Politics

Bamako attacks expose the fragility of AES states

A recent jihadist attack on Mali's capital and a growing threat from northern rebels reportedly getting help from Ukraine begs the question: is the Sahel a new Russia-West battleground?

This video grab shows Malian security personnel detaining a man after Mali's army said a military training camp in the capital, Bamako, was attacked on September 17 2024.

Bamako attacks expose the fragility of AES states

Aman Bezreh

last update on 28 Sep 2024

The recent series of coordinated terrorist attacks in Bamako highlight the growing strength and reach of JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin), the Sahel branch of Al-Qaeda. These attacks—which targeted both the Gendarmerie school and Bamako’s airport—underscore the insurgent group’s ability to strike at critical locations within Mali’s capital, further destabilising an already fragile security situation.

JNIM’s operations have sparked speculation over how militants managed to infiltrate such sensitive areas, with some theories suggesting that militants disguised themselves as cattle traders to bypass checkpoints into the city. In response, Malian authorities closed seven cattle markets in the capital, affecting the livelihoods of many, particularly from the Fulani ethnic group, who are often accused of being JNIM sympathisers.

The timing of the attack was particularly significant, coinciding with high-profile events, including the anniversary of the National Gendarmerie and the anniversary of the signing of the Liptako-Gourma charter on 16 September 2023, during which Bamako was hosting a prominent AES delegation. This charter set the grounds for establishing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—a coalition between Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali aimed at addressing regional security issues with mutual assistance.

While the city was focused on diplomacy, JNIM was executing its strategic assault, catching the government off guard. Despite the severity of the attacks—which reportedly left over 70 dead, many others wounded and damaged several aircraft, including the presidential plane—Mali’s de facto head of state, Assimi Goita, who has led the country since his second coup in 2021, did not directly address the nation. Instead, he chose to host representatives of the AES, raising concerns about his administration’s priorities amidst growing insurgent threats.

AFP — The head of Niger's military government General Abdourahamane Tiani (C), Malian Colonel Assimi Goita (L) and Burkina Faso's Captain Ibrahim Traore (R), sign the AES pact on July 6, 2024, in Niamey.

Tensions in the north

The Bamako attacks also occurred as tensions escalated in northern Mali, where the conflict between the government and northern rebels has reignited and is expected to escalate in the next few days, weeks and months.

Following the joint capture of the rebel stronghold, the town of Kidal, by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Wagner Group in late 2023, northern rebels retreated to remote areas, maintaining some strategic positions along the Algerian border while their leadership dispersed in Mauritania and Algeria.

However, in July this year, in an unexpected turn of events, the rebels—accompanied by FAMa forces—inflicted one of the largest defeats on Wagner at Tinzaouatine in northern Mali on the border with Algeria, reigniting the northern insurgency and bringing the cause of an independent Azawad state back into international focus.

While northern rebels denied formal cooperation with JNIM, the latter claimed its intervention helped secure the Tinzaouatine victory, underscoring the complex alliances between terrorist and rebel groups in Mali’s conflict. Meanwhile, reports of potential cooperation between the rebels and Ukraine have further internationalised the conflict, as the latter claimed to be providing information to the rebels to help them defeat Wagner.

AES fragility

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso was established primarily to combat terrorism and rebel insurgency, but the AES states are failing in their mission. The formation of the AES came in the wake of the withdrawal of foreign forces, primarily the French, at the request of these states and amid escalating tensions between them and the regional bloc, ECOWAS.

Reports of potential cooperation between rebels fighting AES governments and Ukraine have further internationalised the conflict

Instead of effectively targeting extremist groups like JNIM, as they promised, these states have resorted to brutal human rights violations, often targeting the very civilians they claim to protect. Ethnic groups accused of sympathising with JNIM or northern rebels, such as the Arabs, the Tuaregs and the Fulbe, have been particularly affected by this repression.

In Burkina Faso, authorities and military continue to fail to protect their supporters and the paramilitary group, the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), which has also been accused of committing human rights violations against villages and communities suspected of cooperating with JNIM.

By posing as the defender of people against those regimes, JNIM has become the sole defender of marginalised communities in the Sahel region. The group has long exploited local grievances but has now refined its messaging, explicitly targeting these communities for recruitment. It calls on them to join "the jihad", form suicide bomber units, and be ready for escalation, as announced by the group's emir and former rebel leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, in December last year.

The group's promises of swift provision of justice, combined with the dire economic conditions in the Sahel region, likely appeal to those most vulnerable, making them more susceptible to recruitment by JNIM.

JNIM's growing influence is part of a broader trend across the Sahel, where the group is positioning itself as both a military and governing authority and a protector of the populace against the aggression of the AES states. In regions of Mali and Burkina Faso, JNIM has filled governance vacuums by offering essential services, regulating markets, and mediating tribal disputes.

AES presents itself as a champion of pan-Africanism and anti-West powers but is backed by Russia's Wagner Group

Unlike the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP), JNIM's strategy prioritises winning hearts and minds by providing governance—a system and some level of justice in areas abandoned by the state. This approach, aligned with Al-Qaeda's 2013 guidelines to protect civilians, has enabled JNIM to build a robust local support base, particularly among communities targeted by AES forces and Wagner operatives. The group's outreach in local languages and its promise to defend marginalised communities from military and foreign abuses have further broadened its appeal.

By distinguishing itself from the Islamic State (IS)—known for its strict imposition of Sharia law and harsh punitive measures—and by specifically targeting the AES armies and paramilitary groups that mistreat the people, JNIM has established a foothold across the Sahel. This growing influence now poses a significant security challenge not only for Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso but also for neighbouring countries like Togo and Benin.

Foreign mercenaries

For their part, the AES leaders present themselves as champions of pan-Africanism and anti-West powers, but the reality tells a different story. These regimes have solicited external actors like Russia's Wagner Group and, according to rumours, Syrian fighters deployed by SADAT PMC in Niger, undermining their anti-colonial stance and highlighting their dependence on foreign mercenaries.

The failure of the AES states extends beyond security; these regimes cling to power without providing genuine solutions or restoring democratic order. Their inability to tackle extremist violence—coupled with their reluctance to hold democratic elections—highlights the hollowness of their promises of peace and regional leadership to their supporters.

This video grab obtained by AFPTV from Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision du Mali (ORTM) on September 17, 2024, shows Mali's army chief of staff, Oumar Diarra (C), speaking to the media in Bamako.

Amid grand rhetoric of pan-Africanism and anti-Western posturing and the promise of a better Sahel following the withdrawal of French and European forces, authorities in Mali and Burkina Faso demonstrate daily their inability to address the escalating security threats posed by JNIM and other terrorist groups or to unify their populations. Their reliance on foreign mercenaries, brutal repression of civilians, and failure to secure key regions highlight a deepening instability that threatens to affect all of West Africa.

As for JNIM, the group will continue to exploit grievances and fill governance and security vacuums, positioning itself as a de facto replacement for these governments in remote and isolated areas, potentially becoming one of the most accepted extremist groups among marginalised communities.

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