition to further empower Tel Aviv geopolitically in the aftermath of the Iran-led 'Axis of Resistance' recently suffering humiliating setbacks.
Although the new government in Damascus has—at least so far—not been confrontational toward Israel, officials in Tel Aviv have no means of being certain about how Syria may act vis-à-vis Israel in the future.
On 6 January, the Committee for the Evaluation of the Defence Establishment Budget and the Balance of Power released a report warning about how post-Assad Syria backed by Türkiye could threaten Israeli security more than al-Assad’s Syria.
According to the report, “Israel may face a new threat arising in Syria, which, in some respects, could be no less severe than the previous one. This threat could take the form of an extreme Sunni force that would also refuse to recognise the very existence of Israel.”
The committee asserted, “Since the Sunni rebels will wield political power by virtue of their central control in Syria, a greater threat may emerge from them than the Iranian threat, which has been limited due to Israel’s ongoing actions, as well as the restrictions placed on Iran by the sovereign Syrian state.”
The report also warned that this perceived problem might exacerbate if Syria’s Islamist rebels-turned-rulers become Ankara’s “proxy” given “Türkiye’s ambition to restore the Ottoman Empire to its former glory.”
Within this context, Israel seeks a weak and divided Syria, helping to explain Tel Aviv’s interest in Damascus not taking control of north-eastern Syria’s oil and gas fields. Furthermore, based on Israel’s fears of an alleged Turkish threat via Syria, Tel Aviv sees a strong YPG as a bulwark against Ankara.
