In seeking to build a new army, Syria’s leader may build a culthttps://en.majalla.com/node/323884/politics/seeking-build-new-army-syria%E2%80%99s-leader-may-build-cult
One of the most important and urgent tasks for Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is to rebuild the nation’s dismembered armed forces. He has already begun drafting fighters from his Idlib-based group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
He will know that the composition of any new Syrian army is hugely important since it demonstrates a significant alignment between the military and al-Sharaa’s governance structure, which is purely Syrian and not imposed by the West (as was the case for many years in Afghanistan and Iraq).
This alignment is manifested in several ways, not least in terms of religious ideology, cultural harmony, loyalty, and professionalism, since the top generals played a role in deposing longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.
For al-Sharaa, who has effectively governed Idlib province in recent years, this is a significant step up as he seeks to build a new and more formal political framework of state institutions based on meritocracy. A new army should, therefore, follow suit.
After 54 years of Assad rule, many Syrians distrust the army and are wary of new figures seeking power
Getting recruitment right
The revolution that toppled al-Assad is still fresh, and to date, there have been no clear signs of merit-based military recruitment that prioritises skill and qualifications over personal connections and political affiliations.
Recruiting the best fighters is not simple, however. The Assad family's brutal five-decade regime endeared a significant lack of trust in the army among many Syrians now understandably wary of new leaders seeking to secure power and resources.
Syria's de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus on December 30, 2024.
Interestingly, al-Sharaa has shunned obligatory conscription, which would have been the quickest way to grow his army. This decision could be interpreted as an effort to create a new army based on genuine volunteers.
The logic here is that soldiers who volunteer to serve in any new post-Assad military will be seen as more legitimate and loyal to the new state and its principles, such as that of promoting national reconciliation. Banning conscription could, therefore, attract the motivated and well-intentioned.
The Syrian Arab Army was established in the aftermath of Syria's independence from France in 1946. Initially, it was a small force, but it grew in size and capability over the years, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, as Syria sought to assert itself in the region. The SAA's history is marked by its confrontations with Israel, particularly during the Arab-Israeli wars. The most significant of these was the 1973 War, where Syrian forces attempted to reclaim the Golan Heights, which Israel had occupied since the 1967 War.
The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, after the brutal crackdown by Bashar al-Assad and his regime on the revolution, marked a critical turning point for the SAA. The army faced severe challenges, including mass desertions, the rise of insurgent groups, and significant losses. By 2013, the SAA was in a state of chaos, with many units rendered non-operational.
In September 2015, Russia intervened militarily in Syria, providing crucial support to the SAA. This intervention marked the beginning of a restructuring and rebuilding phase for the army, with the establishment of new units and continued to rely heavily on Russian support and the involvement of various paramilitary groups.
Islamist-led senior appointments worry many that the new administration could turn into a cult-like political system
Cult-like dynamics
There are difficulties, however, not least around the army's identity. A black and white flag with the Islamic shahada across it that has been used by HTS fighters in military parades in Damascus and by caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Al Bashir in the first meeting of the transitional government is one stark example.
As many have pointed out, the flag is similar in appearance to others used by Sunni radical Islamist groups, including by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2021. This has led to concern among Syrians that their new leaders may be aiming to rebuild the state's institutions with a radical Islamist orientation from the outset.
A drone view of a military parade held by Khaled Brigade, a partof Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) in Damascus.
Fears over Islamist-led senior appointments were further stoked on 30 December when a Reuters report claimed that foreign jihadists from Jordan, Turkey, and China's Xinjiang province had been named as generals in al-Sharaa's new army. It underscored the worry among many that the new administration may come to resemble a cult-like political system, where loyalty to the ideology supersedes loyalty to the state or society. Footage of al-Sharaa acting as a charismatic and inspiring leader does nothing to lessen the effect. Syrians have seen this before.
For many outside the Sunni majority or the armed factions which distance themselves from Islamism, the result of this perception could be the inadvertent creation of an 'us and them' mentality, which could alienate the armed factions and militias affiliated with different political ideologies, like the Kurds. This risks the creation of a parallel power structure.
In an interview with Agence France-Presse in the first week of the new year, Colonel Nassim Abu Arra, spokesman for the Southern Operations Room, which currently controls Daraa province, said that armed factions under the command of Ahmad al-Awda are holding onto their weapons despite the new authorities' decision to dissolve all armed formations.
Abu Ara, who defected from the Syrian army in 2012, said: "We don't buy the idea of disbanding the factions; we have weapons, heavy equipment and full equipment, and I think we should merge as a military body with the Ministry of Defence."
There are ample regional examples of what not to do when rebuilding a national army
Learning from others
There is a lesson here to be drawn from Iraq in 2003 when US-empowered politicians reconstituted the army. They wanted to shed Saddam Hussein's Baathist legacy, so their policies disproportionately and indiscriminately affected Sunni Arab officers and soldiers, even though they were the nucleus of the armed forces for many decades.
This led to a significant loss of institutional military knowledge and expertise within the Iraqi military ranks and, subsequently, a power vacuum that was quickly filled by Shiite political parties, which had been marginalised under Saddam.
They wanted a new political order that excluded Sunni representation, which created a cult-like dynamic. Sunnis decried their marginalisation, while Shiite militias gained power and influence (even before the fight against Islamic State in Mosul), operating semi-autonomously, outside of the official military chain of command.
Another lesson comes from the failure to build a national Afghan army. The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces was formed in 2014 as international forces completed their mission, but it was built on an American and Western military model that did not align with the local Afghan cultural and social context.
The gap between the image of this new Westernised Afghan army and the reality on the ground was huge, nor was the country's rampant corruption factored in. Positions that should have been filled by the best candidate were filled based on patronage. This led to a range of problems and the forces' collapse under attack by the Taliban.
In summary, al-Sharaa need not look far for examples of how not to rebuild a nation's armed forces. He appears to be prioritising soldiers' motivation and loyalty in the recruitment, but the warning signs are already there. The army cannot become a cult within a state if that state is to heal from its wounds.
