Eye on Niger: Who will win in a multipolar contest for Africa influence?

Meanwhile, the new leader in Niger, General Tchiani took further steps to cement his power, replacing the cabinet of the ousted president with a new government led by Ali Lamine Zeine — an economist and former finance minister.

Now the only hope for the coup to be reversed is either domestic rebellion or divisions within the army. Both of which open the door to the possibility of a civil war in an already highly unstable region.

What makes this coup different than others in the Sahel?

The coup in Niger is the latest in a series of coups (Mali twice, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Chad) that have taken place in the Sahel region — the poorest in Africa where terrorism is rampant — since 2020.

Like Mali, Guinea, Chad and Burkina Faso, the combination of poverty and terrorism has created a security dilemma that the civilian governments are finding difficulty in addressing.

Read more: Africa's string of coups points to waning Western influence

While the coup in Niger shares a number of features with the other countries in the Sahel region that have experienced military coups d'etats, it is different in certain important aspects, rendering it more strategically significant.

First, Niger is a critical node in the counter-terrorism operations of both the United States and France. The US stations 1,100 military personnel and has a drone base there, and France stations 1,500 soldiers in two bases.

In fact, after the military takeovers in Mali, Niger has become the only country in the Sahel region — which connects North Africa to the rest of the continent — that cooperates with both the US and France in counter-terrorism operations.

Read more: US counter-terrorism efforts increasingly focusing on Africa

Second, it is one of the major gateways into Libya for African migrants on their way to Europe, and, therefore, is of critical importance to the EU in its efforts to deal with the problem of illegal immigration. Interestingly, the route the migrants take goes through the town of Agadze, which is in close proximity to the United States drone base.

Third, Niger is the world's seventh largest producer of Uranium, but probably more important is that France receives 20% of its supply of the mineral from Niger. It is, therefore, critically important for France.

But ironically, France's margin of manoeuvre has been greatly diminished over the past years, and now even more so after the coup. The latest development in Niger has reignited anti-French sentiments that have existed since independence.

The colonial legacy of France — particularly when it comes to governance — is rather dismal. According to an analysis by the BBC, of the 27 coups in Africa (excluding North Africa) since 1990, 78% have occurred in Francophone states.

Fourth, it lies on the route of the projected pipeline that is designed to transport Nigerian gas to Europe via Algeria — a project that has gained increased importance for Europe in its quest to secure alternative sources of Russian gas.

Read more: Not just a 'pipe' dream, Morocco-Nigeria gas line set to transform Africa

Fifth, while there are no indications that outside powers have played a role in the coup, Niger can become an arena for competition between the West and Russia in Africa.

The military regimes in Burkina Faso and Mali have gravitated towards Moscow and are using the Wagner group as a substitute for France and United Nations to enhance their counter-terrorism efforts.

Sixth, the military regime in Niamey is not isolated. It has received the support of both Mali and Burkina Faso. Both countries put out a joint statement warning against an ECOWAS intervention, saying it was tantamount to a declaration of war, indicating that they would come to its defence if a foreign military intervention were to materialise.

Read more: Niger coup deepens divisions in West Africa economic bloc

Seventh, the coup has taken place during a period when China and Russia are now narrowly ahead of the United States in their popularity among developing countries, including a vast span of countries stretching from continental Eurasia to the north and west of Africa.

Moscow and Beijing are quite comfortable dealing with military-led regimes, whereas Washington prefers to deal with democratic governments.

Read more: US-China competition in Africa heats up with Beijing in the lead

This is the scenario put forward by President Barzoum in his article published in the Washington Post on 3 August, where he casts the coup as a struggle between Russia and the West raising the spectre of " the entire central Sahel region could fall to Russian influence via the Wagner Group...".

Finally and probably even more important, the coup in Niger could mark a tipping point in creating a critical mass for military-led regimes in Africa that can act as a counterweight to civilian governments, and thereby undermine the consensus achieved at the AU rejecting military takeovers on the continent.

Winners and losers

Although the situation in Niger remains unpredictable, it appears there are already some losers. As for the winners, it is still too early to tell. At this early stage, the main losers are France, Nigeria and ECOWAS — and possibly the United States.

The recent developments have proven that there is not much France can do that will not be negatively perceived by many — if not most— Sahelians.

On his part, Nigerian President Tinubu's political weakness has been exposed.

First, as President of ECOWAS, he pushed the organisation, in what appears to be a hasty manner, to threaten military intervention. The deadline designated by ECOWAS came and went without any action thereby undermining not only the organisation's credibility but also that of President Tinubu.

What further undermined the credibility of the Nigerian president is that his country's senate refused to sanction the threatened military intervention.

President Tinubu's margin of manoeuvrability is further restricted by the fact that there are strong ethnic links between Niger and the Muslim majority in Nigeria that live in the regions on the common border — particularly the influential Hausa and Fulani tribes. This was clearly manifested when President Tinubu resorted to a religious figure from northern Nigeria, the emir of Kano, to act as an emissary to General Tchiani.

As for ECOWAS, already three of its members are sanctioned: Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. Moreover, the organisation has a rather weak record when it comes to military interventions. The only intervention that it managed successfully was in Gambia in 2017.

But Gambia is a special case. It has only one neighbour, Senegal, which surrounds it from three sides. It is a small country with extremely limited military capability. Moreover, it was about a president refusing to accept defeat in elections.

ECOWAS's failure to effect any change will be a blow to its influence. There will be important ramifications in terms of ECOWAS's relations with Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, which the organisation has been able to push to accept "transition timetables" for holding elections to restore civilian rule.

The US, while suspending its military aid programme in Niger, has refrained from describing the development in Niamey as a coup and has dispatched the second most senior State Department official, Victoria Nuland to explore the possibility of restoring President Barzoum.

Meanwhile, Washington continues to maintain its drone base and has not withdrawn its military personnel. Contrary to the measures the military-led government has taken towards France, it has received the US official although no audience with the General Tchiani was granted.

Looming questions

Against this fluid and unpredictable situation, there are a number of questions that deserve attention:

1) Are we approaching a critical mass in the number of military governments in Africa that can form a front to blunt any action by African regional or sub-regional organisations?

2) Is there a serious risk of confrontation between military regimes and the civilian governments that rule neighbouring countries with its attendant implications for regional security and stability

3) Will terrorism continue to spread beyond the Sahel region, undermining the credibility of civilian governments and creating conditions for the militaries to take over?

4) Will the recent developments add another dimension to the ongoing competition between the West on the one side and China and Russia on the other, with the West taking action to reverse military takeovers and China and Russia offering assistance to military-led governments when they take power?

How to avoid military intervention

While one cannot completely discount a military intervention by ECOWAS, the possibility is receding. At this stage, the most urgent objective is to avoid military intervention. It is, therefore, necessary to work toward a negotiated settlement that restores civilian rule and, at the same time, effectively deals with the concerns of Nigeriens on counter-terrorism and economic development.

This is a delicate process that will take time and needs to take into account the rising nationalistic fervour in Niger. What is required is an African-led effort, with the active support of the United States and the passive support — or at least the acquiescence — of both Russia and China.

The alternative would be detrimental to peace and stability not only in Niger but the entire Sahel region with continental implications.

In conclusion, unless the West can rapidly prove that it is better equipped and more efficient in helping African countries address the economic and security challenges they face, the governance models represented by China or Russia will continue to gain more appeal.