Syrian military leader: We decided to overthrow Assad in 2020

In a surprisingly forthright two-part interview with Al Majalla, of which this is Part 1, al-Dalati describes the internal disagreements among the groups comprising the resistance as the process of unifying, streamlining, and professionalising got underway, and leaders' perceived loss of authority led to defections and even detentions.

Interestingly, he sheds light on the military innovations the anti-Assad forces established (such as teams trained to launch night raids) and the makeshift weaponry they created, not least the homemade drones comprised only of commercially available pieces.

He revealed that the four-year planning for the liberation included not just military but manufacturing and governance programmes, with 'ministries' created to familiarise the administrative teams with the methods of running a state the size of Syria. None of this was easy, he explains.

By the end of 2024, he says the resistance was "fully prepared," adding that the Assad regime's actions (and Russian bombing) contributed to their decision to liberate Aleppo, which they did with the use of their Al-Shaheen drones, which proved so pivotal in battle. Once the city was won, al-Assad's army melted away. Hama and Homs followed closely. Within a fortnight, he was gone. 

Years in the planning

Preparation for the operation was "long-term," said al-Dalati. "The revolution, with all that transpired, is part of this process. Anyone who played a role in the revolution is a partner in this operation… which ultimately led to Syria's liberation."

In 2019, al-Assad decided to crush the revolution, he said, "triggering an intense and extensive military campaign led by the regime but bolstered by Iranian militias, the Revolutionary Guard, and Hezbollah, with significant aerial support from Russia". 

So-called "de-escalation agreements" had been agreed a year earlier, in 2018, but al-Assad had other ideas, and his efforts forced yet more Syrians out of their homes, fleeing to the liberated areas in Idlib and its countryside.

Al-Assad's plan was to force a political solution designed to delegitimise the revolution and reclaim routes such as the M-5 and M-4 motorways and Idlib city centre. The remaining population would be confined to a narrow 10km strip along the Turkish border.

His plan included "disarming heavy weaponry, eliminating revolutionary leaders, and negotiating a political settlement… to ensure only a minimal return of displaced people and refugees," said al-Dalati. "Those confined to the strip would face such dire humanitarian conditions that they would accept any resolution".

Although al-Assad's campaign was supposed to be over quickly, al-Dalati said: "We managed to resist and prolong the battle for around 11 months. This imposed a substantial political burden on the regime and its allies." Fighting ended in early March 2020, just as the world was 'locking down' over the Covid pandemic.

A deal…and an opportunity

Türkiye (which was supporting the anti-Assad rebels) and Russia (which was supporting al-Assad) reached a ceasefire. "Lines demarcating zones of influence—including Idlib—were drawn, the very lines from which we launched the liberation operation (in 2024)," explained al-Dalati.

"The situation was profoundly painful; the losses were immense. There was formidable power backing the regime—Russia, Iran, Hezbollah. They had overwhelming superiority in terms of numbers, equipment, and resources." The anti-Assad alliance also "faced our own problems," he said. 

This culminated in a cards-on-the-table meeting to resolve their differences. There was "fragmented decision-making and internal disputes," said al-Dalati. In April 2020, he said, "A strategic decision was made to shift from managing the conflict through isolated cantons, factions, and parties to the establishment of unified institutions." 

The ceasefire agreement between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was pivotal, he said. "Our true moment of victory was at that point, not on 8 December 2024 (when al-Assad fled). This was when the leadership prioritised the country and the revolution over narrow personal agendas."

Overcoming animosity

Implementation was "incredibly complex and costly due to longstanding disputes, particularly between us and HTS, and a history that was difficult to overcome," he said. "However, instead of succumbing to despair after it (the regime's campaign), the immense pain it caused fuelled a remarkable sense of resolve, determination, and hope and inspired a commitment to reinvent ourselves."

He said Syrians were confronting "an overwhelming crisis—waves of despair, massive displacement, and significant territorial losses" to the regime, which had experienced a resurgence, framing events as a major victory. "International politics began shifting in their favour, pushing toward a political settlement and the normalisation of relations" with Arab states, a process that was already underway.

"The regime was reintegrated into the Arab League and other platforms, regaining a degree of international legitimacy," said al-Dalati. "Meanwhile, we faced political and economic isolation. Even humanitarian aid was being cut off. Russia exploited it, blackmailing us to funnel aid exclusively via the regime."

