The pager attacks against Hezbollah personnel in Lebanon have been extraordinary in scope and impact. Never in the history of Hezbollah has the group been subjected to a security breach of this magnitude. But the attacks have not only dealt a painful blow to Hezbollah. They also instilled panic within Iran’s network of proxies in the Middle East. Their reactions following the attacks highlight an emerging awareness of their exposure to risks.
With the attacks having taken place just as the first anniversary of Hamas’s 7 October assault on Israel looms, Iran-backed groups are now forced to prioritise self-preservation over a flagrant display of power in support of Hamas under Iran’s umbrella.
Inward shift
It is plausible that Iran-backed groups were planning a symbolic display of solidarity with Hamas to commemorate the passing of one year since its unprecedented attack on Israel. But after the disarray caused by the communication device attacks, those groups are shifting their resources inwards instead. They reason that if Hezbollah—the crown jewel of Iran's "axis of resistance"—could be infiltrated and exposed, then other entities in Iran’s network which are not as strong as Hezbollah could be even more vulnerable. This has led to growing panic among the groups regarding their own security and standing.
Yemen’s Houthis and Iraq’s Asa’b Ahl Al-Haq were some of the first groups to react by issuing public statements in support of Hezbollah after the pager attack. But the projection of solidarity masks concerns about whether Israel could be planning to widen the scope of its targets and whether Iran-backed groups could be carrying devices that turn out to be dormant killing machines.
After the second attack in Lebanon in which wireless radios exploded, the Syrian state issued an emergency order to its armed forces and security services to dispose of such devices in their possession.
The pager attack also sparked panic about potential security breaches in Iraq, especially since the US had—during the time of its occupation of Iraq—used mobile phones to track and target the leaders of Iran-backed groups like Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, Jaysh Al-Mahdi, and Kataeb Hezbollah. After the second attack in Lebanon, rumours began to circulate about devices exploding in the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) headquarters in Mosul.
Though proven false, the rumours came at a time of severe divisions within Iraq’s political milieu. Trust among Iraqi Shiite actors was already eroded after the discovery of an Iran-backed spy network operating within the Iraqi prime minister’s office in Baghdad and targeting politicians who Iran’s Iraqi allies consider to be opponents or competitors. What happened in Lebanon only adds to the prevailing mistrust. A similar concern about compromised security and moles is shared across Iran’s other proxies in the region.
Paranoia sets in
In addition to the security concerns, paranoia could affect the ability of these groups to communicate with one another, let alone trust one another. Iran’s proxies have never operated as part of one theatre of war despite their and Iran’s claims of constituting a formidable bloc against Israel and the US.
But the groups do support one another tactically. Some of the groups within the PMF have facilitated Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s access to Iranian funding, with Iraqi members frequently showing up in Beirut carrying suitcases of cash sent by Tehran.
They have also sometimes helped Hezbollah acquire equipment by being part of the global supply chain of entities involved in the purchase and transport of goods. It is likely that members of Iran-backed groups other than Hezbollah played a role in purchasing the exploding communication devices as part of Hezbollah’s attempt to cover up its tracks. The attacks in Lebanon cast doubt on the integrity of inter-group cooperation.
