Could China gatecrash the US-Gulf AI wedding?

America offers the technology and the know-how, while the Gulf brings the capital and the energy, but are the Gulf states putting all their AI eggs in the US basket?

Jason Lyon

Could China gatecrash the US-Gulf AI wedding?

US President Donald Trump’s visit to the Gulf in May and the vast, trillion-dollar deals agreed there marked a defining moment in the global AI (Artificial Intelligence) race, because it officially married American technology with Gulf money and energy. This suits both parties. The United States wants to extend its tech supremacy, while the Gulf wants to become a global AI hub.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump and US tech leaders announced a new Saudi-backed AI infrastructure start-up—Humain—to house 18,000 cutting-edge Nvidia chips for a 500 Megawatt (MW) data centre, while the United Arab Emirates won the right to import up to a million US-made AI chips. In Abu Dhabi, a new 5 Gigawatt (GW) UAE-US ‘Stargate AI Campus’ is planned, among the largest outside the United States.

The staggering numbers reveal the new mathematics of AI geopolitics, and strategic logic is compelling for both sides: the Gulf offers patient capital, low-cost energy, and a geographically convenient location between Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ total wealth is expected to rise from $2.7tn to $3.5tn by 2026, so the region’s financial resources dwarf most national budgets, yet it also offers abundant, reliable energy to meet AI computing power demands.

In return, the Gulf gets cutting-edge chips, advanced AI models, and the computational infrastructure to compete in the AI era. America is still home to the most advanced chip architectures, the most sophisticated AI training methodologies, and the largest concentrations of AI talent, so the partnership is a natural alliance of complementary strengths in an era where AI development requires massive transnational resources.

While focus has been on US-Gulf AI partnerships, Gulf states don't rule out other options, such as China, pursuing what some call 'technological hedging'

Energy calculus

As a technology, AI has an insatiable appetite. Energy costs in the United States are higher than in countries such as China, which boasts lower electricity costs and an advanced renewables sector, so with energy prices around $0.03 per kWh in some areas, the Gulf is ideal for energy-intensive AI data centres, which could consume up to 12% of US electricity by 2028 if built domestically.

The planned gigawatt-scale facilities in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with their energy advantages, are powerful incentives for American AI companies to set up in the Gulf, where the UAE has appointed the world's first Minister of AI. Google Cloud and the Saudi sovereign wealth fund PIF are investing $10bn to jointly build and operate an AI hub in Saudi Arabia, while Amazon's AWS and Humain announced a joint $5bn investment to build an 'AI Zone' in the Kingdom to develop advanced AI services.

These reflect strategic responses to the energy economics of AI development, and given that China dominates the supply chain for the green energy revolution, it has significant leverage in the global energy transition that underpins AI development. For now, however, the Gulf's fossil fuels give it an immediate energy advantage.

Chinese alternative

While the headlines have focused on US-Gulf AI partnerships, the Gulf states are not blind to other options, such as China, pursuing what some call 'technological hedging'. While the US dominates in computational capability and chip design, China provides open-source low-cost AI alternatives and renewable energy solutions. Although China may not make the most cutting-edge chips, it has developed critical alternative capabilities, and its AI models are closing the gap with their American peers.

Their dramatically lower costs and the open-source approach China takes offer technological sovereignty that proprietary US systems cannot match. Chief among the riders here is DeepSeek, a Chinese AI start-up which stunned the tech world in January with its V3 model, trained for $6mn (about 6% of the costs of training ChatGPT4), while using only around 10% of the computing power used by Meta's Llama 3.1 model.

Reuters

Most American AI models use proprietary data sets and algorithms, but DeepSeek is open source, meaning that anyone can download it, copy it, and build upon it. This open-source philosophy aligns perfectly with Gulf aspirations for technological sovereignty. Chinese AI companies—from tech giants like Baidu, to startups such as ManusAI—are increasingly adopting open-source licensing models, mirroring Google's Android and the open-source approach it took that transformed mobile development into a global innovation ecosystem.

Building an ecosystem

For Gulf developers seeking to build indigenous AI capabilities without massive computational requirements, credible Chinese models offer them leverage and bargaining power in discussions about technology transfer, pricing, and strategic commitments by US companies. This is about hedging against dependence on US technology, so that it does not become a strategic vulnerability for the Gulf.

Indigenous capabilities are being created and used, including the UAE's Falcon large language model (LLM) and ASK71 platform (which generates insights and automates workflows) have been adopted across government ministries to streamline public services.

DeepSeek is already operating through Saudi Arabia's Aramco Digital data-centres in Dammam, an arrangement carefully structured to avoid direct confrontation with American interests. Its data localisation strategy addresses sovereignty concerns while providing Gulf states with access to Chinese AI capabilities that complement (rather than displace) the US partnerships.

Of interest has been the deployment's timing and methodology, since it potentially offers DeepSeek access to advanced AI infrastructure that may contain restricted chips through rental arrangements, rather than direct ownership. It also gives the Gulf states options should the US weaponise its AI exports, such as when it limited Chinese access to advanced US chips. To borrow an analogy, it avoids all the Gulf's AI eggs being in just one basket.

While the US dominates in computational capability and chip design, China provides open-source low-cost AI alternatives and renewable energy solutions

Avoiding dependence

For Gulf states, export controls create both opportunities and constraints. On one hand, limited Chinese access to US chips increases the value of Gulf partnerships with US firms. On the other hand, export controls create risks for Gulf hedging strategies. If US firms face restrictions on deploying advanced systems in countries that also maintain Chinese partnerships, Gulf states could be forced to choose.

Can Gulf states have tech relationships with both American and Chinese entities without triggering export control restrictions that would force binary choices? That remains to be seen. It will require careful management of operational partnerships, investment flows, and technology deployment to avoid a reactionary response from an 'America First' White House that is nevertheless seeking to cooperate with partners.

In the short term, US policymakers worry that China will get access to advanced US-made AI chips through the Gulf. Longer term, Washington worries that US firms will increasingly move wholesale to the Gulf, including with jobs and the giant data centres currently being built in the US. Just as the Trump administration works to bring industrial manufacturing home, America's AI infrastructure risks being offshored.

Energy is America's AI Achilles' heel. Republicans are ending subsidies for renewables, making the US less energy competitive, causing it to slide further down the leader board when it comes to the energy transition—something that is inextricably linked to the AI revolution. Control over AI and energy infrastructure increasingly determines economic prosperity, technological leadership, and ultimately geopolitical power. The Gulf's model shows that the future belongs not to individual superpowers but to strategic alliances that combine complementary strengths across multiple domains.

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