On the strategic decision to rebuild and unify, al-Dalati said this was "a continuation of an earlier initiative launched by HTS" with the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in Idlib. "This effort marked the beginning of a transformation, allowing us to evolve into something entirely new and more structured."

Dividing up responsibilities

From 2017-19, he said the greatest burden fell on HTS as the largest entity because it controlled the land. "The process of delineating authorities and allocating responsibilities to institutions was incredibly complex.

For us in Ahrar al-Sham, the task was perhaps somewhat easier: our role was primarily military. HTS had to manage both civil and military aspects, which significantly increased its responsibilities." He said the establishment of the Al-Fatah al-Mubin Operations Room in 2020 was "a key step, allowing a dedicated focus on military matters". Various factions joined it. 

"The primary objective was to recreate a centralised operations room to coordinate military efforts and unify military decision-making. Security was separated from military operations, and administration was further separated from both. This principle of clear separation of powers and responsibilities was strongly upheld by the SSG."

Disputes and defections

This restructuring caused internal disputes, particularly within HTS and Ahrar al-Sham, he said, and even led to the imprisonment of prominent figures within HTS and some senior defections from Ahrar al-Sham. They "attempted rebellions against the new structure", forming Hurras al-Din and the Fathbutu operations room as a reaction.

The aggrieved were those who "had exercised complete authority for ten years" over military, media, political, and administrative decisions, who were now being confined to just one sphere and having to seek approval from local police stations for their activities. 

"Most of the personnel we introduced into these police stations were defected police officers, who couldn't deal with these people from the factions. For the mujahideen, who saw themselves as liberators, having to answer to these officers was difficult. They were thinking, 'don't you know who you're talking to?' These challenges were immense."

Defections and disputes aside, the Al-Fatah al-Mubin Operations Room was now fully online, implementing "a systematic and scientific program to retrain personnel and leaders militarily," said al-Dalati.

"Additionally, an academic track was introduced with the establishment of the Military Academy. This trained over 500 officers drawn from revolutionary faction leaders who primarily had civilian backgrounds."

Training and manufacturing

While there were already seasoned and effective military leaders with substantial battlefield expertise, this programme sought to combine their practical experience with structured academic knowledge, he explained. "Remarkably, all of this was accomplished using local expertise and training resources. The process was extraordinarily complex, integrating academic principles into military operations."

Most being taught "had a weak cultural and educational background, with many illiterate… It required not only military training but also in mathematics, topography, engineering, and mapping—fields that demand a solid scientific basis. To address this, there was a creative effort to develop practical, hands-on curricula rather than theoretical academic programs. Enormous efforts were made."

The second track was focused on manufacturing, al-Dalati explained. "Given the targeting and the siege we faced, it became clear that no external party would provide us with the military resources we required, so we embarked on a path of self-reliance through military manufacturing. 

"By God's grace, we were able to meet our battle demands using locally produced equipment, even if it did not meet international standards. We manufactured rocket launchers, missiles, and vehicles, all with local expertise, but faced immense challenges, especially in drone manufacturing. We later unveiled the al-Shaheen drones. Engines and parts had to be smuggled in, which was fraught with difficulties. We lost nearly half the materials during transit. The costs were exceptionally high."

Trenches and drones

Alongside the manufacturing track, military training sessions were being conducted "tirelessly", throughout both the day and the night. "We were building fortifications and deploying specialised reinforcements. Before the battle began, 40-50km of tunnels were dug along the frontlines, with extensive trench systems. One was 700m long."

Al-Dalati denied claims that Ukrainian intelligence had helped them make drones. "No one contributed. On the contrary, we were heavily targeted. The materials we use are not 'military grade'. They contain no military components. They are entirely commercial. Even the control, communication, and reception systems were all manufactured locally. Our engineers worked diligently to produce the auto-pilot systems."

They have been producing drones for two years, he said, with the design evolving. "The 'al-Shaheen' name does not refer to a single design but rather to a series of models tailored for various purposes, including reconnaissance, suicide missions, and the Qasef, for bombing. Young engineers from our side in the manufacturing unit were pivotal to these efforts." 

Nucleus of a state

Alongside the military training and manufacturing was "the development of infrastructure for the state in Idlib," he said. "We introduced the concept of ministries. The aim was to immerse workers and employees in a governance framework—complete with ministers—to prepare them for leadership roles." 

It sparked numerous debates over authority, personnel, expertise, and competencies, he explained. "Nevertheless, we created the nuclei of key institutions essential to the state's functionality, particularly in the service sector. These institutions served as a training environment for developing cadres, a platform for attracting talent, and a hands-on exercise in governance."

The training—whether military, manufacturing, or governance—involved "hundreds of camps and thousands of specialised training courses," said al-Dalati, revealing that the onset of war in Ukraine over 1,000km away gave them an opportunity. 

Geopolitics and timing

"It led to the withdrawal of Russian forces, the regime's most critical international ally, which had previously provided substantial military support. We closely monitored their movements. They withdrew from multiple locations, taking aircraft and artillery. They had five squadrons comprising 43 aircraft. Of their 12-13 planes at the airport, most were withdrawn… Ukraine severely drained the Russian military."

Al-Dalati said the second pivotal issue was the Gaza conflict. "This drew Iran… and its militias, including Hezbollah, into direct confrontation with Israel, which weakened the axis (of which al-Assad's Syria was part).

 While all this was going on, al-Dalati said the Syrian regime was "paralysed by four years of stagnation". Though some states tried to rehabilitate it, Damascus did not take the opportunity, preferring instead to continue producing and exporting Captagon and "engineering security and refugee crises to politically blackmail these states". Economically, things were going from bad to worse. 

All the while, "its oppressive grip on society tightened with each passing day," said al-Dalati. "People were being crushed and left deeply resentful. They were increasingly rejecting the regime." 

Israel and Iran

Another nail in the regime's coffin was Iran's Revolutionary Guards' suspicions that Damascus was betraying their coordinates in Syria after a series of intelligence leaks. "Its relationships with allies began to unravel," said al-Dalati. "This trend intensified notably over the past year." 

When the war in Lebanon erupted, al-Dalati said, "We in the Al-Fatah al-Mubin Operations Room had already anticipated this shift… We held meetings to assess the political, military, and security situation on a continuous basis. We were essentially a crisis cell that could convene at any moment, depending on developments."

After Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's assassination, the leadership of Ahrar al-Sham, HTS, and other factions met. "From the outset, we gathered intelligence. Given the regime's fragile structure, we successfully penetrated deep into its inner workings." Al-Dalati also said the resistance kept a close eye on Israel's movements, having assessed its options, preferences, and capabilities. 

"We were fully prepared," he said. "What further bolstered our opportunity was the regime's behaviour in the three months leading up to the battle (when Israel attacked Lebanon). The regime sought to shift blame onto us, escalated tensions in the north, and moved to the frontlines to target our military forces. We implemented precautions to deny them effective military targets, so they shifted their focus to civilian populations." 

Al-Assad blows the whistle

Over 2-3 months, the regime's attacks intensified, said al-Dalati. "They were accompanied by Russian air strikes, displacing over 200,000 from villages along the western line into the Aleppo countryside. The regime began mobilising for a military campaign, activating forces along the frontlines from August to October, redeploying the 25th Division from the desert, where it had been fighting IS."

At the same time, al-Dalati said, Israel was intensifying its actions, advancing towards the south-eastern Syrian city of Quneitra and constructing fortifications. To the resistance, it felt like the time was approaching. Nevertheless, "deciding to launch the battle was an extremely difficult decision," he said. 

"While the opportunity presented was significant, the challenges were equally immense. We lacked political or military support from any state, so we were entirely self-reliant and risked catastrophic humanitarian consequences should our operation fail. Our infrastructure—hospitals, bakeries, camps, shelters—the regime might target them all. Idlib is home to 5.5 million people, including 1.7 million living in 1,300 camps. The stakes were extraordinarily high."

The time is now

Sensing their opportunity, the resistance leaders launched a round of shuttle diplomacy to convince various parties that the time was now and that they were ready. "We had to convince them of our capabilities," al-Dalati explained. "Eventually, we determined that the conditions on the ground and the political climate were suitable to initiate action. 

"We used elite forces such as the Red Banners units, which operate behind enemy lines. We established specialised battalions and specialised weaponry on a significant scale, including sniper systems, direct-support weapons, and other advanced arms. We also introduced an innovative tactic: the formation of specially trained night combat companies for nocturnal operations.

"To be honest, we developed flexible and hybrid strategies that deviated from classical warfare methods. Our primary objective was to avoid direct confrontation with the regime while delivering calculated strikes aimed at causing its collapse." Everything was set. The timing felt right. The fight for Syria was about to begin.

**Al Majalla publishes part 2 of this interview tomorrow**